医疗物联网RFID认证：椭圆曲线密码技术的应用与分析
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"这篇研究论文深入探讨了椭圆曲线密码技术在医疗环境中物联网RFID认证方案的应用和分析。随着信息和通信技术的进步，物联网（IoT）在医疗领域得到了广泛应用，如实时监控、病人信息管理、医疗急救管理、血液信息管理和健康管理等。其中，射频识别（RFID）技术是物联网部署的关键技术之一。为了满足RFID在医疗IoT环境中的各种安全需求，过去十年间提出了许多RFID认证方案。最近，基于椭圆曲线密码学（ECC）的RFID认证方案受到了广泛关注，并被应用于医疗环境。本文详细讨论了ECC为基础的RFID认证方案的安全需求和优势，以及它们如何改进现有的RFID安全性能。"
在物联网（IoT）的医疗应用中，RFID技术扮演着至关重要的角色，它能够实现设备的自动化识别和数据交换，极大地提高了医疗服务的效率和准确性。然而，RFID系统也面临着诸如身份伪造、数据篡改、隐私泄露等安全挑战。为了解决这些问题，研究人员开始探索更安全的加密算法，其中椭圆曲线密码学（ECC）因其高效性和安全性成为了热门选择。
ECC是一种公钥加密技术，以其高效的计算性能和相对较小的密钥长度而闻名。相比于传统的RSA加密，ECC可以在保持相同安全级别的情况下使用更短的密钥，这在资源有限的RFID设备中尤其重要。此外，ECC还具有抵抗量子计算机攻击的能力，因为它的数学基础——椭圆曲线离散对数问题，被认为比RSA的因子分解问题更难解决。
论文中，作者Debiao He和Sherali Zeadally分析了ECC如何应用于RFID认证协议，以提供更强的身份验证、数据完整性和机密性保护。他们可能讨论了ECC在密钥协商、签名和加密过程中的具体实现，以及如何通过这些机制防止中间人攻击、重放攻击和假冒设备攻击。此外，他们也可能评估了ECC在实际医疗环境中的性能，包括计算和通信开销，以及对电池寿命的影响。
通过对现有ECC-RFID认证方案的比较和分析，作者可能会提出未来研究的方向，比如优化协议设计以提高效率，或者结合其他安全技术来增强整体系统的安全性。这项工作对于理解如何利用ECC强化医疗物联网的RFID安全有着重要意义，有助于推动医疗物联网领域的进一步发展。
74 IEEE INTERNET OF THINGS JOURNAL, VOL. 2, NO. 1, FEBRUARY 2015
backscatter modulation to send messages. The active tag
is equipped with a small battery and a radio transceiver. It
can communicate directly with the reader.
2) RFID reader: An RFID reader is composed of a radio
transmitter, a radio receiver, a control unit, and a memory
unit. The main function of an RFID reader is to enable the
RFID tag and the server to exchange messages between
each other and achieve mutual authentication. Usually, the
RFID reader’s computing capacity is higher compared to
that of the RFID tag.
3) Server: A server is a trusted entity. To achieve the goal
of mutual authentication, it stores all the RFID tag’s iden-
tification information in its database when the system is
set up. Using the stored identification information, the
server could determine the validity of the tag. Usually,
the server’s computing capability and memory capacity
are high.
B. Security Requirements for RFID Communication
RFID authentication is one of the most important steps to
ensure secure communication in the RFID system. However,
messages transmitted between the RFID tag and the RFID
reader are exposed to many kinds of security threats. Previous
research efforts on RFID security have identified the following
security requirements that must be satisfied to ensure secure
RFID communications in addition to a robust and efficient
authentication scheme in place [57], [60], [61], [66], [67].
1) Mutual authentication: It is essential that mutual authen-
tication among the RFID tag, the RFID reader, and the
server should be achieved before a session starts. In our
system architecture, the communication channel between
the RFID reader and the server is secure. In this case,
only mutual authentication between the RFID tag and the
server is required.
2) Confidentiality: It is essential that the secret information
(such as identity and password) stored in the RFID tag
cannot be retrieved by the adversary when it is transmit-
ted through the communication channels. The adversary
could impersonate the tag to the server if access to the
secret information is possible. The information must be
encrypted before transmission.
3) Anonymity: It is essential that an RFID authentication
scheme should provide anonymity. The adversary will
violate the owner’s privacy and trace his/her action if the
tag’s identity becomes known. The tag’s identity must be
encrypted as part of the mutual authentication process.
4) Availability: It is essential that the authentication process
of an RFID authentication scheme be executed during
the lifecycle of the RFID tag. To provide anonymity, the
RFID tag and the server in most of RFID authentication
schemes update the secret information shared between
them when the authentication scheme is executed. If an
adversary destroys the synchronization of the update, the
authentication scheme will be invalid.
5) Forward security: It is essential that an RFID authenti-
cation scheme provides forward security. In many RFID
authentication schemes, the adversary could trace back
the past location of the tag if the secret information from
the RFID tag is successfully retrieved by the adversary.
This will seriously violate the owner’s privacy.
6) Scalability: It is essential that an RFID authentication
scheme should be scalable. To authenticate the RFID tag,
the s erver in the RFID system has to find the matching
record from its database. If the computational workload
of the searching algorithm increases significantly as the
number of RFID tags increases, the system will not scale.
7) Attack resistance: To guarantee secure communication
within the RFID system, the RFID authentication pro-
cess should be secure against various attacks including the
replay attack, the tag masquerade attack, the server spoof-
ing attack, the man-in-the-middle attack, the tag cloning
attack, and the modification attack.
III. R
EVIEW OF SEVERAL NOVE L ECC-BASED RFID
A
UTHENTICATION SCHEMES
Wolkerstorfer [31] introduced the concept of ECC-based
RFID authentication scheme in 2005. However, he did not pro-
pose any specific authentication scheme. Tuyls and Batina [32]
adopted Schnorr’s identification protocol [33] and proposed the
first ECC-based RFID authentication scheme in 2006. Later,
Batina et al. [34] adopted Okamoto’s identification protocol
[35] and proposed another ECC-based RFID authentication
scheme in 2007. However, Lee et al. [36] pointed out that both
Tuyls and Batina’s scheme [32] and Batina et al.’s scheme
[34] cannot provide anonymity. To enhance security and ensure
anonymity, Lee et al. [36] proposed a provably secure ECC-
based RFID authentication scheme. However, Bringer et al.
[37] found that Lee et al.’s scheme cannot withstand track-
ing attack (the adversary could track the tag’s action) and the
tag impersonation attack (where the adversary can imperson-
ate the tag to the server). To withstand those two attacks,
Bringer et al. [37] proposed a new RFID authentication scheme
called randomized Schnorr scheme. Later, Lee et al. [38] also
proposed an ECC-based RFID authentication scheme to with-
stand the tracking attack and the tag impersonation attack
against their previous schemes [36]. However, Deursen and
Radomirovi [39] pointed out that all of Lee et al.’s schemes
[38] cannot withstand the man-in-the-middle attack and the
tracking attack. Deursen and Radomirovic [48] pointed out
that Lee et al.’s schemes were vulnerable to the man-in-the-
middle attack. Sandhya and Rangaswamy [40] and Martinez
et al. [41] proposed two other authentication schemes using
the zero-knowledge proof and ECC. Zero-knowledge proof is
a method by which one party can prove to another party that
a given statement is true, without conveying any information
apart from the fact that the statement is indeed true. Later, Lv
et al. [42] pointed out that Martinez et al.’s scheme is vulnerable
to the tracking attack.
To overcome weaknesses in t heir previous schemes, Lee
et al. [43] proposed three improved ECC-based RFID
schemes. Later, Fan et al. [44] pointed out that all the
three schemes [43] were not secure against man-in-the-middle
attack. Subsequently, Lee et al. [45] analyze the privacy chal-
lenges in RFID systems and proposed three ECC-based RFID
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