网络威慑与网络战争：美国的挑战与策略

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"CYBERDETERRENCE AND CYBERWAR" 是一本由MARTIN C. LIBICKI编写的关于网络安全和网络战的书籍，兰德公司（RAND Corporation）的报告，探讨了美国如何在网络战争中取得胜利。这本书的中译本名为《兰德报告-美国如何打赢网络战争》，于2013年8月由东方出版社出版。该资源提供了英文PDF版本，共240页。书中详细阐述了以下几个关键知识点： 1. **网络空间机制**：作者分析了网络空间的工作原理，以及如何通过这个机制进行攻击和防御。 2. **网络威慑**：定义了网络威慑的概念，并讨论了如何构建有效的网络威慑策略，包括了解攻击者身份、具备反击能力、防止冲突升级、以及确保报复的可信度。 3. **网络攻击的目的**：区分了错误、施压、武力和其他动机下的网络攻击，并探讨了这些动机对威慑策略的影响。 4. **反应策略**：研究了如何应对网络攻击，包括是否公开攻击事件、何时公布攻击源、报复的可见性、以及对不同类型的网络犯罪进行报复的策略。 5. **战略网络战**：探讨了网络战的目标、合理性、局限性和管理问题，提出了以战防战和保留二次攻击能力的概念。 6. **战术网络战**：分析了网络战作为先发制人手段、打击网络中心节点、以及在实际冲突中的应用。 7. **网络防御**：详述了网络防御的目标、政策、策略和操作层面的措施，强调了架构设计的重要性。 8. **复杂性分析**：认识到网络战争的复杂性，可能涉及多方面的挑战，包括法律、伦理和技术难题。 9. **附录**：提供了网络空间战争行为的构成分析、明示型和默示型威慑的对比，以及对网络军备控制前景的悲观展望。本书对于理解网络威慑和网络战争的战略和战术具有重要价值，对于政策制定者、军事专家和网络安全专业人士来说，是一份深入研究网络安全问题的重要参考资料。

xiv Cyberdeterrence and Cyberwar

Yet system vulnerabilities do not result from immutable physi-

cal laws. ey occur because of a gap between theory and practice. In

theory, a system should do only what its designers and operators want it

to. In practice, it does exactly what its code (and settings) tells it to. e

dierence exists because systems are complex and growing more so.

In all this lies a saving grace. Errors can be corrected, especially

if cyberattacks expose vulnerabilities that need attention. e degree

to which and the terms by which computer networks can be accessed

from the outside (where almost all adversaries are) can also be spec-

ied. ere is, in the end, no forced entry in cyberspace. Whoever

gets in enters through pathways produced by the system itself.

It is

only a modest exaggeration to say that organizations are vulnerable to

cyberattack only to the extent they want to be. In no other domain of

warfare can such a statement be made.

Operational Cyberwar Has an Important Niche Role, but

Only That

For operational cyberwar—acting against military targets during

a war—to work, its targets have to be accessible and have vulnerabili-

ties. ese vulnerabilities have to be exploited in ways the attacker nds

useful. It also helps if eects can be monitored.

Certainty in predicting the eects of cyberattacks is undermined

by the same complexity that makes cyberattacks possible in the rst

place. Investigation may reveal that a particular system has a particu-

lar vulnerability. Predicting what an attack can do requires knowing

how the system and its operators will respond to signs of dysfunction

and knowing the behavior of processes and systems associated with the

system being attacked. Even then, cyberwar operations neither directly

harm individuals nor destroy equipment (albeit with some exceptions).

At best, these operations can confuse and frustrate operators of mili-

Distributed denial-of-service attacks, the sort perpetrated against Estonia in 2007, are a

partial exception. ey clog the entryways to the system, rather than get into it. However,

such attacks are, at worst, a minor nuisance to organizations (e.g., the military, electric power

producers) that can run without interacting with the public at large.

Summary xv

tary systems, and then only temporarily. us, cyberwar can only be a

support function for other elements of warfare, for instance, in disarm-

ing the enemy.

e salient characteristics of cyberattacks—temporary eects and

the way attacks impel countermeasures—suggest that they be used

sparingly and precisely. ey are better suited to one-shot strikes (e.g.,

to silence a surface-to-air missile system and allow aircraft to destroy

a nuclear facility under construction) than to long campaigns (e.g., to

put constant pressure on a nation’s capital). Attempting a cyberattack

in the hopes that success will facilitate a combat operation may be pru-

dent; betting the operation’s success on a particular set of results may

not be.

Strategic Cyberwar Is Unlikely to Be Decisive

No one knows how destructive any one strategic cyberwar attack

would be. Estimates of the damage from today’s cyberattacks within

the United States range from hundreds of billions of dollars to just a

few billion dollars per year.

e higher dollar gures suggest that cyberattacks on enemy civil-

ian infrastructures—strategic cyberwar—may be rationalized as a way

to assist military eorts or as a way to coerce the other side to yield to

prevent further suering. But can strategic cyberwar induce political

compliance the way, say, strategic airpower would? Airpower tends to

succeed when societies are convinced that matters will only get worse.

With cyberattacks, the opposite is more likely. As systems are attacked,

vulnerabilities are revealed and repaired or routed around. As systems

become more hardened, societies become less vulnerable and are likely

to become more, rather than less, resistant to further coercion.

ose who would attempt strategic cyberwar also have to worry

about escalation to violence, even strategic violence. War termination

is also not trivial: With attribution so dicult and with capable third

parties abounding (see below), will it be clear when one side has stopped

attacking another?

xvi Cyberdeterrence and Cyberwar

Cyberdeterrence May Not Work as Well as Nuclear Deterrence

e ambiguities of cyberdeterrence contrast starkly with the clarities

of nuclear deterrence. In the Cold War nuclear realm, attribution of

attack was not a problem; the prospect of battle damage was clear; the

1,000th bomb could be as powerful as the rst; counterforce was pos-

sible; there were no third parties to worry about; private rms were

not expected to defend themselves; any hostile nuclear use crossed an

acknowledged threshold; no higher levels of war existed; and both sides

always had a lot to lose. Although the threat of retaliation may dissuade

cyberattackers, the diculties and risks suggest the perils of making

threats to respond, at least in kind. Indeed, an explicit deterrence pos-

ture that encounters a cyberattack with obvious eect but nonobvious

source creates a painful dilemma: respond and maybe get it wrong, or

refrain and see other deterrence postures lose credibility.

e case for cyberdeterrence generally rests on the assumption

that cyberattacks are cheap and that cyberdefense is expensive. If cyber-

attacks can be conducted with impunity, the attacker

has little reason

to stop. Besides, nuclear deterrence prevented the outbreak of nuclear

conict during the Cold War. What is there about cyberspace that

would prevent a similar posture from working similarly well? Plenty, as

it turns out. Questions that simply do not crop up with nuclear or even

conventional deterrence matter in cyberspace whenever the target of an

attack (the “we”) contemplates retaliation.

Will we know who did it? Cyberattacks can be launched from

literally anywhere, including cybercafés, open Wi-Fi nodes, and sub-

orned third-party computers. ey do not require expensive or rare

machinery. ey leave next to no unique physical trace. us, attribu-

tion is often guesswork. True, ironclad attribution is not necessary for

deterrence as long as attackers can be persuaded that their actions may

provoke retaliation. Yet some proof may be necessary given (1) that

the attacker may believe it can shake the retaliator’s belief that it got

attribution right by doing nothing dierent (“who, me?”) in response

to retaliation, (2) that mistaken attribution makes new enemies, and

(3) that neutral observers may need to be convinced that retaliation is

not aggression.

Summary xvii

Can retaliators hold assets at risk? It is possible to understand

the target’s architecture and test attack software in vivo and still not

know how the target will respond under attack. Systems vary by the

microsecond. Undiscovered system processes may detect and override

errant operations or alert human operators. How long a system mal-

functions (and thus how costly the attack is) will depend on how well

its administrators understand what went wrong and can respond to the

problem. Furthermore, there is no guarantee that attackers in cyber-

space will have assets that can be put at risk through cyberspace.

Can they do so repeatedly? It is dicult to imagine an act of

cyberretaliation that is prospectively so awesome that no potential

attacker would run the risk of being hit (a crucial feature of nuclear

retaliation). Repeated application may be necessary but is not neces-

sarily possible. Even successful retaliation may not be convincing if the

attacker tells itself it will be less vulnerable the next time around.

Can cyberattacks disarm cyberattackers? In a world of cheap

computing, ubiquitous networking, and hackers who could be any-

where, the answer is no.

Will third parties stay out of the way? Cyberattack tools are

widely available. If nonstate actors jump into such confrontations, they

could complicate attribution or determining whether retaliation made

the original attackers back o.

Might retaliation send the wrong message? Most of the criti-

cal U.S. infrastructure is private. An explicit deterrence policy may

frame cyberattacks as acts of war, which would indemnify infrastruc-

ture owners from third-party liability, thereby reducing their incentive

to invest in cybersecurity.

Can states set thresholds for response? Unless a state declares

that all cyberattacks, no matter how minor, merit retaliation, it needs

to dene an actionable threshold. Proving that any one attack crossed

it, however, may be tricky.

Can escalation be avoided? Even if retaliation is in kind, coun-

terretaliation may not be. A ght that begins in cyberspace may spill

over into the real world with grievous consequences.

xviii Cyberdeterrence and Cyberwar

Responses to Cyberattack Must Weigh Many Factors

In many ways, cyberwar is the manipulation of ambiguity. Not only do

successful cyberattacks threaten the credibility of untouched systems

(who knows that they have not been corrupted?) but the entire enter-

prise is beset with ambiguities. Questions arise in cyberwar that have

few counterparts in other media.

What was the attacker trying to achieve? Because cyberwar can

rarely break things much less take things, the more-obvious motives of

war do not apply. If the attacker means to coerce but keep its identity

hidden, will the message be clear? If the attack was meant to disarm

its target but does so only temporarily, what did the attacker want to

accomplish in the interim? Can an attack and its aftermath be used

as part of a competitive strategy in commercial or political markets?

What role might a cyberattack play in the attacker’s master narrative?

What should the target reveal about the attack? Many attacks—

corruption attacks, disruption attacks on systems deep within an orga-

nization—have eects that are not generally obvious.

Revealing what

happened is more honest and necessary to justify public retaliation.

However, silence might mitigate panic, preserve condence in systems

as they are being xed, and support nonconfrontational strategies (e.g.,

private exposure followed by diplomatic threats) or nonpublic retalia-

tory strategies. Whether and when to name the attacker also deserve

thought. Premature revelation can be embarrassing, but if revelation

comes long after the attack, the link between retaliation and the origi-

nal attack may lose credibility. Revelation too far in advance of retali-

ation gives the attacker time to ward o a retaliatory attack through

better defenses, counterthreats, or mobilizing opinion to its side.

How should states respond to freelance attacks? Establishing

that a state is protecting the attackers creates yet another hurdle to

attribution, but what if the hackers were just not sought with sucient

vigor? It is hard to know whether retaliating against such a state would

energize its prosecutorial energies—or backre.

Should deterrence be extended to allies? Figuring out who actu-

ally hit the ally’s system and with what eect requires poking into their

systems, something they may balk at (“don’t you trust us?”). Allies may

also have ulterior motives for ngering one particular attacker.

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