多光子量子安全通信：突破与应用

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《多光子量子安全通信》是一本探讨在无序多光子脉冲背景下实现安全信息传输的新方法的著作，与传统的量子密钥分发技术相区别。该书主要关注非传统加密方式，强调利用量子通信的特性来保障信息安全。书中介绍了一种创新技术，通过光学纤维的偏振通道，能够安全地传输任何对称密钥，用于传统的数据加密。虽然书中所阐述的内容已经部分在实验室环境下得到了实践验证，作为概念验证而非商业级设备，它展示了量子通信在安全通信领域的潜力。作者Pramode K. Verma、Mayssaa El Rifai和Kam Wai Clifford Chan，分别来自美国俄克拉荷马大学电气与计算机工程学院，他们在信号与通信技术领域有着深厚的学术背景。这本书是"信号与通信技术"系列的一部分，更多关于该系列的信息可以访问Springer网站（<http://www.springer.com/series/4748>）。本书的国际标准书号(ISBN)分别为978-981-10-8617-5和978-981-10-8618-2，电子版可通过DOI: <https://doi.org/10.1007/978-981-10-8618-2> 获取。版权方面，该作品受到Springer Nature Singapore Pte Ltd的保护，所有权利保留，包括翻译、复制等。书中涉及的关键知识点包括： 1. **多光子量子通信**：基于量子力学原理，利用单个或多光子的量子态来进行信息传递，这些光子的量子纠缠性质使得通信过程高度安全。 2. **替代加密方法**：与传统的公钥密码学不同，书中探讨了无需依赖传统加密算法的安全通信途径，这在一定程度上降低了复杂性和潜在的攻击面。 3. **偏振通道的应用**：通过光纤的偏振态进行量子密钥分发，确保在数据加密阶段的密钥传输安全。 4. **实验室验证与实用性挑战**：尽管书中技术已经在实验室环境得到了初步实现，但书中也讨论了将理论转化为实际商用设备时可能面临的工程挑战和环境适应性问题。 5. **版权与授权**：强调版权保护，确保内容的合法传播，同时也为后续的研究者提供了明确的授权规定。《多光子量子安全通信》提供了一个前沿的视角，展现了量子信息技术如何在安全通信领域开辟新的路径，并对未来可能的通信基础设施发展具有重要参考价值。

Eve’s measurement conceals th the actual qumode used. In

the ﬁgure, the number of qumod es under the mask ing effect is

5. The two states for Bob to distinguish (the two ends of the

qumode basis in red) are well separated even with

measurement noise

.................................. 88

Fig. 5.1 Three-stage protocol operation

......................... 98

Fig. 5.2 Implementation of the three-stage protocol [5]

............. 100

Fig. 6.1 Representation of the choices of encoding angles and the

angles used over the channel for 2M =32

................ 108

Fig. 6.2 Man-in-the-middle attack

............................. 110

Fig. 6.3 Channel characterization angle iteration outcome

........... 112

Fig. 6.4 Different locations on the optical ﬁber, where Eve tries to

carry out man-in-the-middle attacks and impersonate Alice

and Bob

.......................................... 112

Fig. 6.5 Operation of the three-stage protocol using four variables

.... 114

Fig. 6.6 Implementation of the four variables three-stage protocol

..... 115

Fig. 7.1 Photon number splitting attack on the three-stage protocol

.... 123

Fig. 7.2 Interplay between the number of photons and P

........... 124

Fig. 7.3 Diagram of a Trojan horse attack on the three-sta ge

protocol

........................................... 127

Fig. 8.1 IR versus PNS attack on a three-stage protocol

............ 134

Fig. 8.2 Plots of the a IR and b PNS error probabilities of Eve as

functions of the mean number of photons N

............... 135

Fig. 8.3 Schematic diagram of the three-sta ge protocol under the

man-in-the-middle (MIM) attack

........................ 135

Fig. 8.4 Bob’s error probabilities in the estimation of X for the normal

three-stage operation (blue lines) and under the MIM attack

(red lines) at different values of the channel transmittance t.

The green lines denote the differences between the two error

probabilities

....................................... 137

Fig. 8.5 a Diagram of an ampliﬁcation attack on the three-stage

protocol b diagram of Eve’s amplifying medium

........... 138

Fig. 9.1 Four-way handshake message exchange between an access

point AP and a station STA

........................... 145

Fig. 9.2 Pairwise key hierarchy

............................... 145

Fig. 9.3 Quantum handshake procedure

......................... 147

Fig. 9.4 The three-stage protocol

.............................. 150

Fig. 9.5 Quantum handshake using the three-stage protocol

.......... 151

Fig. 9.6 Quantum handshake using the four variable three-stage

protocol

........................................... 152

Fig. 9.7 The quantum handshake of the IEEE 802.11i using the

single-stage protocol

................................. 153

Fig. 9.8 Implementation setup of the IEEE 802.11i integrated

with QKD

......................................... 154

xviii List of Figures

Fig. 9.9 Multi-agent approach to BB84 in IEEE 802.11i.

Source [8]

......................................... 155

Fig. 9.10 Operation of a multi-agent approac h ..................... 156

Fig. 9.11 Agents used for the three-stage (and its varia nts)

........... 157

Fig. 10.1 a Material theft, b Information theft

..................... 162

Fig. 10.2 Cross-section of an optical ﬁber

........................ 163

Fig. 10.3 Schematic diagram of polarization-based intrusion detection

system consists of: the measured data, and optical ﬁber with

FC connectors on both ends

........................... 165

Fig. 10.4 Sample text ﬁle of collected measurements

................ 165

Fig. 10.5 Results of single-mode ﬁber with occasi onal alterations

...... 167

Fig. 10.6 Results of perturbed single-mode ﬁ ber

................... 168

Fig. 10.7 Results of perturbed multimode ﬁber

.................... 169

Fig. 10.8 Real-life application of intrusion detection system: a switches

and IP camera layout; b intrusion detection system; c optical

ﬁber link layout; and d real-time video

................... 170

Fig. 10.9 Schematic diagram of real-life application of intrusion

detection system

.................................... 170

Fig. 11.1 Secure AES key transfer using a wavelength channel

........ 175

Fig. 11.2 Secure AES key transfer using the polarization channel

...... 176

Fig. 11.3 Poincaré sphere

..................................... 177

Fig. 11.4 Mueller matrix for SMF

.............................. 180

Fig. 11.5 256-POLSK [zone center values S_(3)]

.................. 180

Fig. 11.6 Schematic of the implementation

....................... 184

Fig. 11.7 Implementation system hardware and software

............. 185

Fig. 11.8 Changes in SoPs a over unperturbed ﬁber b over

perturbed ﬁber

...................................... 187

Fig. 11.9 Lab set up

......................................... 188

Fig. 11.10 Unperturbed ﬁber front panel LabVI EW

.................. 189

Fig. 11.11 Transmitted and received SoPs for unperturbed ﬁber

........ 189

Fig. 11.12 Perturbed ﬁber front panel LabVIEW

.................... 189

Fig. 11.13 SoPs plotted for perturbed ﬁber

........................ 190

Fig. 11.14 Calibration time and data rate

.......................... 190

Fig. 12.1 Difﬁe-Hellman key exchange

.......................... 196

Fig. 12.2 Man in the middle attack in case of a Difﬁe-Hellman key

exchange system

.................................... 197

Fig. 12.3 Key exchange scheme using discrete logar ithms............ 198

Fig. 12.4 Man in the middle attack on the proposed system

.......... 200

Fig. 12.5 The operation of the multi-stage protocol using four

variables

.......................................... 203

Fig. 12.6 Key exchange scheme using the two-stage protocol (iteration

zero cycle n)

....................................... 204

List of Figures xix

not begin until around a hundred years ago. In the next section, a brief history of

cryptography is offered starting from the ﬁrst known evidence of its usage in Egypt

up until now.

The concept of securing messages throu gh cryptography has a long history that

may be divided to four main phases:

– From ancient civilization till the beginning of the twentieth century with simple

algorithms designed and implemented by hand.

– Around the second world war with the extens ive use of electro-mechanical

machines.

– In the last ﬁfty years with the widespread use of the computers supported by a

mathematical framework.

– The new era of cryptography based on quantum mechanics instead o f the use

mathematical techniq ues.

1.1.1 Short History

Ancient Cryptography

The art of cryptography began around 1900 B.C when an Egyptian scribe used a

non-hieroglyph for inscription. The earliest known text containing components of

cryptography originated in the Egyptian town Menet Khufu on the tomb of

Khnumhotep II. The scribe used uncommon hieroglyphic symbols here and there

instead of the more commonly used ones. The inscription was not meant to be

secret, the transformation was made to dignify it. Only those privileged with an

extensive education were able to read and write hieroglyphs. This is the oldest

known text to incorporate transformations in the o riginal text though these trans-

formations did not protect the privacy of the text but merely gloriﬁed it [2].

In 1500 B.C ancient Assyrian merchants used intaglio, a ﬂat stone with a collage

of images and some writing to identify themselves in trading transactions. This

mechanism is nowadays known as “digital signature”. A particular engraving

belonged to a certain trader who was the sole owner of the intaglio that can produce

the signature.

During 500–600 B.C., Hebrew transcribers writing down the book of Jeremiah

made use of a reversed-alphabet substitution cipher known as ATBASH. The name

derives from the ﬁrst, last, second, and second to last Hebrew letters

(Aleph-Tav-Beth-Shin). It works by substituting the ﬁrst letter of an alphabet for the

last letter, the second letter for the second to last, and so on, effectively reversing the

alphabet. The ATBASH cipher of the Latin alphabet is given in the Table 1.1 [3]:

Table 1.1 ATBASH cipher

of the Latin alphabet

Plaintext ABCDEFGHIJKLMNOPQRSTUVWXYZ

Ciphertext ZYXWVUTSRQPONMLKJIHGFEDCBA

2 1 Introduction

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多光子量子安全通信：突破与应用

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