航天系统故障健康管理理论与设计策略

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"系统故障健康管理"是一篇深入探讨航天航空领域系统健康管理和故障管理（PHM）理论与设计策略的重要论文。作者Stephen B. Johnson和John C. Day来自美国国家航空航天局（NASA）马歇尔太空飞行中心和Inspace Systems，他们共同提出了一个基础性的系统健康管理系统理论，包括其子集——故障管理（FM）。论文首先阐述了系统健康管理系统理论的核心原则，这些原则定义了理论的基础假设，并将其与工程学中的其他主要概念和理论相联系。系统健康管理不仅关注系统的正常运行，还着重于预防、检测和应对潜在故障，以确保系统的可靠性和效率。故障管理在系统设计过程中扮演关键角色，它涉及到设计出能够预测、识别并有效响应操作中可能出现的故障的能力。作者详细地讨论了故障管理的功能，包括实时监控、故障模式识别、故障诊断以及制定相应的预防措施和应急计划。进一步地，论文强调了理论的实际应用，提出了一套系统设计过程的第一步，旨在将健康管理系统的能力融入到系统的各个层面。这包括早期故障预防、健康状态评估、性能监控以及与维护活动的集成，确保系统的持续可用性。通过介绍这些核心理念和实践步骤，论文为航空航天和其他复杂电子系统的健康管理提供了一个全面而实用的框架。理解并实施有效的系统故障健康管理，对于降低运行风险、提高系统可靠性和整体性能具有重要意义。这篇论文不仅深化了对PHM的理解，而且为工程师们提供了在设计阶段引入健康管理系统的关键指导。

American Institute of Aeronautics and Astronautics

Fault and failure are interdependent, recursive concepts of “cause” and “effect,” as shown in Figure 1. Seen from

one perspective, a fault explains a given failure, but from another, that same fault is seen as the failure that needs an

explanation. For example, in the Columbia tragedy of 2003, the hole in the leading edge of the wing is the failure

that needs explaining, and its cause is a chunk of insulation foam hitting the wing and causing a structural breach.

However, from the perspective of the designers of the External Tank, the foam falling off the External Tank is the

failure to be explained, and its cause was air bubbles in the foam insulation. In turn, the air bubbles in the foam can

be seen as the failure, and flaws in the

foam application process seen as the fault

that explains it. This process can continue

for quite a long time in a failure

investigation, but ultimately the

investigation stops and no further causes

are sought. The first causes in these long

chains of explanation are the root causes—

failure is often the result of the interactive

effects of several root causes. The term

“root cause” is also relative, because as far

as one group is concerned, the explanation

that satisfies them so that they require no

deeper explanation is their root cause.

However, another group may not be

satisfied with this. For them, the original

group’s root cause is not a cause at all, but

a failure to be explained. When they stop

their investigation, their first causes are the

root causes. The recursive nature of these

terms helps to explain the major difficulties

that many groups have had in defining

them, but also explains their utility.

F. Human Causation of System Failure

Human causation of the majority of failures is a key axiom of SHM theory. Human faults, whether individual or

social via miscommunication or lack of communication, are the root causes for most failures, other than a relatively

small percentage of failures caused by expected system wear-out or environmental causes. Those who have

compiled aerospace failure databases suggest that the vast majority (80% or more) of failures are ultimately due to

one of two fundamental causes: individual performance failures, and social communicative failures. This should

come as little surprise. As is now well understood through studies in the history and sociology of science and

technology, humans create and operate systems for their own purposes, using individual and social processes.

It is

therefore human failings in these areas that lead to faults in design, manufacturing, or operations. We interpret the

Columbia Accident Investigation Board’s finding that NASA’s “culture” is a cause of human spaceflight disasters as

ultimately due to the principle of human causation of system failure.

The results of human faults differ, depending on when they occur in the system life cycle. Human mistakes in the

design phase generally lead to “design faults” or “common mode failures,” since they lead to faults in all copies of

the system. Mistakes in manufacturing generally lead to faults in single copies of the system. These are typically

called “random part failure”, though the label of “random” is usually a cover for our inability to find the human fault

that is almost always the root cause. In manufacturing, faults can also lead to failures in all copies of the system, but

when this is true, the fault is in the design of equipment that manufactures multiple copies, in which case the fault is

ultimately a design flaw. Mistakes in operations are generally considered human operational faults, and are often

blamed on the operators. However, since most failures are ultimately due to humans, then most of them share this

fundamental similarity. For SHM, the implication of human causation is that SHM must address all failure causes,

whether “design faults,” “manufacturing faults”, or “operator faults”, and that the basic rates of occurrence of these

faults are roughly the same due to common human causation. Too often the SHM design focuses on random part

failure, despite the fact that the the other two major failure types are usually just as frequent.

G. System Complexity

Figure 1. Failure / Fault Recursion. Failures and faults are

recursive concepts, and the classification will depend on the

perspective of the observer and whether the analysis is causal or

explanatory.

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