ISO/IEC 11889-1:2015 - Trusted Platform Module Library Part 1: Architecture

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"ISO/IEC 11889-1:2015是国际标准化组织（ISO）和国际电工委员会（IEC）联合发布的一份标准，它定义了可信平台模块（Trusted Platform Module, TPM）图书馆的第1部分：架构。这份标准主要涉及信息技术领域的安全硬件模块，旨在提供一个可信的计算基础，确保平台的安全性。" ISO/IEC 11889-1标准是关于可信平台模块（TPM）的详细规范，该模块是一个专门设计用于增强计算机系统安全性的硬件组件。TPM的主要目标是提供一套可靠的安全功能，包括密钥管理、数字签名、硬件级别的安全存储以及平台状态的验证。这一标准的第二版发布于2015年12月15日，并在2016年4月1日进行了修正。标准的内容通常包括以下几个方面： 1. **范围**：这部分会明确标准适用的领域，例如，它可能规定了TPM的通用功能、接口和安全特性，适用于各种类型的计算设备，如个人电脑、服务器和移动设备。 2. **规范性引用**：标准中可能会引用其他相关标准和技术文档，这些引用对于理解和实现TPM功能至关重要。 3. **术语和定义**：标准会定义与TPM相关的专业术语，以便读者准确理解标准的内容。 4. **架构**：详细描述TPM的硬件和软件架构，包括其内部组件、接口和通信协议，以及如何与其他系统组件交互。 5. **功能**：介绍TPM提供的各项功能，如生成和存储密钥、执行密码操作、平台配置寄存器（PCR）的使用，以及固件更新的安全验证等。 6. **安全性**：涵盖TPM的安全设计原则，包括保护机制、攻击防护和故障恢复策略。 7. **一致性测试**：为了确保产品符合标准，通常会提供一致性测试程序和要求，帮助制造商和验证机构检查TPM实现的正确性。 8. **实施指南**：可能包含指导制造商如何将TPM集成到硬件和操作系统中的建议。此标准对于确保全球范围内TPM的互操作性和安全性具有重要意义。它促进了不同厂商产品的兼容性，同时也为消费者和企业提供了可信赖的安全保障，有助于保护数据免受恶意攻击和未授权访问。通过遵循ISO/IEC 11889-1标准，制造商可以开发出更安全、更可靠的计算平台，满足日益增长的网络安全需求。

ISO/IEC 11889-1:2015(E)

Introduction

Collectively the four parts of ISO/IEC 11889 specify the architecture, data structures, command interface

and behavior of a Trusted Platform Module (TPM). A properly constructed platform that incorporates a

TPM meeting the requirements may enable establishing trust in platform scenarios involving security and

privacy.

TPMs require hardware protections to provide three roots of trust: storage, measurement, and reporting.

Basing TPM roots of trust in hardware is an improvement over software based solutions whose

protections are vulnerable to malicious software. The architecture defines a TPM that is a passive

component that receives commands and returns responses. The commands defined have meticulous

descriptions and perform primitive actions on data confidential to the TPM. Typical implementations

integrate a TPM in the context of a platform like a laptop or a mobile device. By sending commands to a

TPM and processing the responses, security benefits accrue for the platform as a whole. Properly

constructed platforms with a TPM can provide hardware based roots of trust for storage, measurement

and/or reporting.

The root of trust for storage consists primarily of creating, managing and protecting cryptographic keys

and other data values. Artifacts protected by or associated with encryption keys, like passwords,

certificates or other credentials, can be used for authentication and many other security scenarios.

Cryptographic keys can be created with restrictions on their use or management.

EXAMPLE 1 Cryptographic keys can be created that require a password to be used, have a single purpose (e.g.

signing), or cannot be exported elsewhere.

Separate from cryptographic key management, the root of trust for storage also allows data values to be

stored in a TPM so they are protected from unauthorized modification or can only be changed in defined

ways.

EXAMPLE 2 A data value protected by the TPM might be defined so it can be incremented but not decremented.

Typical use cases can include storing security policy information that can only be updated by an

authorized entity or incrementing a value to keep track of failed password entry attempts.

The root of trust for measurement is intended to reflect what software is running on a platform in a trusted

way. This root consists of the TPM and other components of a platform that start a chain of

measurements. Before software runs, its measurement is calculated and stored in the TPM by sending a

command. Later software can add more measurements, but cannot erase its own measurement that was

recorded before it started running. If the measurement process unconditionally starts when a platform is

powered on, the TPM ends up holding an accurate measurement of all the software running on the

system from each power-on. Across power cycles, the same software running on a platform results in the

same measurements being present in the TPM. Combining the root of trust for measurement with the

root of trust for storage, it is possible to create keys or store data using the TPM that only software with

specific measurements can use. The result is specific software on a platform can maintain its own keys,

confidential data or security policy information that is not accessible and not able to be tampered with by

other software that may run on the platform.

The root of trust for reporting helps entities external to a platform establish trust in platform software

measurements or cryptographic keys by proving the values exist in a TPM. TPMs have Endorsement

Keys that are essentially unique identities for a TPM. Through commands the TPM provides, it is

possible to prove keys exist in a TPM with a specific Endorsement Key. Establishing that a key exists in a

TPM permits services external to the TPM to trust a key is protected by a TPM’s root of trust for storage.

Also, if a key is known to be in a TPM, and the key is used to sign measurements of software, evidence of

what software is running on a platform can be shared with an external entity in a trusted way. This

enhances privacy protections as the need to share the TPM’s Endorsement Key identity directly with a

remote verifier can be avoided, resulting in a platform that can anonymously prove to a remote verifier

what software is running.

Not all privacy and security use cases enabled by this International Standard are relevant for all

platforms. For this reason, this International Standard is defined as a generic library of commands,

cryptographic algorithms and capabilities for which a subset can be used to meet the needs of a specific

ISO/IEC 11889-1:2015(E)

platform or i

mplementation, with the flexibility to meet diverse and even contradictory global requirement

sets. To address the needs of platform types, market segments, regulations, assurance criteria,

certification programs, etc., the structure allows complimentary materials to be developed by interested

parties constraining the generic library to address specific requirement sets. To promote product

interoperability, implementers are encouraged to consult existing specifications augmenting this

International Standard with domain specific considerations for specific applications and platform types. A

platform specific context is able to articulate scenarios, functionality, relevant security and privacy goals,

implementation considerations and methods of assurance. Because of the generic nature of this

International Standard, certification programs are likely to be based on additional specifications that

further define platform specific implementations and security characteristics. Having a single TPM library

that implementations across different platforms types can use to add security and privacy benefits lowers

complexity and permits reuse of software and security analysis across the trusted computing ecosystem.

EXAMPLE 3 Opt-in versus secure by default are examples of contradictory requirements for TPM provisioning

that are both supported by this International Standard.

This International Standard is useful for a variety of audiences. Two key audiences are TPM

implementers and adopters. Clauses 6 and 7 in this part of ISO/IEC 11889 are useful to orientate

audiences to the organization of the four parts and how they are used to build a compliant

implementation. Implementers will need to use all four parts to build a compliant implementation.

Adopters can benefit from the architectural concepts in this part of ISO/IEC 11889 when developing

scenarios and incorporating a TPM into a platform design. ISO/IEC 11889-2 and ISO/IEC 11889-3 are

beneficial for adopters to understand the syntax and semantics of using individual TPM commands.

Implementers and adopters of this International Standard need to carefully assess the appropriateness of

controllability, security and privacy capabilities and algorithms implemented for satisfying their goals. In

assessing algorithms, implementers and adopters should diligently evaluate available information.

Solutions involving cryptography are dependent on the solution architecture and on the properties of

cryptographic algorithms supported. Over time, cryptographic algorithms can develop deficiencies for

reasons like advances in cryptographic techniques or increased computing power. Solutions that support

a diversity of algorithms can remain durable when subsets of supported algorithms wane in usefulness.

Therefore, implementers intent on providing robust solutions are responsible for evaluating both algorithm

appropriateness and diversity.

The International Organization for Standardization (ISO) and International Electrotechnical Commission

(IEC) draw attention to the fact that it is claimed that compliance with this document may involve the use

of a patent.



ISO and IEC take no position concerning the evidence, validity and scope of this patent right.

The holder of this patent right has assured the ISO and IEC that he/she is willing to negotiate licences

either free of charge or under reasonable and non-discriminatory terms and conditions with applicants

throughout the world. In this respect, the statement of the holder of this patent right is registered with ISO

and IEC. Information may be obtained from:

Fujitsu Limited

1-1, Kamikodanaka 4- hrome, Nakahara-ku, Kawasaki-shi, Kanagawa, 211-8588 Japanc

Microsoft Corporation

One Microsoft Way, Redmond, WA 98052

Enterasys Networks, Inc

50 Minuteman Road, US-Andover, MA 01810

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