Identity-Based Blind Proxy Re-Signature Scheme for
Data Security
*
Xiaodong Yang
College of Computer Science and
Engineering
Northwest Normal University
Lanzhou, China
State Key Laboratory of
Cryptology, Beijing, China
y200888@163.com
Likun Xiao
College of Computer Science and
Engineering
Northwest Normal University
Lanzhou, China
nwnuwei@163.com
Yutong Li
College of Computer Science and
Engineering
Northwest Normal University
Lanzhou, China
Liyutong@nwnu.eud.cn
Shudong Li
Cyberspace Institute of Advanced
Technology
Guangzhou University
Guangzhou, China
lishudong@gzhu.edu.cn
Jinli Wang
College of Computer Science and
Engineering
Northwest Normal University
Lanzhou, China
lichmei@126.com
Chunlin Chen
College of Computer Science and
Engineering
Northwest Normal University
Lanzhou, China
chenchunl@163.com
Abstract—Identity-based blind proxy re-signature (IDBPRS)
not only has the functionality of signature conversion, but also
can protect the privacy of the signed data. In this paper, we
present an efficient IDBPRS scheme in the standard model. The
proposed scheme is blind and bidirectional, and is proven to be
existentially unforgeable under the Diffie-Hellman assumption.
Furthermore, the performance analysis results show that our
IDBPRS scheme outperforms the Wang’s IDBPRS scheme in
terms of signature length and computational cost.
Keywords—ID-based proxy re-signature, blindness, standard
model, data privacy
I. INTRODUCTION
Digital signature can confirm the source and the integrity of
the data, and provides the signer’s non-repudiation. Therefore,
it is one of the key technologies for data security. However, in
some cases, we need to convert Alice’s signature to Bob’s
signature on the same message. For example, we verify Alice’s
signature but cannot know Alice’s public key or Alice’s public
key has expired. In order to achieve such a signature
conversion, Blaze et al. [1] proposed the concept of proxy re-
signature (PRS). In a PRS scheme, a semi-trusted proxy uses a
re-signing key to convert Alice’s signature to Bob’s signature,
but the proxy cannot generate a valid signature for any
message on behalf of either Alice or Bob.
The combination of identity-based cryptography and PRS
to design efficient identity-based proxy re-signature (IDPRS)
schemes has become a hot research topic in the field of
cryptography. In an IDPRS scheme, the user’s unique identity
information such as the email address is used as the user’s
public key, and the corresponding user’s private key is
generated by a trusted key generation center (KGC) using the
master secret key and the user’s identity. Hence, IDPRS
eliminates the need for public key certificates in traditional
PRS and simplifies public key management.
IDPRS has attracted the attention of researchers, and some
IDPRS schemes have been proposed in recent years. Shao et al.
[2] presented the first IDPRS scheme and proved the security
of their scheme in the standard model. Later, Hu et al. [3]
proposed a new IDPRS scheme without random oracles, but its
security depends on stronger complexity assumption. In order
to reduce the computational burden on the verifier, Yang et al.
[4] proposed an IDPRS scheme to delegate most of the
computational tasks of signature verification to a server. Feng
et al. [5] used the target collision-resistant hash function to
design an IDPRS scheme, but there was a security flaw that the
security of their scheme could not be reduced to the hardness
of the associated complexity assumption [6]. Wang and Xia [7]
proposed an IDPRS scheme with aggregate property using the
full domain hash structure. However, their scheme was proved
to be selectively secure under stronger complexity assumption.
Huang et al. [8] proposed an efficient IDPRS scheme which
was provably secure in the random oracle model. Jiang et al. [9]
and Tian [10] respectively constructed IDPRS schemes over
lattices in the random oracle model, but the length of key and
signature is relatively large. It is well known that a scheme that
is proven to be secure in a random oracle model might be
insecure in reality [11]. Therefore, it is very important to
design a secure IDPRS scheme in the standard model, such as
not relying on ideal random oracles or stronger complexity
assumptions.
However, the above schemes [2-10] do not take into
account the privacy of the data. That is, the signer or the proxy
knows the details of the data to be signed. To overcome the
shortcomings of ordinary IDPRS schemes, Wang [12]
presented an identity-based blind proxy re-signature (IDBPRS)
scheme in the standard model which is the only available
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2018 IEEE Third International Conference on Data Science in Cyberspace
978-1-5386-4210-8/18/$31.00 ©2018 IEEE
DOI 10.1109/DSC.2018.00013