IEEE 1609.2标准：车载无线通信的安全与信息交互

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"1609.2协议是车载网络通信中的一个重要标准，由IEEE（电气和电子工程师协会）发布，全称为IEEE Std 1609.2™-2006，也称为无线接入车载环境（Wireless Access in Vehicular Environments, WAVE）的安全服务标准。该标准主要关注车辆间以及车辆与基础设施间的通信安全，包括信息交换、应用和管理消息的安全服务。此标准由IEEE智能交通系统委员会赞助，并由IEEE Vehicular Technology Society批准，于2006年6月8日正式发布。" 在车辆通信领域，1609.2协议扮演着至关重要的角色，它定义了一系列安全措施，旨在保护车载通信免受恶意攻击和数据篡改。这些安全服务主要包括身份验证、数据完整性、数据机密性和时间同步。协议中包含了加密算法、数字签名和证书管理机制，确保了消息在传输过程中的安全性。身份验证是1609.2协议的核心组件之一，通过公钥基础设施（Public Key Infrastructure, PKI）实现。每辆车辆和基础设施节点都有一个唯一的证书，这个证书由可信的证书颁发机构（Certificate Authority, CA）签发，用来验证通信双方的身份。数据完整性是保证信息未被修改的关键。1609.2协议使用消息认证码（Message Authentication Code, MAC）或数字签名来确保数据在传输过程中没有被篡改。这样可以防止虚假信息的传播，保证交通信息的准确性和可靠性。数据机密性是另一个关键方面，尤其在涉及敏感信息如车辆位置、速度等时。协议可能采用对称加密技术，如AES（高级加密标准），来保护这些数据不被非法获取。时间同步对于某些安全功能至关重要，例如，确保事件的正确顺序和实时性。1609.2协议规定了一种精确的时间同步方法，使得车辆和基础设施能够同步其时间戳，以确保所有通信发生在同一时间框架内。此外，1609.2协议还涵盖了错误检测和容错机制，以应对通信中的干扰和故障。它还定义了管理消息的格式和流程，包括证书的分发、更新和撤销，以及设备状态的报告。 1609.2协议是构建安全、可靠的车载无线通信环境的基础，它不仅保障了交通安全，还促进了智能交通系统的发展，例如，实现车与车（Vehicle-to-Vehicle, V2V）、车与基础设施（Vehicle-to-Infrastructure, V2I）的通信，以及车与行人（Vehicle-to-Pedestrian, V2P）的通信，从而提高道路安全和交通效率。

IEEE Std 1609.2-2006 IEEE TRIAL-USE STANDARD FOR WIRELESS ACCESS IN VEHICULAR ENVIRONMENTS

IETF Request for Comments: 3629, UTF-8, A Transformation Format of ISO 10646.

NIMA Technical Report TR8350.2, “Department of Defense World Geodetic System 1984, Its Definition

and Relationships With Local Geodetic Systems.”

NIST Special Publication SP 800-38C, Recommendation for Block Cipher Modes of Operation: the CCM

Mode for Authentication and Confidentiality.

3. Definitions, abbreviations, and acronyms

3.1 Definitions

For the purposes of this document, the following terms and definitions apply. The Authoritative Dictionary

of IEEE Standards Terms [B1] should be referenced for terms not defined in this clause.

3.1.1 advanced encryption standard (AES): A symmetric block cipher adopted by the U.S.

government as a standard and used to encrypt and decrypt electronic data.

3.1.2 airlink: A radio-frequency communication interface, from the physical layer of one device to that

of a remote device, such as the interface defined by WAVE.

3.1.3 application: In the context of IEEE Std 1609.2, a receiving application aggregates messages sent

to one or more endpoints. A sending application sends messages to one or more endpoints.

3.1.4 application context mark (ACM): A code that identifies a specific instance of an application.

3.1.5 application class identifier (ACID): A code that identifies a class of application.

3.1.6 ApplicationID: A structure that contains an ACID and an ACM.

3.1.7 associated ApplicationID: If a certificate or signed message uses the from_issuer value in its

ApplicationID, the associated ApplicationID is the first ApplicationID other than

from_issuer to appear in its certificate chain. The associated ApplicationID is used as if it

appeared in the original certificate or signed message.

3.1.8 asymmetric cryptographic algorithm: A cryptographic algorithm that uses two related keys— a

public key and a private key. The two keys have the property that given the public key it is

computationally infeasible to derive the private key.

3.1.9 block cipher: A symmetric encryption algorithm that processes data in blocks, typically of 8 or 16

octets.

3.1.10 broadcast application: An application that transmits information without targeting a specific

recipient and without expecting a response. Contrast: transactional application.

3.1.11 certificate authority (CA) certificate: A certificate that is used to sign other certificates.

Contrast: message signing certificate.

This technical report is available from http://earth-info.nga.mil/GandG/tr8350/tr8350_2.html.

This special publication is available from http://csrc.nist.gov/publications/nistpubs/.

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SECURITY SERVICES FOR APPLICATIONS AND MANAGEMENT MESSAGES IEEE Std 1609.2-2006

3.1.12 cache: A collection of data objects such that each object stays in the cache for a limited period of

time.

3.1.13 certificate: See digital certificate.

3.1.14 certificate authority (CA): An entity that issues certificates, and is accepted by other entities to

have in place valid procedures to ensure that, if a certificate identifies an entity, it is only issued to

that entity, and if a certificate grants permissions, it is only issued to entities who have a right to be

granted those permissions.

3.1.15 certificate chain: A collection of certificates that can be put into an ordered list such that each

certificate in the list (except the first) was issued by the owner of the certificate before it.

3.1.16 certificate signing request (CSR): A request by an entity to a CA to be issued with a certificate.

3.1.17 certificate signing request signing certificate (CSRSC): A certificate used to sign a certificate

signing request (CSR).

3.1.18 certificate revocation list (CRL): A mechanism for the revocation of certificates. See:

revocation.

3.1.19 certificate subject: The entity identified in a certificate; the entity that knows the private key

corresponding to the public key in the certificate.

3.1.20 cipher block chaining (CBC): A mode of operation for a block cipher that uses the previous

block of ciphertext to randomize the current block of plaintext, masking plaintext patterns.

3.1.21 cipher block chaining message integrity check (CBC-MIC): An application of the CBC mode

of operation that produces a message integrity check rather than ciphertext.

3.1.22 control channel (CCH): A radio channel used for exchange of management data and WAVE

short messages.

3.1.23 counter mode: A mode of operation of a block cipher where the output of encrypting an

incrementing counter is used as a keystream.

3.1.24 cryptographically secure hash function: A hash function is a transformation that converts a

variable length input to a fixed length string called the hash value. A cryptographically secure

hash function maps an arbitrary-length input into a fixed-length output (the hash value) such that

(a) it is computationally infeasible to find an input that maps to a specific hash value and (b) it is

computationally infeasible to find two inputs that map to the same hash value.

3.1.25 datagram TLS (DTLS): A modification of TLS appropriate for packets transferred by UDP (or

some other unreliable transport mechanism) as opposed to TCP (or some other reliable transport

mechanism).

3.1.26 data plane: A set of communication protocols defined to carry application and management data.

3.1.27 decode: To parse an array of octets into a set of its constituent fields. Contrast: decrypt, encode.

3.1.28 decrypt: To convert unreadable, encrypted data to readable, decrypted data using an decryption

algorithm and a key. Contrast: decode, encrypt.

3.1.29 decryption algorithm: An algorithm that takes as input ciphertext and a key and (if the correct

key is provided) produces plaintext.

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IEEE Std 1609.2-2006 IEEE TRIAL-USE STANDARD FOR WIRELESS ACCESS IN VEHICULAR ENVIRONMENTS

3.1.30 dedicated short range communication (DSRC): A system for wireless communication between

vehicles and the roadside and from one vehicle to another.

3.1.31 digital certificate: A digitally signed document binding a public key to an identity and/or a set of

permissions.

3.1.32 digital signature: See: public-key digital signature.

3.1.33 elliptic curve cryptography (ECC): A form of public-key cryptography based on the problem of

finding discrete logarithms in a group defined over elliptic curves.

3.1.34 elliptic curve digital signature algorithm (ECDSA): A digital signature algorithm based on the

hard problems of elliptic curve cryptography.

3.1.35 elliptic curve integrated encryption scheme (ECIES): A public-key encryption scheme based

on the hard problems of elliptic curve cryptography.

3.1.36 encode: To convert a data structure into an array of octets. Contrast: decode, encrypt.

3.1.37 encrypt: To convert readable data to unreadable, encrypted data using an encryption algorithm

and a key. Contrast: decrypt, encode.

3.1.38 encryption algorithm: An algorithm that takes as input plaintext and a key and produces

ciphertext.

3.1.39 endpoint: The destination of a transmitted message. In the case of the IP stack, an endpoint is

uniquely identified by the combination of IPv6 address and port number. In the case of the WSMP

stack, an endpoint is uniquely identified by the Application Class ID and Application Context

Mark.

3.1.40 expiry: Removing a certificate from the system after a given time.

3.1.41 hardware security module (HSM): A device that executes cryptographic functions in a secure

execution environment, preventing unauthorized access to keys and functionality.

3.1.42 hash function: See: cryptographically secure hash function.

3.1.43 hash value: The output of a hash function.

3.1.44 implementation: Any entity that sends messages over the WAVE stack. An application, or set of

applications that use the same radio.

3.1.45 issuing certificate: If the public key from certificate A can be used to verify the signature on

certificate B, then A is the issuing certificate for B. Contrast:

subordinate certificate.

3.1.46 keypair: A private key and the corresponding public key for an asymmetric cryptosystem.

3.1.47 keystream: A cryptographically secure stream of random data that is XORed with plaintext to

produce ciphertext.

3.1.48 management plane: The collection of functions performed in support of the communication

functions provided by the data plane, but not directly involved in passing application data.

3.1.49 message integrity check (MIC): A cryptographic checksum generated using a symmetric key.

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SECURITY SERVICES FOR APPLICATIONS AND MANAGEMENT MESSAGES IEEE Std 1609.2-2006

3.1.50 message integrity check length (MIC length): The length of the MIC generated by a MIC

scheme.

3.1.51 message integrity check scheme (MIC scheme): An instantiation of a cryptographic process that

produces a MIC.

3.1.52 message signing certificate: A certificate that is used to verify signatures on messages. Contrast:

CA certificate.

3.1.53 networking services: The collection of management plane and data plane functions at the

network layer and transport layer.

3.1.54 on-board unit (OBU): A WAVE device that can operate when in motion and supports

information exchange with RSUs and other OBUs.

3.1.55 plaintext: Data that has not been cryptographically processed (or has had all the cryptographic

processing removed from it).

3.1.56 provider: An entity in the system, typically though not exclusively an RSU, that offers services

for consumption by entities known as users, which are typically though not exclusively on-board

units (OBUs).

3.1.57 provider service table (PST): The collection of data describing the applications that are

registered with and available through a WAVE device.

3.1.58 public-key digital signature: A code generated with an asymmetric cryptographic algorithm. The

signing operation takes as input a message to be signed and the signer’s private key, and produces

a signature. The verification takes as input the purported signer’s public key, the message, and the

signature, and will produce “valid” if the signature was produced with the corresponding private

key and the message and signature have not been altered since generation, and “invalid”

otherwise.

3.1.59 public safety on-board unit (PSOBU): An on-board unit (OBU) on a public safety vehicle.

3.1.60 public safety vehicle: A vehicle that is given privileges over ordinary, private vehicles by a

government agency to assist it in carrying out functions necessary for safety of life, or other public

safety functions.

3.1.61 randomized encryption: An encryption mechanism that has the property that the same message,

encrypted twice with the same key, will give different results. Randomized encryption is

semantically secure if an attacker who only sees the two ciphertexts will not be able to tell that

they were derived from the same plaintext.

3.1.62 registration: The provision of application parameters to a provider or user. These parameters are

used by the provider to populate the PST, by the user to decide whether to link to a service

advertised by a provider, and by both entities to manage the establishment and maintenance of the

link in support of the service.

3.1.63 replay attack: An attack in which an attacker records a valid message and retransmits it at a

different time or location, hoping that listeners will still react to it as if it were valid.

3.1.64 revocation: The act of removing a certificate from the system by distributing a signed statement

that the certificate is no longer to be trusted.

3.1.65 revoked certificate store: A unit’s list of revoked certificates.

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IEEE Std 1609.2-2006 IEEE TRIAL-USE STANDARD FOR WIRELESS ACCESS IN VEHICULAR ENVIRONMENTS

3.1.66 roadside unit (RSU): A WAVE device that operates only when stationary and supports

information exchange with on-board units (OBUs).

3.1.67 root certificate: A certificate that was issued by itself and that can be used as a trust anchor to

validate other certificates.

3.1.68 root certificate store: A unit’s store of root certificates.

3.1.69 security manager: The application that is responsible for managing the root certificate store and

the revoked certificate store on a unit.

3.1.70 semantically secure randomized encryption: See: randomized encryption.

3.1.71 service: An application offered by a provider for consumption by a user over an airlink.

3.1.72 service channel (SCH): A secondary channel used for application specific information

exchanges.

3.1.73 store: A collection of data objects (typically certificates and CRLs in this standard) such that each

object stays in the store until it expires, is superseded, or is revoked.

3.1.74 subordinate certificate: If the public key from certificate A can be used to verify the signature on

certificate B, then B is a subordinate certificate to A. Contrast: issuing certificate.

3.1.75 symmetric cryptographic algorithm: A cryptographic algorithm that uses a single key. Anyone

who knows a symmetric encryption key can both encrypt and decrypt. Anyone who knows a

symmetric authentication key can both generate and check a MIC.

3.1.76 symmetric key: See: symmetric cryptographic algorithm.

3.1.77 transactional application: An application in which two entities exchange information. Contrast:

broadcast application.

3.1.78 transport layer security (TLS): An IETF standard providing for secure communications over

TCP/IP.

3.1.79 trust anchor: A known, trusted certificate. When a party receives a certificate, it will typically

attempt to construct a certificate chain back to a trust anchor. If no trust anchor is available, the

party shall use an out-of-band method to check that the certificate under consideration was issued

by a legitimate issuer.

3.1.80 unit: An implementation of a WAVE stack, with a single WAVE management entity (WME) and

a single security manager.

3.1.81

vehicle host: In-vehicle device running applications that communicate to external WAVE devices

using the WAVE system through the OBU vehicle-host interface.

3.1.82 WAVE device: A device that contains a WAVE-conformant medium access control (MAC) and

physical layer (PHY) interface to the wireless medium (see IEEE Std 802.11 and IEEE P1609.4).

3.1.83 WAVE management entity (WME): The set of management functions, defined in IEEE

P1609.3, required to provide WAVE Networking Services; the management entity that performs

these functions.

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