2 Introduction
all the more puzzling given that reasoning is often characterised as the process by
which we integrate remembered information with newly acquired information, by
which we draw out the implications of current knowledge, apply existing
knowledge to novel problems, challenge existing assumptions, and make changes
to our knowledge base. Reasoning requires short-term memory in which to
operate, and it also shares component processes with many types of memory. To
take just two examples: Dougherty and colleagues (Dougherty, Thomas & Lange,
2010; Lange et al., this volume) have shown how a global memory model can be
adapted to explain probability judgment and decision making. In the field of
artificial intelligence, Hélie and Sun (2010) have developed a cognitive architecture
(CLARION) based on fundamental principles of memory that can account for a
number of key reasoning phenomena.
To be sure, the reasoning literature has long acknowledged the central role of
working memory in reasoning. For example, we know that individual differences
in cognitive capacity, as measured either by IQ or proxies to IQ (e.g., Stanovich,
2011) or Working Memory Capacity (WMC) (e.g., De Neys 2006a, 2006b) are
strong predictors of performance in a wide range of reasoning tasks. This relationship
is a critical piece of evidence in support of Dual Process Theories of Reasoning
(Evans & Stanovich, 2013), which posit that WMC is necessary to engage higher-
order, analytic thinking. Indeed, Evans and Stanovich (2013) have argued that the
engagement of WMC is the defining feature of analytic thinking.
Thus, it is not surprising that several of the chapters in this book address the
relationship between WM and reasoning. Of interest, however, is that these
chapters illustrate how much has been learned about that relationship and how
sophisticated theorising in that domain has become. As a point of contrast, an
earlier book in this series was Logie and Gilhooly’s (1998) book Working Memory
and Thinking. Comparison between that book and this one is intriguing. As their
title suggests, Logie and Gilhooly were primarily concerned with one particular
aspect of memory, and the chapters in their book considered questions about
strategic use of working memory sub-systems in reasoning, how working memory
is involved in age differences in reasoning, and the role of working memory in
expertise and problem solving. One very telling fact is that whilst most of the
chapters in the earlier book referred to Baddeley’s multi-store model, only one of
the chapters in this book does. Another telling comparison is between the
contributions made by Graeme Halford, who is the only contributor common to
both books; Graeme has co-authored a chapter for this volume, and was the author
on a chapter in the earlier book. Reading both chapters side by side, one can
clearly see how thinking about working memory and its role in reasoning has
developed since the late 1990s. Whereas Halford (1998) was concerned with ideas
about the development of processing capacity and relational complexity, Halford,
Andrews and Wilson (this volume) couch their arguments about working
memory and relational reasoning in terms of Dual Process Theories (see Evans,
2008) and contemporary ideas about relational binding in working memory (see
Oberauer, Süß, Wilhelm & Sander, 2007). The comparison between the two