可编辑财团区块链保障工业物联网安全与透明

研究论文

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本文主要探讨了在工业物联网（Industrial Internet-of-Things, IIoT）背景下，如何构建一种可编辑的财团区块链（Consortium Blockchain），以应对日益增长的计算能力带来的安全挑战。传统的区块链技术，如比特币的公有链，由于其去中心化、透明且不可篡改的特性，被广泛用于建立信任层。然而，这种高度的透明性也可能成为安全隐患，如51%攻击可能导致数据操纵，匿名性和不可更改性则可能被用于非法交易。随着IIoT设备的多样化和互联性增强，确保安全性变得至关重要。现有的联盟链（Consortium Blockchain）方案虽然成本效益较高，但面对强大攻击时，无法轻易地修改历史记录，一旦链条受到破坏，恢复到正常状态成为一个棘手问题。为了实现对IIoT设备可控的区块链运营，Ethereum团队曾提出使用变色龙哈希（Chameleon Hash, CH）的可编辑区块链概念（EuroS&P 2017）。CH允许在必要时对区块链历史进行修改，从而提供了一种潜在的解决方案。然而，将这一理念应用于工业物联网面临挑战。首先，需要解决的是如何在保证IIoT设备间协作与数据共享的同时，确保信息的隐私性和可控制性。这可能涉及到对CH的优化，比如提高其效率以适应工业环境中的高数据流量。其次，如何设计一个有效的权限管理系统，确保只有授权的节点能够进行历史修改，防止滥用和恶意操作，是另一个核心问题。此外，文章还可能探讨了与其他安全技术（如多方计算、零知识证明）的结合，以进一步增强可编辑区块链在IIoT中的适用性和安全性。同时，可能涉及对区块链性能、扩展性以及合规性的考量，因为这些因素对于工业级应用来说至关重要。这篇研究论文旨在探索如何通过创新的区块链技术手段，如可编辑的财团区块链，来平衡IIoT的安全需求、隐私保护和数据完整性，以实现工业互联网的可持续发展。通过解决上述问题，该研究对于推动IIoT安全架构的改进具有重要意义，为工业界和学术界提供了新的思考方向和实践指导。

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3670 IEEE TRANSACTIONS ON INDUSTRIAL INFORMATICS, VOL. 15, NO. 6, JUNE 2019

Building Redactable Consortium Blockchain

for Industrial Internet-of-Things

Ke Huang , Xiaosong Zhang ,YiMu , Senior Member, IEEE, Xiaofen Wang,

Guomin Yang

, Senior Member, IEEE, Xiaojiang Du , Senior Member, IEEE,

Fatemeh Rezaeibagha

,QiXia , and Mohsen Guizani , Fellow, IEEE

Abstract—Applying consortium blockchain as a trust

layer for heterogeneous industrial Internet-of-Things de-

vices is cost-effective. However, with an increase in com-

puting power, some powerful attacks (e.g., the 51% attack)

are inevitable and will cause severe consequences. Re-

cent studies also conﬁrm that anonymity and immutability

of blockchain have been abused to facilitate black market

trades, etc. To operate controllable blockchain for IIoT de-

vices, it is necessary to rewrite blockchain history back to a

normal state once the chain is breached. Ateniese et al. pro-

posed redactable blockchain by using chameleon hash (CH)

to replace traditional hash function, it allows blockchain his-

tory to be written when needed (EuroS&P 2017). However,

we cannot apply this idea directly to IIoT without solving

the following problems: (1) achieve a decentralized design

of CH; (2) update the signatures accordingly to authenticate

the redacted contents; (3) satisfy the low-computing need

of the individual IIoT device. In this paper, we overcome the

above issues by proposing the ﬁrst threshold chameleon

hash (TCH) and accountable-and-sanitizable chameleon

signature (ASCS) schemes. Based on them, we build a

redactable consortium blockchain which is efﬁcient for IIoT

devices to operate. It allows a group of authorized sensors

to write and rewrite blockchain without causing any hard

Manuscript received January 27, 2019; accepted February 17, 2019.

Date of publication February 22, 2019; date of current version June 12,

2019. This work was supported in part by the National Key R&D Program

of China under Grant 2017YFB0802300, in part by the National Natural

Science Foundation of China under Grants U1833122, 61572115, and

61872087, in part by the Sichuan Provincial Major Frontier Issues under

Grant 2016JY0007, and in part by the foundation from the State Key

Laboratory of Integrated Services Networks, Xidian University (ISN18-

09). Paper no. TII-19-0278. (Corresponding author: Ke Huang.)

K. Huang, X. Zhang, X. Wang, and Q. Xia are with the Center for

Cyber Security, the College of Computer Science and Engineering, Uni-

versity of Electronic Science and Technology of China, Chengdu 611731,

China (e-mail:, kh936@uowmail.edu.au; johnsonzxs@uestc.edu.cn;

wangxuedou@sina.com; xiaqi@uestc.edu.cn).

Y. Mu is with the Fujian Provincial Key Laboratory of Network Security

and Cryptology, College of Mathematics and Informatics, Fujian Normal

University, Fuzhou 350007, China (e-mail:, ymu.ieee@gmail.com).

G. Yang is with the Institute of Cybersecurity and Cryptology, School

of Computing and Information Technology, University of Wollongong,

Wollongong 2519, Australia (e-mail:, gyang@uow.edu.au).

X. Du is with the Department of Computer and Information Sciences,

Temple University Philadelphia, PA 19122 USA (e-mail:,dxj@ieee.org).

F. Rezaeibagha is with the SMART Infrastructure, University of Wol-

longong, Wollongong 2519, Australia (e-mail:, fr683@uowmail.edu.au).

M. Guizani is with the Department of Electrical and Computer

Engineering, University of Idaho, Moscow, ID 83843 USA (e-mail:,

mguizani@ieee.org).

Color versions of one or more of the ﬁgures in this paper are available

online at http://ieeexplore.ieee.org.

Digital Object Identiﬁer 10.1109/TII.2019.2901011

forks. Basically, TCH is the ﬁrst TCH and ASCS is a public-

key signature supporting ﬁle-level and block-level modiﬁca-

tions of signatures without impairing authentications. Ad-

ditionally, ASCS achieves accountability to avoid abuse of

redaction. While security analysis validates our proposals,

the simulation results show that redaction is acceptably ef-

ﬁcient if it is executed at a small scale or if we adopt a

coarse-grained redaction while sacriﬁcing some securities.

Index Terms—Chameleon hash (CH), chameleon signa-

ture (CS), consortium blockchain, industrial Internet-of-

Things (IIoT), sanitization.

I. INTRODUCTION

HE industrial Internet-of-Things (IIoT) envisions connec-

tions and interactions of massive heterogeneous devices

for a smarter and more autonomous industry [1], [2]. Gener-

ally, IIoT devices are geographically distributed, computation-

ally limited and adopt different techniques. This requires a de-

centralized, efﬁcient, and cross-platform trust layer to connect

all IIoT devices [3], [4]. However, there is no conventional net-

work structure which can achieve these features efﬁciently. The

blockchain proposed by Nakamoto [5] is considered as a prefer-

able answer as it provides a public, decentralized, and immutable

trust layer [6], [7]. While integrating blockchain with IIoT net-

work, efﬁciency and security are two crucial aspects to consider

[7], [8]. For efﬁciency, it is suggested to adopt lightweight cryp-

tographic schemes as most IIoT devices have limited computing

resources. For security, the underlying cryptographic schemes

such as SHA-256 and elliptic curve discrete signature algorithm

(ECDSA) [9] were well studied. Noticeably, public blockchain

has recently been accused of abusing anonymity and immutabil-

ity to facilitate black market trades, ﬁnance terrorists and dis-

tribute illegal contents, etc [10]. Meanwhile, attacks against

blockchain are evolving to become stronger and more powerful

(the well known 51% attack has already been witnessed [11]),

they pose signiﬁcant threats to those relying on blockchain to

build trust, especially for industries where valuable, sensitive,

and real-time activities are taking place.

To repair blockchain from corruptions, Ateniese et al. [10]

proposed the notion of “redactable blockchain” by enabling

chameleon hash (CH) [12] to rewrite blockchain history. How-

ever, this idea cannot be applied to a typical IIoT scenario due to

1) lack of a threshold version of CH;

2) no authentication to validate redaction; and

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