Computer Security and Privacy in the Interactions Between Victim Service
Providers and Human Trafficking Survivors
Christine Chen
Paul G. Allen School of Computer Science & Engineering
University of Washington
Nicola Dell
The Jacobs Institute
Cornell Tech
Franziska Roesner
Paul G. Allen School of Computer Science & Engineering
University of Washington
Abstract
A victim service provider, or VSP, is a crucial partner in a
human trafficking survivor’s recovery. VSPs provide or con-
nect survivors to resources such as medical care, legal ser-
vices, employment opportunities, etc. In this work, we study
VSP-survivor interactions from a computer security and pri-
vacy perspective. Through 17 semi-structured interviews
with staff members at VSPs and survivors of trafficking, we
surface the role technology plays in VSP-survivor interac-
tions as well as related computer security and privacy con-
cerns and mitigations. Our results highlight various tensions
that VSPs must balance, including building trust with their
clients (often by giving them as much autonomy as possible)
while attempting to guide their use of technology to mitigate
risks around revictimization. We conclude with concrete rec-
ommendations for computer security and privacy technolo-
gists who wish to partner with VSPs to support and empower
trafficking survivors.
1 Introduction
Human trafficking is a crime in which a perpetrator, or “traf-
ficker”, preys on vulnerable individuals through atrocities
such as sexual exploitation, forced labor, or the removal of
organs [30]. As a conservative estimate, around 24.9 mil-
lion individuals worldwide are being exploited in this man-
ner [16]. Technology is playing an increasing role in this
ecosystem, from enabling trafficking via online platforms
(e.g., [2, 18]) to aiding in the detection and halting of traf-
ficking (e.g., [6, 25]).
In this work, we focus on a previously understudied role
that technology plays in the human trafficking ecosystem:
technology in the interactions between trafficking survivors
and organizations known as victim service providers, or
VSPs. VSPs exist to support their clients by providing re-
sources such as temporary shelter, help with employment
and legal issues, and mental health support. In this work,
we focus on VSPs providing resources to individuals who
are exiting or recovering from a trafficking situation. These
resources are critical in protecting these individuals from for-
mer or future exploiters (“revictimization”).
Our research is driven by the following questions: How do
VSPs communicate and interact with their clients (trafficking
survivors), and, particularly, what role does technology play
in that interaction? What are VSPs’ computer security con-
cerns and threat models, both for themselves and on behalf of
their clients? What technical (or non-technical) strategies do
they use to mitigate these concerns? And, ultimately, what
opportunities exist to better safeguard VSPs and their clients
from a computer security perspective?
To investigate these questions, we conducted a qualitative
interview study with 17 participants, including staff mem-
bers at VSPs and several trafficking survivors. We analyzed
these interviews using thematic analysis common in qualita-
tive research. Our findings shed light on the general role of
technology in VSP-survivor interactions (Section 4.1), the
computer security concerns and threat models of VSPs and
their clients (Section 4.2), and the corresponding defenses,
where present (Section 4.3). We identify fundamental ten-
sions and challenges that must be taken into account by tech-
nologists who wish to improve VSP and client security and
privacy (Section 5).
At a high level, we find that VSPs make technology-
related choices with the goals of protecting their clients from
revictimization and other harm. Specific instances of how
VSPs protect clients include helping clients lock down social
media accounts and enforcing shelter rules restricting photos
or social media posts (that may reveal the shelter’s location).
We also find that, sometimes, the most effective means for
VSPs and their clients to interact are not the most conducive
to client safety. For example, despite the potential risk of
trafficker-compromised accounts, some VSPs use Facebook
to communicate with clients because it provides a reliable
way to reach them even in the absence of cellular service.
More generally, we find that our participants must balance
building client trust and maintaining contact with imposing
technology-related client safety rules.
From findings such as these, we distill concrete recom-
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