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Transactions on Wireless Communications
IEEE TRANSACTIONS ON WIRELESS COMMUNICATIONS, VOL. XX, NO. YY, MONTH 2019 3
We assume that the wireless channels of the system undergo
independent identically distributed (i.i.d.) fading, where the
channels keep invariant within a frame duration T
f
and vary
between frames independently. Furthermore, the multicarri-
er transmission has been adopted to overcome the channel
frequency selective fading in the wireless environment and
we divide the whole system bandwidth B into N orthogonal
subcarriers.
For the kth subcarrier, h
(k)
SR
, h
(k)
RD
, h
(k)
RE
, and h
(k)
LI
respec-
tively represent the corresponding channel coefficients of the
source-relay (SR) link, the relay-destination (RD) channel, the
relay-eavesdropper (RE) link, and the LI channel. x
(k)
S
with
E[|x
(k)
S
|
2
] = p
(k)
S
and x
(k)
R
with E[|x
(k)
R
|
2
] = p
(k)
R
are the
transmitted signals from S and R over the kth subcarrier,
respectively, where E[·] is the expectation operator. p
(k)
S
and
p
(k)
R
respectively represent the transmit power of S and R
over the kth subcarrier [1]. Considering that nodes S, D, E
are all the legitimate network nodes, we premise that h
(k)
SR
,
h
(k)
RD
, h
(k)
RE
, ∀k, can be estimated via training pilot sequences
exchanged between the transmitter and receiver. Hence, the
perfect CSI about h
(k)
SR
, h
(k)
RD
, and h
(k)
RE
is available during the
information transmission.
In the FD mode, over the kth subcarrier, the received signals
at R, D, and E are expressed respectively as y
(k)
R
, y
(k)
D
, and
y
(k)
E
. We have
y
(k)
R
= h
(k)
SR
x
(k)
S
+ h
(k)
LI
x
(k)
R
+ n
(k)
R
, (1)
y
(k)
D
= h
(k)
RD
x
(k)
R
+ n
(k)
D
, (2)
y
(k)
E
= h
(k)
RE
x
(k)
R
+ n
(k)
E
, (3)
where n
(k)
R
, n
(k)
D
, and n
(k)
E
are the corresponding complex
additive white Gaussian noises (AWGNs) with the distribution
n
(k)
i
∼ CN (0, σ
2
i
), i ∈ {R, D, E} and σ
2
i
is the variance of
the complex AWGN. The two items, h
(k)
SR
x
(k)
S
and h
(k)
LI
x
(k)
R
in
(1), are the desired signal and the LI, respectively. In practice,
for the FD relay, its LI is much larger than the desired signal
sometimes. The LI cancelation becomes necessary, but it is
hard to completely remove the LI due to the imperfect channel
estimation. Considering the above non-ideal LI cancelation,
the practical received signal at R is written as
˜y
(k)
R
= h
(k)
SR
x
(k)
S
+
˜
h
(k)
LI
x
(k)
R
+ n
(k)
R
, (4)
where
˜
h
(k)
LI
is the estimated channel coefficient of the residual
LI link and
˜
h
(k)
LI
x
(k)
R
is the practical residual LI.
The instantaneous signal-to-noise ratios (SNRs) correspond-
ing to the above four transmission channels can be defined
as γ
(k)
SR
=
|h
(k)
SR
|
2
(σ
(k)
R
)
2
, γ
(k)
LI
=
|
˜
h
(k)
LI
|
2
(σ
(k)
R
)
2
, γ
(k)
RD
=
|h
(k)
RD
|
2
(σ
(k)
D
)
2
, and
γ
(k)
RE
=
|h
(k)
RE
|
2
(σ
(k)
E
)
2
, respectively. Then, the instantaneous signal-
to-interference-and-noise ratios (SINRs) of R, D, and E
over the kth subcarrier are obtained as γ
(k)
R
=
p
(k)
S
γ
(k)
SR
1+p
(k)
R
γ
(k)
LI
,
γ
(k)
D
= p
(k)
R
γ
(k)
RD
, and γ
(k)
E
= p
(k)
R
γ
(k)
RE
, respectively.
Based on the achievable secrecy rate of the HD relaying
system [25] and the SINRs of the relay and the eavesdropper
[1], we obtain the achievable secrecy rate of the kth subcarrier
in the secure FD relay system as
R
(k)
sec
=
"
log
2
1 + min{γ
(k)
R
, γ
(k)
D
}
1 + γ
(k)
E
!#
+
, (5)
where [x]
+
means the maximum value selection for a real
random variable x, also expressed as max{x, 0}.
From (5), it is noted that min
n
γ
(k)
R
, γ
(k)
D
o
≤ γ
(k)
E
if γ
(k)
RD
≤
γ
(k)
RE
, which means that the achievable secrecy rate R
(k)
sec
at
the kth subcarrier becomes zero. In other words, no transmit
power should be assigned to the kth subcarrier in this case.
Therefore, the system would interrupt the transmission from
R to D at the moment. Thus, the secrecy rate is non-negative
and γ
(k)
RD
> γ
(k)
RE
should always be satisfied.
The achievable system secrecy rate is the sum of the
achievable secrecy rate over all the subcarriers, which is
expressed as
R
sec
=
N
X
k=1
R
(k)
sec
. (6)
B. Secure Effective Capacity
The effective capacity is a powerful tool to address the
issue of statistical QoS guarantees, in terms of queue-length-
bound/delay-bound violation probability. In particular, for
a discrete-time stable queue with infinite buffer size, let
a[τ], (τ = 1, 2, ...), denote a discrete-time stationary and
ergodic service process, and A(t) ,
P
t
τ =1
a[τ] be the partial
sum of the service process. Supposing that G¨artner-Ellis limit
of A(t) exits, we can express it as
Λ
a
(θ) = lim
t→∞
1
t
log E[e
θA(t)
]= lim
t→∞
1
t
log E[e
θ
P
t
τ =1
a[τ ]
], (7)
where θ denotes a delay QoS exponent. It is a convex function
differentiable for all θ ≥ 0 [26].
Then, the effective capacity of this service process can be
formulated as [16]
E
sec
(θ) = −
Λ
a
(−θ)
θ
. (8)
If the service process is uncorrelated, then we have
E
sec
(θ) = −
1
θ
log(E
γ
[e
−θa[τ ]
]). (9)
According to the definition of the effective capacity [16], [26],
[27], the SEC essentially define the maximum secrecy rate
at a given delay QoS requirement [14]. Accordingly, for the
stochastic process which provides the secrecy service rate, we
formulate the SEC as
E
sec
(θ) = −
1
θ
log
E
γ
e
−θT
f
BR
sec
, (10)
where the delay QoS exponent θ is a crucial parameter to
characterize the exponential decay rate of the delay viola-
tion probability, B denotes the system bandwidth, and E
γ
means a mathematical expectation operation on the channel
state information. It is noticed that the SEC is a monotonic
decreasing function of the delay QoS exponent θ. Given θ, the
secure effective capacity E
sec
(θ) can be calculated. Moreover,