PREFACE xxiii
It was, however, systems engineering more of the ‘whole exceeds the sum of the parts’ nature than
of the ‘systemic engineering management’ variety adopted in the US for defense engineering.
Meanwhile, the 1990s saw a realization in the West that defense ‘systemic engineering
management’ version of systems engineering was unsuccessful, even counterproductive. Japanese
approaches to procurement and manufacturing were providing a powerful counter-example of how
to do these things much more efficiently and effectively; Japanese methods were ‘joined up,’
consensual and synthetic, rather than piecemeal, authoritarian and reductionist. Recognizing the
inevitable, the contemporary US administration led the way by discarding their military standards
and systemic engineering management practices, seeking instead to adopt Japanese methods, styles
and even culture in their revised approaches to defense procurement.
Damage had been done, however: the reputation of systems engineering was tarnished.
Redundant US DoD military standards and practices had imprinted a persistent legacy of people,
trained and experienced in the DoD practices, who still believed that those methods and practices
were sound. Even the core ideas of what systems engineering was about had been subverted. Instead
of being associated with innovation, creativity, managing complexity, excellence and integrity, it
had become associated with complication, ‘gold-plating,’ introspection and the engineering philos-
ophy of ‘giving the customer what he/she wants,’ as opposed to the original: solving the customer’s
problem and providing the whole of what the customer needs.
The demand for world-class systems engineering persisted, however, and many realized that
there had to be a way of creating better systems in all areas and walks of life. The ‘whole
systems approach’ was the only rational answer when viewing complex issues and problems;
piecemeal practices clearly did not work, more often than not exacerbating issues. Would-be
systems engineering practitioners were uncertain as to how to proceed; few could recall the ideas,
the vitality, the enthusiasm, the processes and the methods of earlier times. Whereas previously
these had been handed down typically within major aerospace companies by successive generations
of dedicated systems engineers, now employees might spend as little as three or four years in any
one job. The legacy was frittered away.
There had been a vibrant pool of classic systems engineering know-how in the so-called ‘systems
houses.’ These were companies, notably in the USA and Europe, which undertook the task of solving
customers’ problems objectively by conceiving, designing and providing whole-system bespoke, or
‘turnkey,’ solutions. In general, they were not manufacturing companies — to manufacture would
inevitably prejudice objectivity — but instead they either contracted engineering companies to
make parts to specification, or selected suitable existing parts that were available in the marketplace
and interfaced/integrated them so as to synthesize the whole solution. Systems houses valued their
integrity as well as objectivity, and they were generally creative and innovative, but it was not a
high-profit business, principally because they did not manufacture and sell hardware. Similarly,
there was limited profit in IDA systems, with minimal hardware, some software development and
some training of customer’s personnel.
The 1990s saw most systems houses driven out of the systems engineering business by the
large aerospace companies, who offered to do the work of the systems houses, particularly concept,
feasibility and project definition studies, often for nothing — an offer cash-strapped governments
found too tempting to forego. Unfortunately, some aerospace companies were sometimes less than
creative, and their solutions were invariably comprised of products from their own product range —
not the objective, innovative solution that government was seeking. Further, they had little to
offer in relation to IDA systems. This episode illustrated yet another example of the so-called
Law of Unintended Consequences, which so often seems to associate with piecemeal initiatives by
disjointed government.
Nothing if not resourceful, engineers in industry started to reinvent systems engineering.
Instead of working at ‘whole system’ level as had the originators, engineers employed their