无证书条件隐私保护认证协议（CL-CPPA）在车联网中的应用
需积分: 10 75 浏览量
更新于2024-09-01
收藏 1.31MB PDF 举报
"CL-CPPA Certificate-Less Conditional Privacy-Preserving Authentication Protocol for the Internet of Vehicles"
在车联网（IoV）领域，隐私保护和身份认证是确保系统安全的关键要素。有条件保护隐私认证（CPPA）协议就是为了满足这些需求而提出的，它能够同时保护用户的隐私并进行有效的身份验证。然而，CPPA协议的设计面临着诸多挑战，例如主密钥的安全性问题，伪身份（PID）的有效性，以及防止身份间的可链接性。
CL-CPPA协议是为了解决这些问题而提出的一种无证书的CPPA方案。在这个协议中，车辆和可信授权机构（TA）不再需要存储任何证书来进行验证和追踪操作，从而降低了系统的复杂性和潜在的安全风险。CL-CPPA协议的设计旨在提供更高级别的安全性和隐私保护，同时避免了主密钥的不安全性，确保了PID的有效性，并降低了身份之间的可链接性。
该协议通过一系列的加密和认证机制，保证了在IoV系统中的车辆通信过程中的数据安全。它能够抵抗修改攻击，即攻击者试图篡改传输中的信息；同时也能抵御模拟攻击，即攻击者尝试冒充合法实体进行通信。此外，CL-CPPA协议还被证明可以抵御其他已知的安全威胁。
对比现有的CPPA协议，CL-CPPA协议在计算和通信效率上具有显著优势。较低的计算成本意味着车辆和基础设施可以在不影响性能的情况下快速完成认证过程，而较低的通信成本则减少了网络负载，提高了整体系统的效率。
CL-CPPA协议是一种创新的无证书CPPA解决方案，它有效地应对了IoV安全和隐私的挑战，提供了高效且安全的认证机制。其设计考虑了实际应用场景的需求，能够在保障用户隐私的同时，增强车联网的安全性。未来的研究将进一步评估其在大规模IoV网络中的性能，并探索如何适应不断变化的网络安全威胁环境。
2327-4662 (c) 2019 IEEE. Personal use is permitted, but republication/redistribution requires IEEE permission. See http://www.ieee.org/publications_standards/publications/rights/index.html for more information.
This article has been accepted for publication in a future issue of this journal, but has not been fully edited. Content may change prior to final publication. Citation information: DOI 10.1109/JIOT.2019.2938008, IEEE Internet of
Things Journal
JOURNAL OF L
A
T
E
X CLASS FILES, VOL. XX, NO. XX, XX XXXX 3
VI.
II. BACKGROUND
A typical IoV infrastructure includes trusted authority (TA),
RSUs, and OBUs deployed inside vehicles [7], [10], [30], [31],
[32].
• TA: The TA is considered fully trusted by all parts in
the IoV and has plenty of communication, computation
and storage capabilities. In addition, TA is in charge of
the computation of system parameters and enrollment of
vehicles and RSUs. After successfully completing their
enrollment, TA computes the system parameters of IoV
and issues them to the vehicles and RSUs offline. Once a
malicious vehicle broadcasts bogus messages to mislead
nearby RSUs or other vehicles, the TA can recover the
vehicle owner’s identity from its transmitted information.
Hence, the TA can be a government entity or a trusted
organizational entity.
• RSUs: RSUs are immobile infrastructures that stay on the
roadside. RSUs serve the function of a bridge between
vehicles and the TA and use the DSRC protocol for
V2V (i.e., vehicle-to-vehicle) and V2R (i.e., vehicle-
to-RSU) wireless communications. They can verify the
traffic messages from vehicles and process them locally
or forward them to TA. RSUs are generally semi-trusted,
and the TA can detect them and then reset or remove an
RSU once it is found to be compromised.
• Vehicles: Each vehicle is deployed with an OBU, which
allows it to intercommunicate wirelessly with RSUs and
vehicles via DSRC protocol. Every OBU has a tamper-
proof device (TPD) to safeguard the memorized secret
information, e.g., secret keys and location information
from the global positioning system (GPS), etc.
Here, we will review two key cryptographic primitives
used in the proposed CL-CPPA protocol, namely, the discrete
logarithm (DL) problem and computational Diffie-Hellman
(CDH) problem [33].
• Discrete Logarithm (DL) Problem: For an element y ∈
G, the DL challenge is to be able to compute x ∈ Z
∗
q
such that y = g
x
holds, where g is the generator of G and
q is the order of G, respectively. For a random logarithm,
it is generally expected that the correct solution can be
obtained after checking half of all possible x values. In
other words, the complexity is O(|G|) steps, where |G| is
the cardinality of the group. To avoid brute-force attacks
on DL-based cryptosystems in practice, the cardinality
|G| of the underlying group must be sufficiently large
[34].
• Computational Diffie-Hellman (CDH) Problem: For
two elements g
a
, g
b
∈ G with two unknown elements
a, b ∈ Z
∗
q
, the CDH problem is to compute g
a·b
∈ G.
According to the literature [11], [12], [16], [17], [35], [36],
a secure CPPA solution for IoV should satisfy the following
security and privacy requirements.
1) Message Authentication: The messages sent from vehi-
cles should be authenticated by the receivers (i.e., RSUs
and other vehicles), and the receivers should be capable of
detecting the modification or forgery of received message.
2) Conditional Privacy-Preserving (or Traceability):
With the exception of TA, no entity (i.e., RSUs, vehicles
and other third participants) can track or extract the
vehicle’s true identity with the messages issued from
a specific vehicle. The TA can track the vehicle’s
true identity by analyzing the messages when it is
determined that a malicious vehicle transmits a false
or modified message to mislead others. Therefore, the
privacy-preserving is conditional for TA.
3) Certificate-Less: To achieve better performance and fea-
sibility in the IoV system, it is desired to support a
certificate-less CPPA scheme, where the vehicles does not
need to store any certificates for authentication and the
Trusted Authority (TA) does not need the certificates to
recover the real identity of malicious vehicles either. This
is because the overhead and complexity of certificates
management by TA increase with the number of vehicles.
In addtion, the certificate verification on the receiver
end is quite costly and not efficient in the VANET
system, since the vehicles broadcast traffic messages very
frequently.
4) Unlinkability: No entity (i.e., RSUs, vehicles and other
third-party participants) can identify a vehicle simply by
analyzing its broadcasted messages; that is, they cannot
link and determine whether two messages are issued from
the same vehicle.
5) The Secerecy of Master Keys: Although every vehicle
or RSU is installed with a tamper-proof device, the
highly-motivated adversary can extract the data stored in
the device by power analysis techniques [29]. Therefore,
it is very necessary to protect the master keys of VANETs
system safely.
6) Batch Authentication: Authenticating all messages re-
ceived by the receiver singly is not effective; hence,
batch authentication for the IoV system is an extremely
important and necessary property. In other words, a
verifier needs to be able to verify multiple messages from
several vehicles simultaneously since vehicles and RSUs
receive multiple messages within the same time interval
in practice [11].
7) Resilient to Message Modification Attack: The
attacker might send fabricated information in the IoV
system in order to reach its specific goal. For instance,
an attacker can transmit fabricated information about the
traffic condition to vehicles in the vicinity in order to
avoid the buildup of traffic or transmit different messages
to different vehicles in order to ‘lure’ the target vehicle
into a specific location.
8) Resilient to Impersonation Attack: Such attack is gen-
erally targeted at legitimate vehicles. It is run through
transmitting fabricated messages to vehicles in which
the attacker tries to impersonate as a honest vehicle
u
i
. This attack is executed to frame another vehicle,
say, u
i
, in the sense that when the TA discovers that
the transmitted messages are fabricated, the TA will
automatically associate u
i
as the originator of this attack.
剩余11页未读，继续阅读
2020-10-12 上传
2022-01-10 上传
2024-10-07 上传
2024-10-07 上传
2024-10-07 上传
cripple0
- 粉丝: 0
- 资源: 4
我的内容管理
展开
最新资源
- 多功能HTML网站模板：手机电脑适配与前端源码
- echarts实战：构建多组与堆叠条形图可视化模板
- openEuler 22.03 LTS专用openssh rpm包安装指南
- H992响应式前端网页模板源码包
- Golang标准库深度解析与实践方案
- C语言版本gRPC框架支持多语言开发教程
- H397响应式前端网站模板源码下载
- 资产配置方案：优化资源与风险管理的关键计划
- PHP宾馆管理系统（毕设）完整项目源码下载
- 中小企业电子发票应用与管理解决方案
- 多设备自适应网页源码模板下载
- 移动端H5模板源码，自适应响应式网页设计
- 探索轻量级可定制软件框架及其Http服务器特性
- Python网站爬虫代码资源压缩包
- iOS App唯一标识符获取方案的策略与实施
- 百度地图SDK2.7开发的找厕所应用源代码分享
