SDN环境中的恶意主机攻击防御策略

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"本文探讨了在软件定义网络(SDN)环境中对抗恶意终端主机攻击的安全技术。文中提出了一个安全架构设计，该架构包括在SDN控制器中运行的安全管理应用，用于指定和评估安全策略，以及在交换机中实现这些安全策略的组件，以强制执行网络流量的安全策略。提出的解决方案能帮助在攻击端主机的流量请求到达SDN控制器之前检测到它们，同时，对于在与SDN控制器交互后变为恶意并发起数据平面攻击的主机，该架构也有机制来应对这些发生在路由建立后的攻击。SDN控制器的全局网络视图使得能够检测和防御这些威胁。" SDN（Software-Defined Networking）是一种新型网络架构，它将网络控制功能与转发功能分离，使得网络的管理和配置变得更加集中化和灵活。在这种环境下，恶意终端主机的攻击可能会对网络的稳定性和安全性构成严重威胁。论文提出的SDN安全架构由两部分组成：一是运行在SDN控制器中的安全管理应用，二是交换机中的安全组件。安全管理应用是整个架构的核心，它的主要任务是定义和评估网络的安全策略。这可能涉及到访问控制、流量监控、异常检测等策略，以防止恶意流量进入网络。通过这种方式，可以预先阻止潜在的恶意流量，避免其对网络造成破坏。安全组件部署在网络的交换机中，它们负责执行由控制器制定的安全策略。这包括但不限于对网络流量的过滤、深度包检查（Deep Packet Inspection, DPI）、会话分析等，确保只有符合安全规定的流量才能通过网络。此外，这些组件还能实时监测网络行为，以便及时发现并响应任何异常活动。针对那些在与SDN控制器交互后变恶意的主机，论文提出的架构具备后处理机制。即使攻击发生在路由已经建立之后，如数据平面的DDoS攻击或中间人攻击，系统也能识别并采取措施限制或阻止这些攻击。这通常需要通过持续的监控和更新安全策略来实现。 SDN控制器的全局网络视图是这个安全体系的关键优势。由于控制器能够看到整个网络的状态，因此可以更有效地识别和隔离恶意行为，提供跨域的威胁检测能力。这种全局视角使得快速响应和修复成为可能，提高了网络的整体安全性。这篇论文为SDN环境下的网络安全提供了一种全面的解决方案，不仅能在流量请求到达控制器前进行预检测，还能对已发生攻击的情况作出及时反应，增强了SDN网络的防护能力。通过这样的安全架构，网络管理员可以更有效地管理和保护他们的网络资源，抵御来自恶意终端的各种威胁。

162 IEEE TRANSACTIONS ON NETWORK AND SERVICE MANAGEMENT, VOL. 17, NO. 1, MARCH 2020

Fig. 2. SDN Environment.

II. ATTACKER MODEL

Consider an SDN environment shown in Figure 2 with

heterogeneous devices such as client and server machines,

and wireless mobile devices. The client and server machines

are either physical hosts or implemented as virtual machines

(VMs) running on a hypervisor or virtual machine monitor

(VMM) [16] based system. A VMM is an additional software

layer that has complete control over the physical resources

underneath and enables to run multiple VMs on a scalable

computer. The hosts are connected to the Internet using a

gateway/switch.

The SDN Controller enables programming the networking

devices and establishes routes for communication between the

hosts. For example, the Controller in Figure 2 conﬁgures the

Flow Tables in switches S2, S1 and the OVS in VMM1 to

enable communication between Host 1 and VM1. The switches

can be physical or virtual devices and can have any function-

ality from layer 2 to 7 in the OSI model. For example, client

and server machines can be connected using physical switches;

VMs hosted on the VMM are connected using the virtual

Open vSwitch (OVS) based on OpenFlow. Hence depending

on the functionality supported by a switch, appropriate secu-

rity policies can be enforced in that switch. For example, a

layer 2 device can enforce security mechanisms based on the

MAC protocol values, whereas layer 3 devices can have secu-

rity mechanisms on IP protocol values, and layer 7 devices can

enforce application level security policies, and virtual switches

can use introspection to monitor the internal state of the virtual

machines in their enforcement of security policies.

The focus of this paper is on the attacker model where the

goal of the attacker is to exploit the weaknesses in the end

hosts to compromise them (and turn them malicious) and make

use of the compromised hosts to generate attacks. As network

systems are ofen large and dynamic, there exist several oppor-

tunities for an attacker to compromise some system within an

organisation’s network and then use the compromised system

to access sensitive information, inject malicious messages into

the network and spread the attacks. There is an ever increas-

ing number of attacks including zero day attacks for which

no solutions are previously known (e.g., no software patches

exist) at the time of the attack. Although such attacks are not

speciﬁc to SDNs, there is a need to deal with such attacks in

SDNs just like in any network system.

Our proposed security solution is aimed at dealing with the

following set of attacks in a SDN environment.

• Flooding attacks from malicious end hosts: Our security

solution aims is to protect the switches and the SDN

Controller from ﬂooding attacks from malicious end hosts

such as in [17]. One of the challenges with securing the

Controller is that it has to be accessible to the users and

end host applications while at the same time protecting

the Controller from ﬂooding attacks from such end hosts.

For example, the malicious hosts can directly ﬂood the

Controller and/or the switches by using their address as

the destination address. This can happen in the SDN as

follows: The end hosts use intent messages in SDN for

conveying the speciﬁc ﬂow requirements. Since all the

intent messages will be destined to the Controller, a mali-

cious end host can obtain the IP address of the Controller

by analysing the intent messages and then use this IP

address for ﬂooding the Controller. The end hosts can

also perform a traceroute to obtain the IP addresses of the

switches in the network and use them to generate ﬂooding

attacks on the switches. The malicious end hosts can also

indirectly ﬂood the Controller and the switches by gen-

erating several new ﬂow requests to other end hosts with

minor variations in the TCP/IP header values in such a

way that it will not match with the ﬂow tables records in

the switches. This will result in all the ﬂow requests being

forwarded to the SDN Controller for making the routing

decision as a new ﬂow request. This will in turn cause

ﬂooding of the switch that is connected to the end host

and subsequently ﬂood the Controller as well, impacting

on the availability of the complete network.

• Injecting false information or tampering information by

malicious end hosts: Malicious end hosts can also inject

false messages or tamper with messages in the SDN. For

instance, [8], [13] showed how malicious messages with

spoofed addresses can be used to exploit implementa-

tion vulnerabilities in a SDN Controller to effectively

poison the network topology information, which is a

fundamental building block for topology-aware SDN

applications. Attackers can use these techniques to mis-

lead the Controller services and applications and achieve

man-in-the-middle as well as denial of service attacks.

Furthermore, the study in [8] conﬁrms that several of the

major SDN Controllers are vulnerable to such attacks.

Furthermore, often there will be a need to contain the spread

of attacks by isolating malicious end hosts as there may be

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