保护关键基础设施：安全与韧性新策略

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"Critical Infrastructure Security and Resilience: Theories, Methods, Tools and Technologies" 是一本专注于关键基础设施安全与韧性的书籍，由 Dimitris Gritzalis、Marianthi Theocharidou 和 George Stergiopoulos 编辑。本书涵盖了安全理论、方法、工具和技术，旨在应对新兴的对关键基础设施及其底层网络的威胁。本书分为四个部分，深入探讨了关键基础设施保护的不同方面： 1. **治理与风险管理**：这部分讨论了如何采用韧性方法来保护关键信息基础设施，提出保护策略和方法，以及针对风险的分析，包括对城市基础设施因气候变化后果的脆弱性进行基于风险的分析。 2. **依赖性和网络分析**：这一部分涉及网络系统中的漏洞识别，利用博弈论决策来增强相互依赖基础设施的韧性，以及通过蕴含依赖模型解决最小伪目标集识别问题。同时，通过网络理论和压力测试评估关键基础设施的相互依赖性。 3. **工业与自动化控制系统**：书中详述了微电网控制安全分析，研究当前和新兴的漏洞，提出在工业控制系统中实施边缘安全的方法，以及在工业4.0中安全连接IT-OT网络的策略。 4. **网络安全**：这部分内容关注高级黑客攻击，如针对西方国家关键基础设施的APT28、RED October和Regin等，以及航空领域的网络安全和抵御能力评估。此外，还探讨了能源部门的开源情报对网络攻击的应对，以及关键基础设施和相关系统的旁路通道攻击分类。本书对于关键基础设施的管理者、安全官员、工业控制系统人员和相关研究人员来说，提供了了解该领域最新进展、将安全研究融入工作、改进现有基础设施建模和分析方法以及缓解可能影响或源自关键基础设施的危机和紧急情况的宝贵知识。标签提及“JavaScript”，虽然在摘要中没有具体涉及JavaScript的内容，但可以推测这本书可能包含了一些与关键基础设施中使用的软件或编程技术相关的安全实践或案例。 "Critical Infrastructure Security and Resilience" 提供了一个全面的视角，从理论到实践，从风险管理到网络防御，深入剖析了保护关键基础设施免受日益复杂和先进威胁的关键技术和策略。通过学习此书，读者能够提升对现代安全挑战的理解，并为确保关键基础设施的安全和韧性做出贡献。

10 E. Luiijf and M. Klaver

cable infrastructure, mobile telecommunications, navigation systems, ground

and space segments for satellite communications, and broadcast). An area with

fast technological changes and organizational changes due to liberalisation,

privatization, mergers, and acquisitions. Over the last decade, “internet access”

services were added to their set of CI services by an increasing number of

nations, The Netherlands being the ﬁrst in 2001 [16]. Only recently, nations

recognise other Internet-related services as CII or as essential services, e.g. in the

NIS directive [8]: key digital infrastructure service providers Internet Exchange

Points, Top-Level Domain registrars and root/Domain Name Service providers,

and DSP.

• Despite the fact that the Internet and its services are critical to modern

societies, many nations do not pursue much the governance of this CII area.

Nations take the stance that private industry has the lead. It is only when

market failure occurs, that regulators and government may reluctantly step

in. Earlier occasions have not led to a wake-up call. We just mention to (a) the

bankruptcy ﬁling by KPNQwest affecting 67 country code top-level domains

in May 2002 [19], (b) hostile takeover of a CII operator by a foreign company,

and (c) cut undersea cables depriving multiple nations from internet services

at the same time. Telecommunication backbone operators are recognized as

CII in the USA but have not been identiﬁed as critical or essential by nations

in Europe.

• An issue in this second area is the risk of foreign inﬂuence on a national CII

or essential services by mergers and acquisitions. Several nations pro-actively

have developed or are developing legislation to block foreign takeovers of

CII operators, e.g. Australia, the United Kingdom and Canada; the European

Commission started to develop regulation to protect essential assets to the

Union and its Member States [9]. Other nations may ﬁnd themselves in a

position where a foreign acquisition happens and they have to try to remedy

this risk to national security after the fact.

3. ICT and OT embedded in other CI sectors.

Major technological changes in (embedded) ICT and OT in ‘traditional CI’

services such as the energy and ﬁnancial sectors may cause the need to add new

critical services to the national set of CII and essential services. As a result,

the criticality of one or more CII and essential services may fade overtime.

An example of possible new CII is the blockchain infrastructure including

cryptocurrency services, whereas the use of national beeper infrastructures

diminishes fast as their functionality is replaced by the internet and mobile

telephone technologies.

Moreover, all nations that have created of list with CI sectors, have put power

on their list of critical services. However, currently roll-outs occur of smart

meters, solar power panels and other distributed energy resources at a massive

scale. All equipment which has embedded ICT and sometimes OT.

Is the risk of a nation-wide power blackout to be left to the market or do

national authorities have a say? An example was the recent need for a ﬁrmware

Resilience Approach to Critical Information Infrastructures 11

upgrade of almost 230,000 solar power plants (millions of solar panels) in

Germany as the exploitation of a software vulnerability could cause such a

blackout [2]. How can a nation ensure that the majority of the plant owners update

their system?

4. Critical services by third parties to ICT service providers.

Certain services provided by third parties to the ICT sector such as name and

address services can be crucial for the operations of CII and essential services,

and implicitly CI. Both technological and organizational changes in this area may

(silently) cause shifts in the set of CII.

Such services that support the functioning of critical and essential ICT-

services are often provided out of plain sight and are overlooked by policymak-

ers. The services may be offered by relatively small businesses. These businesses

may even fail to meet the number of employees and turnover criteria set by

governments to identify their set of CII and essential operators, e.g. as part of

the implementation of the NIS directive.

Only recently, services in this fourth area are recognized by a number of

nations as critical or essential. Both the USA and the EU Member States (by

means of the NIS directive) recognize top-level domain name registrars, DNS

service providers, and Internet Exchange Points as critical respectively essential

to their nations.

Unfortunately, this set of services is incomplete. An essential service in

the Internet domain comprises the trust and security infrastructure. High-trust

certiﬁcate, Public Key Infrastructure (PKI) and Trusted Third Party (TTP)

services, especially those used in e-government and banking, are not yet rec-

ognized by the USA and EU as essential, despite the lessons identiﬁed by The

Netherlands in 2011. The certiﬁcate infrastructure used by the Dutch government

and the municipalities was considered compromised. National crisis management

response actions were required which included the nationalization of DigiNotar,

the certiﬁcate operator, and postponing of the certiﬁcate invalidation by Windows

Update for the .nl domain [14]. The latter action provided time for other

certiﬁcate providers to generate a new certiﬁcate root with some 3500 new strong

certiﬁcates in a trusted way. Moreover, installation of these certiﬁcates in e-

government and trusted machine-to-machine information services of 400–500

municipalities and governmental agencies required a lot of effort.

More of this type of essential third-party services critical to the functioning

of internet and telecommunication exist but are hidden to the plain sight of the

public and governmental policymakers. Hidden, that is, until a major incident

occurs and an unexpected crisis occurs.

The risk of a large-scale impact is high. Therefore, some form of governmen-

tal oversight is essential for this type of essential services where a higher level

of assurance and business continuity is required. One might consider regulatory

measures similar to those that apply to the CII and essential operators in the

telecommunication and IT sector(s), e.g. by applying the same breach reporting

requirements as applied to the set of digital service providers referred to by the

NIS directive.

12 E. Luiijf and M. Klaver

5. Mass market ICT.

Although citizens, small and medium enterprises (SME) and organizations

use a lot of ICT embedded in functions and for accessing information services,

we are still on the verge of a mass market uptake of ICT and OT in our daily

lives. Service disruptions of Facebook and WhatsApp already cause people to

dial the 1-1-2 (or 9-1-1) emergency number as people perceive that their social

live breaks down as they ‘do not live in cyberspace anymore’ [11].

• When larger numbers of citizens and SME distrust their ICT, cannot access

their social networks or electronic banking, etcetera for more than a couple of

days, the socio-psychological impact may come close or exceed the national

criteria used to deﬁne C(I)I.

EU’s NIS directive takes into account digital service providers as market

places and search engines but lacks the societal impact of disrupted mass-

scale end-user ICT-based services and social media. Moreover, Google started

in 1998, Facebook in 2004, and Whatsapp in 2009; can you pinpoint today’s

start-up that will be considered as an essential service in about 5 years by your

nation?

6. Mass market functionalities with embedded and connected IT and OT.

Psychologically, people are addicted to anything that make one’s live more

convenient, provides us happiness, or provides delight. That drives the mass

markets of (a) Internet of Things, and (b) enhanced functionalities by embedded

IT and OT which people do not recognize anymore as IT/OT. Increasingly,

consumer and professional product functions are based on IT and OT embedded

in the product. Most often, these products connect to and interact with the

internet, and with ICT that is part of the ﬁfth area above: ‘Mass market ICT’.

• Market analysts expect an exponential uptake of Internet of Things (IoT) and

smart appliances with estimates that range between 28 and 50 billion IoT

devices worldwide by 2021 (see e.g. [5]).

• The development of the IoT products is predominantly by other manufacturers

than the traditional IT manufacturers. Most of those manufacturers have a

reputation in producing functional equipment, e.g. kitchen appliances, for

the consumer market. The new functionality is based on the embedded use

of IT and OT. The manufacturers, however, lack long-term knowledge and

experience in cyber security.

• The other set of manufacturers are start-ups who invented new functionality

(with embedded IT and OT) which make people happy and one’s live

easier. Think about manufacturers of washing machines, smart fridges, digital

TVs, thermostats, carbon monoxide and smoke detector sets (e.g. Google

Nest), smart toasters, home lighting, smart doorbells, and home automation

equipment.

• Such mass-market IoT devices provide major cyberattack opportunities as the

IoT devices are spread in manifold across multiple nations and are connected

to a wide array of telecommunication and internet service providers. The ﬁrst

Resilience Approach to Critical Information Infrastructures 13

glimpses of IoT-based cyberattacks to C(I)I have already been shown by e.g.

the Mirai, Hajime and Bricker botnets [10].

• To reduce this societal risk by insecure IoT, manufacturers on the one hand

should properly implement security standards and take adequate preventive

and response measures such as timely provision of patches in case of a

vulnerability. On the other hand, the EU and a set of its Member States

currently discuss governance measures especially for IoT such as certiﬁcation

of hardware and software, and ICT-product liability [7]. How such an approach

will work for securing mass-market products such as smart dish washing

machines, smart doorbells, and smart BBQs is currently unclear. If this

governance by nations is not arranged fast and too a full extend, nations need

to be prepared to deal with major incidents with (inter)national impact.

• Another threat arises from the massive roll-out of enhanced functionalities in

cyber physical systems including autonomous vehicles and robots. Embedded

ICT and OT, but hidden to the unconscious end-users, support new functional-

ities to our daily life. Consider the amount of ICT- and OT-supported functions

in a modern car. In a split moment software decides to hit the brakes, explode

the air bag, correct the drive by a lane departing system, or automatically park

the car. And then we are not yet discussing autonomous driving by for instance

Teslas and Google cars. Soon we will see platooning ‘trains’ of trucks on the

road [18].

• An exploited vulnerability, e.g. through Ecall, mobile connectivity or WiFi,

may result in a safety risk to persons in or near that cyber-physical system.

Just consider all cars of one brand exploding airbags while driving on the

highway due to malware.

• Nations, their policy-makers, legislation, regulators, and crisis management

currently do not consider how deal with for example:

• millions of smart TVs affected by malware or acting as a denial-of-service

attack platform to C(I)I,

• millions of smart fridges, smart washing and dish-washing machines with a

serious exploited vulnerability which causes instabilities in the smart power

grid,

• an exploited cyber security ﬂaw or software failure affecting the safety

of millions of vehicles taking part in collaborative driving or autonomous

driving.

• In a ﬁrst reaction, authorities will state that the consumer is responsible for

the cyber security problem and that he/she should discuss the problem with

the manufacturer. But when power grids blackout and hospitals shut down

operations as a result of such an attack?

• Proper governance of such threats and part of C(I)I should start exploring

scenarios about the ‘unthinkable’ moment one has to act.

14 E. Luiijf and M. Klaver

5 Conclusion and Recommendations

The (new) stakeholders in these six areas that can be considered as (potential) key

players in CII and the provision of essential IT- and OT-based services need to be

involved in the governance and the protection thereof. The ﬁrst challenge for nations

is to identify sufﬁciently early that such new services are part of their set of CII or

set of essential services. This means that nations need to keep track of technological

developments as well as changes in the ownership of organizations, e.g. through

mergers and acquisitions, as part of this identiﬁcation process.

Secondly, the obligations of CII stakeholders and essential service operators need

to be applied to new stakeholders as well. On the one hand this can be difﬁcult to

pursue as new entrants might be reluctant to become part of the existing CIIP or

essential service protection community. They may be unwilling to bear the costs

of increased protection for society. On the other hand, the long existing trust-based

operator communities may be reluctant to admit operators of fast rising essential

services to their inner circle of sharing cyber security information.

Moreover, some traditional CII operators may fall below the threshold of

criticality criteria as their systems are no longer deemed critical or essential at

the national level. They may be reluctant to give up their position to the inner

information sharing circle.

The analysis above showed that the current risk and approaches by governments

to protect the CII and essential services in their nation are too much focused on

the classical telecommunications and IT-sector. CII and essential IT- and OT-based

services increasingly appear in other, less or even none governed areas of the

current ICT landscape. New globally communicating IT- and OT-based products

and services appear fast on the market. Such products and services may be used at

a massive scale, e.g. IoT. In case their level of cyber security is insufﬁcient, citizens

may expect that authorities step in and take action such as creating legislation or

more oversight by regulators. Moreover, governments need to be alert to reduce

the risk of mass-scale cyberattacks through mass market equipment on the one

hand, and on the other hand of disruptions in new CII and essential services which

suddenly disrupt the perceived undisturbed way of living of tens of million people.

Based upon the analysis above, we recommend governmental policy-makers

to:

• Use the list of identiﬁed ICT areas (Fig. 2) as a checklist for checking your

policies and identiﬁcation of possible new CII and essential IT- and OT-based

services as well as CII services that are not critical or essential anymore.

• Collaborate internationally in order to deﬁne policies for international ICT

products and services that are identiﬁed as CII or essential service in one’s nation.

• Use horizon scanning and technology watching to identify both emerging

technologies, and IT- and OT-based products and services that may become

critical or essential rapidly. After identiﬁcation, proper governance activities need

to be started.

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