美国核管会NUREG-0800：数字计算机控制系统的多样性与纵深防御评估指南

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"NUREG0800 BTP-70-19是美国核管理委员会（U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, NRC）发布的一个标准审查计划，旨在为评估数字计算机为基础的仪表和控制系统中的多样性和纵深防御提供指导。这份文档修订于2007年3月，是NRC工作人员在审批核电站建设与运营申请时使用的评价标准。" 《NUREG0800》不是NRC法规的替代品，遵守该标准并非强制要求，但申请人必须指出其设施设计特性、分析方法和程序措施与《标准审查计划》（SRP）接受标准之间的差异，并评估这些提议的替代方案如何提供符合NRC法规的可接受方法。这份标准审查计划的章节编号与《监管指南1.70》（"核能发电厂安全分析报告的标准格式和内容"）的相应章节相一致。并非《监管指南1.70》的所有章节都有对应的审查计划章节。对于综合许可证申请，适用的SRP章节会有所不同。《NUREG0800 BTP-70-19》特别关注的是多样性（Diversity）和纵深防御（Defense-in-Depth）的概念在数字化计算机控制系统中的应用。多样性是指在系统设计中采用不同的技术、设备或方法，以减少单一故障可能导致的系统失效风险。而纵深防御则是一种多层防护策略，确保即使在某一层次的安全功能失效时，仍有其他层次可以防止事故的发生或减轻其后果。在核电站的仪表和控制系统中，多样性和纵深防御至关重要，因为它们确保了系统的可靠性、稳定性和安全性。例如，通过使用不同的硬件平台、软件编程语言以及冗余系统，可以增加抵抗潜在故障的能力。同时，纵深防御包括物理隔离、独立的安全系统和操作程序等多个层面，以确保在各种可能的事故场景下，都有有效的应对措施。在申请审批过程中，申请人需要详细阐述他们的设计方案如何实现多样性和纵深防御，以及如何证明这些设计满足NRC的法规要求。这通常涉及到详细的安全分析报告，其中包含对潜在故障模式的识别、风险评估以及预防和缓解措施的详细描述。《NUREG0800 BTP-70-19》是NRC对核设施安全审查的一个关键工具，它强调了在数字化控制系统的安全设计中，多样性和纵深防御的重要性，并提供了评估这些原则是否得到适当实施的框架。对于核电站的开发者和运营者来说，理解和遵循这个标准是确保核设施安全运行的基础。

Revision 5 - March 2007

USNRC STANDARD REVIEW PLAN

This Standard Review Plan, NUREG-0800, has been prepared to establish criteria that the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission

staff responsible for the review of applications to construct and operate nuclear power plants intends to use in evaluating whether

an applicant/licensee meets the NRC's regulations. The Standard Review Plan is not a substitute for the NRC's regulations, and

compliance with it is not required. However, an applicant is required to identify differences between the design features, analytical

techniques, and procedural measures proposed for its facility and the SRP acceptance criteria and evaluate how the proposed

alternatives to the SRP acceptance criteria provide an acceptable method of complying with the NRC regulations.

The standard review plan sections are numbered in accordance with corresponding sections in Regulatory Guide 1.70, "Standard

Format and Content of Safety Analysis Reports for Nuclear Power Plants (LWR Edition)." Not all sections of Regulatory Guide 1.70

have a corresponding review plan section. The SRP sections applicable to a combined license application for a new light-water

reactor (LWR) are based on Regulatory Guide 1.206, "Combined License Applications for Nuclear Power Plants (LWR Edition)."

These documents are made available to the public as part of the NRC's policy to inform the nuclear industry and the general public

of regulatory procedures and policies. Individual sections of NUREG-0800 will be revised periodically, as appropriate, to

accommodate comments and to reflect new information and experience. Comments may be submitted electronically by email to

NRR_SRP@nrc.gov.

Requests for single copies of SRP sections (which may be reproduced) should be made to the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory

Commission, Washington, DC 20555, Attention: Reproduction and Distribution Services Section, or by fax to (301) 415-2289; or by

email to DISTRIBUTION@nrc.gov. Electronic copies of this section are available through the NRC's public Web site at

http://www.nrc.gov/reading-rm/doc-collections/nuregs/staff/sr0800/, or in the NRC's Agencywide Documents Access and

Management System (ADAMS), at http://www.nrc.gov/reading-rm/adams.html, under Accession # ML070550072.

NUREG-0800

U.S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION

STANDARD REVIEW PLAN

BRANCH TECHNICAL POSITION 7-19

GUIDANCE FOR EVALUATION OF DIVERSITY AND DEFENSE-IN-DEPTH IN DIGITAL

COMPUTER-BASED INSTRUMENTATION AND CONTROL SYSTEMS

REVIEW RESPONSIBILITIES

Primary – Organization responsible for the review of instrumentation and controls

Secondary – Organization responsible for the review of reactor systems

A. BACKGROUND

Digital instrumentation and control (I&C) systems can be vulnerable to common-cause failures

caused by software errors, which could defeat the redundancy achieved by hardware

architecture. In NUREG-0493, "A Defense-in-Depth and Diversity Assessment of the

RESAR-414 Integrated Protection System," the staff documented a diversity and

defense-in-depth (D3) analysis of a digital computer-based reactor protection system in which

defense against common-cause failures was based on an approach using a specified degree of

system separation between echelons of defense. Subsequently, in SECY 91-292, "Digital

Computer Systems for Advanced Light-Water Reactors," the Staff included discussion of its

concerns about common-cause failures in digital systems used in nuclear power plants. As a

result of the reviews of advanced light-water reactor (ALWR) design certification applications for

designs that use digital protection systems, the staff has documented its position with respect to

common-cause failures in digital systems and defense-in-depth. This position was documented

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美国核管会NUREG-0800：数字计算机控制系统的多样性与纵深防御评估指南

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