An
Overview
of
PKI
Trust
Models
Radio Perlman
Sun Microsystems
Abstract
If
Alice and Bob each know their own private key and the other's public key, the[
can communicate securely, through any number
of
public-key based protaco
s
suc
as IPSec
[l],
PGP
[2],
S/MIME
[3],
or
SSL
[4].
However, how do they know each
other's public keys? The foal of,a public key infrastructure (PKI)
is
to enable
secure, convenient, and ef icient discovery of public keys.
It
should be applicable
within as well as between organizations, and scalable to support Ihe Internet.
There are various types
of
PKI
that are widely deployed or have been proposed.
They differ in the configuration information required, trust rules, and flexibility.
There are standards such
as
X.509
[5]
and
PKlX
[6],
but these are sufficiently flexi-
ble
so
that almost any model of
PKI
con be supported. In
this
article we describe
several types of PKI and discuss the advanta es and disadvantages of each. We
argue a ainst several popular and widely jeployed models as being insecure,
unscalabge, or overly inconvenient. We also recommend a particular model.
lie
term
principul
is
cominonly
used
in
the literature
for any client of
the
public key inlrastructurc (PKI),
whether it
be
human,
server, client machine, or
something clse.
A
principal
is
anything that
needs
to
authenticate itself
or
verify tlic identity of anothcr principal.
Also, for clarity, sometimes
wc
use
iiaiiics
sucli
as
Alice
or
Hob
for principals. This
enables
the use of
pronouns
to
makc cxplanations shorter
and
clcarcr.
How
do
principals
learn
each nthcr's public kcys? Various
mctliotls
can
bc
insecure
or
so
ineflicient
as
to
be
impractical in
a
large
nct-
work
*
Configure
each
principal will1
thc
public key of cvcry otlicr
principal,
in
casc they nced to coininuiiicale.
This
is
clearly
unworkable
in
n
large
nctwork.
*
Widely publisli puhlic kcys,
such
as
providing
a
Web site or
newspaper
on
which principals
can
advertise their keys. 'I'his
is
insecure. Althnugh public kcys
do
lint
nccd
to
hc
kept
secret,
iuid
in fact wide knvwledge of
a
principal's public key
is
desiniblc, the sccurity problem
is
hit
Unb
nniist know fnr
certain that
a
particular
key
really
does
bclvng
Lo
Alicc.
If
Bob
can
be frickcd into thinking that Trudy's public
key
is
really Alice's, Trudy ciin irnpersontitc Alice
lo
Rob.
The acccptcd solution
is
lo
havc trusted nodcs known
as
certification
authorities
(CAS) digitally sign
dat;i
structures
known
as
certificates
that state tlic mapping bctwecn
names
and
public keys. If Bob trusts
ti
particular
CA
and
knows that
CA's public key,
he
can sccurcly know Alice's public key if hc
can obtain
a
certificate signed hy thiit CA certifying Alice's
puhlic key
as
hclongiiig to
the
nanic
Alicc.
In
many ciiscs it
is
unrciilistic to cxpcct
Llob
lo
bc
c(mfigured
with the public key
of
thc CA that certified
Alicc's
key. Thcrc-
fore, it
is
ncccssaiy
for
Bob
to obtain
ii
chain of ccrtificalcs. For
cxarnplc, suppose
Bob
knows the puhlic key of CA1 and trusts
CAI. Rob might obtain the following
set
of
certificates:
[CATS
key
is
PZ]
signed
hy
CAI
*
[CA3's key
is
P3]
signed by CA2
*
[Alice's key
is
P4] signed by CA3
Mathematically this
is
straightforward,
once
Rob
has
this
set
of
ccrtificates. However, how
docs
Bob
know
CAI's
key?
I~low does
hc
vhtain the particular
set
nf
certificates that
so
neatly creale
a
sccure path tv Alice's puhlic key'? Shnuld
all
chains
he
trustcd if tlicy mathematically create
an
unbroken
path
to
the
target
name?
In this article wc explore various
methods. Principles
we
advocate arc:
Security
is
not
"onc
size fits
all."
Tlic
security involved
in
certifying kcys of
NSA
cmployees
is
likely to nccd to be
liighcr than
the
that involvcd in certifying keys for
users
of
the
Incal
puhlic
lihrary.
*
Tlicrc
is
no
perfect solutioii. It
is
better for
the
world to
deploy something that will
work
in
most cases than delay
dcplnying anything until
R
perfect solution
is
found.
Security needs to
hc
convenient
or
users will circuinvcnt
it.
A
Singie-CA
Mode/
This
modcl
consists
of
a
single
CA
fnr
the
world.
Every
piece
of
cquipmcnt would cvme configured with knowledge of that CA's
public kcy,
or
hitvc
tliat
CA's
public key
einbcddcd
in
the
hard-
ware.
All
certificates wodd nced
to
bc
obtained from the nrgani-
zation which runs that CA.
This
is
certainly
the
simplest strategy.
What2
Wrong
with
it?
There
is
no
organization uiiivcrsally trustcd by
all
countries,
companics, univcrsitics, political organizalions,
and
so
vn,