社交媒体时代：隐私设置与SCA的更新期待

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本文是一篇深入探讨隐私保护议题的研究论文，标题为"隐私设置的合理期望：社交媒体和存储通信法案（SCA）"。该论文发表于2015年，针对1986年美国国会通过的《存储通信法案》（SCA）进行了分析。SCA旨在为在电子存储中被第三方保管的个人通信提供额外的法律保护，特别是针对1986年技术环境下的电子通信内容。然而，随着科技的飞速发展，SCA的语言变得过时，使得法院在处理利用现代技术，如社交媒体产生的私人通信内容时面临挑战。文章指出，由于SCA对特定技术的依赖，其未能为如今的通信形式提供充分的统一保护，导致对于委托给第三方的个人信息，如社交媒体上的个人表达，其隐私期望可能不再符合第四修正案的精神。作者们主张，鉴于SCA最初旨在限制第三方记录原则的范围并保护个人隐私，法院应重新审视这一法律，引入一个技术中立的保护标准，确保不论通信方式如何变化，私人通信内容都能得到同等的保护。他们建议，法院在解释SCA时，应尊重国会设立的初衷，即在保护个人隐私的框架内，考虑到新技术如社交媒体所反映的用户隐私偏好。论文的作者包括Christopher J. Borchert、Fernando M. Pinguelo和David Thaw，他们在各自的专业领域——法律、信息技术和教育机构——都有丰富的经验。他们通过此论文提供了关于如何适应科技进步，调整法律框架以满足现代隐私需求的见解，以期促进对SCA的适用性和未来立法的讨论。此外，读者可以通过社会科学研究网络（SSRN）下载该论文全文，以便进一步了解这个重要的法律问题及其对社会和个人隐私的影响。

40 REASONABLE EXPECTIONS OF PRIVACY SETTINGS [Vol. 13

protections against unreasonable searches and seizures may not reach the

virtual world. First, Supreme Court privacy jurisprudence has created

“uncertainty over whether and when Internet users can retain a ‘reasonable

expectation of privacy’ in information sent to network providers, including

e-mails.”

In United States v. Miller, the Supreme Court established the

third-party doctrine, which denies Fourth Amendment protections to

information disclosed to an entity not originally party to the

communication.

Because virtually all Internet communications are shared

with a network service provider, i.e., a third party, users may be

categorically prohibited from enjoying a reasonable expectation of privacy

online. Second, Fourth Amendment rules governing grand jury subpoenas

suggest that the government may subpoena online communications held by

third-party network service providers without first obtaining a warrant

based on probable cause.

Third, most providers are private actors and

may therefore disclose stored communications without violating the Fourth

Amendment.

A. Legislative History of the SCA

In October 1985, the Office of Technology Assessment issued a

report entitled “Electronic Surveillance and Civil Liberties,” which

concluded that “current legal protections for electronic mail are weak,

ambiguous, or non-existent,” and that “electronic mail remains legally as

well as technically vulnerable to unauthorized surveillance.”

One year

later, Congress passed the Electronic Communications Privacy Act

(“ECPA”), and with it 18 U.S.C. §§ 2701–2712, or the SCA, “to update and

clarify Federal privacy protections and standards in light of dramatic

changes in new computer and telecommunications technologies.”

The

Senate Report on the SCA highlights Congress’s desire to extend to

electronic communications the underlying privacy protections already

afforded to postal mail and private telephone conversations:

A letter sent by first class mail is afforded a high level of protection

against unauthorized opening by a combination of constitutional

provisions, case law, and U.S. Postal Service statutes and regulations.

Voice communications transmitted via common carrier are protected

by title III of the Omnibus Crime Control and Safe Streets Act of

1968.

Id. at 1210.

Miller, 425 U.S at 443.

Kerr, supra note 5, at 1212.

Id.

S. REP. NO. 99-541, at 4 (1986), reprinted in 1986 U.S.C.C.A.N. 3555, 3358.

Id. at 1.

Electronic copy available at: https://ssrn.com/abstract=2306839

No. 1] DUKE LAW & TECHNOLOGY REVIEW 41

But there are no comparable Federal statutory standards to protect the

privacy and security of communications transmitted by new

noncommon carrier communications services or new forms of

telecommunications and computer technology. This is so, even though

American citizens and American businesses are using these new forms

of technology in lieu of, or side-by-side with, first class mail and

common carrier telephone services.

In passing ECPA, Congress sought to promote technological

innovation, encourage the commercial use of “innovative communications

systems,” discourage unauthorized users from obtaining access to

communications to which they are not a party, and establish clearer

standards to protect both law enforcement officials from liability and the

admissibility of legitimately obtained evidence.

Congress explicitly

sought to achieve a “fair balance between the privacy expectations of

American citizens and the legitimate needs of law enforcement agencies.”

The Senate Report on the SCA plainly indicates Congress’s intent

to protect certain information stored electronically in the same manner as

information stored locally: “With the advent of computerized recordkeeping

systems, Americans have lost the ability to lock away a great deal of

personal and business information . . . . For the person or business whose

records are involved, the privacy or proprietary interest in that information

should not change.”

This sentiment is repeated throughout the report:

“Privacy cannot be left to depend solely on physical protection, or it will

gradually erode as technology advances. Congress must act to protect the

privacy of our citizens. If we do not, we will promote the gradual erosion

of this precious right.”

The SCA’s fundamental parts reflect Congress’s

dueling priorities of promoting technological innovation while securing

reasonable expectations of privacy, as the next section explains.

B. Key Components of the SCA

The SCA affords privacy protections to online communications

held by two types of Internet service providers (“ISPs”): providers of

electronic communication services (“ECS”) and providers of remote

computing services (“RCS”).

The SCA defines ECS as “any service

which provides to users thereof the ability to send or receive wire or

Id. at 5.

Id.

Id. at 3.

Id. at 5. For a more detailed discussion of how these sentiments demonstrate

Congress’s intent to establish additional protections under law designed to limit the

scope of the TPRD, see Part I.C.

18 U.S.C. § 2702(a)(1)–(2) (2012).

Electronic copy available at: https://ssrn.com/abstract=2306839

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