云计算中可审计的属性基外包加密访问控制技术

需积分: 8 51 浏览量更新于2024-08-13 收藏 575KB PDF 举报

"可审核的$ \sigma $ -Times基于属性的外包加密，用于云计算中的访问控制" 这篇研究论文探讨了在云计算环境中实现安全细粒度访问控制的一种创新方法——可审计的$ \sigma $ -Times基于属性的外包加密。云计算在数据存储和处理方面提供了巨大的便利，但同时也带来了数据安全和隐私保护的挑战。传统的加密技术，如对称密钥加密和公钥加密，可能无法满足云环境中的复杂访问权限需求。 CP-ABE（Ciphertext-Policy Attribute-Based Encryption，密文策略属性基加密）是一种先进的加密机制，它允许根据数据接收者的特定属性来解密数据，从而实现对加密数据的精细访问控制。然而，CP-ABE在实际应用中面临两个主要问题：一是密钥管理的复杂性，二是缺乏有效的审计机制来确保数据访问的合规性。该论文的作者Jianting Ning、Zhenfu Cao、Xiaolei Dong、Kaitai Liang、Hui Ma和Lifei Wei提出了一种新的解决方案，即可审计的$ \sigma $ -Times基于属性的外包加密。这种加密方案旨在解决上述问题，特别是通过外包加密的方式减轻了用户端的计算负担，同时引入了审计功能，能够验证云服务提供商是否按照预设的访问策略正确地处理和访问了加密数据。在$ \sigma $ -Times外包加密中，$ \sigma $代表一个时间戳或时间窗口，这意味着加密系统会考虑到时间因素，允许动态的访问策略。例如，只有在特定时间段内拥有特定属性的用户才能解密数据。这为动态访问控制提供了可能性，有助于适应不断变化的业务需求和安全政策。此外，审计机制使得第三方可以检查云服务商的行为，确保其未超出授权范围。这增强了用户对云服务的信任，对于商业应用来说尤其重要，因为合规性和透明性是企业选择云服务的重要考量因素。论文中可能会详细阐述该加密系统的构建原理，包括密钥生成、加密、解密以及审计过程。此外，可能会讨论安全性分析，证明新方案能够抵抗各种攻击，同时保持良好的效率和实用性。可能还会提到实施和实验结果，展示在实际云环境中的性能和效果。这篇研究论文为云服务的数据安全和访问控制提供了一种具有前瞻性和实用性的解决方案，有望推动CP-ABE在商业环境中的广泛应用。通过解决密钥管理和审计难题，它为云计算的安全性带来了显著的提升。

1556-6013 (c) 2017 IEEE. Personal use is permitted, but republication/redistribution requires IEEE permission. See http://www.ieee.org/publications_standards/publications/rights/index.html for more information.

This article has been accepted for publication in a future issue of this journal, but has not been fully edited. Content may change prior to final publication. Citation information: DOI 10.1109/TIFS.2017.2738601, IEEE

Transactions on Information Forensics and Security

IEEE TRANSACTIONS ON INFORMATION FORENSICS AND SECURITY, VOL. , NO. , 2017 3

the user master secret key).

B. Related Work

Attribute-based encryption was ﬁrst introduced by Sahai and

Waters [30]. Goyal et al. [8] later formalized two complemen-

tary forms of ABE: ciphertext-policy attribute-based encryp-

tion (CP-ABE) and key-policy attribute-based encryption (KP-

ABE). In a CP-ABE system, a decryption key is associated

with a set of attributes and a ciphertext is associated with

an access policy deﬁned over attributes. KP-ABE is reversed

in that a ciphertext is associated with a set of attributes and a

user’s decryption key is associated with an access policy. There

are many ABE (including CP-ABE and KP-ABE) systems that

have been proposed in the literature [4], [11], [34], [12], [25],

[26], aiming at achieving the balance of efﬁciency, expressive-

ness and security. However, the relatively expensive decryption

cost has been known as one of the crucial drawbacks of the

standard ABE systems. To address the problem, Green et al.

[9] introduced the outsourced decryption notion, and further

presented concrete ABE systems satisfying the notion. Later,

Lai et al. [10] introduced the veriﬁability of ABE to verify the

correctness of outsourced decryption. Lin et al. [19] revisited

the veriﬁable outsourced ABE [10] and proposed a more

efﬁcient construction. In addition to outsourcing decryption, Li

et al. [13], [14] and Ma et al. [21] considered to outsource key-

issuing and encryption, respectively. Qin et al. [28] proposed a

hash-function-based approach to construct ABE with veriﬁable

outsourced decryption. Mao et al. [22] later proposed generic

constructions of CPA-secure and RCCA-secure ABE systems

with veriﬁable outsourced decryption from CPA-secure ABE

(with outsourced decryption). We also state that there have

been some variants of ABE applications in the literature, such

as [24], [23], [33], [16], [18], [35], [17], [15]. Unfortunately,

the aforementioned works fail to support expressive access

policy, limited time access control, and the decryption audit-

ing, simultaneously.

II. BACKGROUND

A. Notation

Deﬁne [l] = {1, 2, ..., l} for l ∈ N. Let PPT be probabilistic

polynomial-time. We let (v

, v

, ..., v

) be a row vector and

, v

, ..., v

)

⊥

be a column vector. By v

we denote the i-th

element in a vector ~v. And by M~v we denote the product of

matrix M with vector ~v. Let Z

l×n

be the set of matrices of

size l × n with elements in Z

. We let GD = (p, G, G

, e)

be the groups and the bilinear mapping description where G

and G

are two multiplicative cyclic groups of prime order p

and e : G × G → G

is a bilinear map.

B. Access Structure and Linear Secret-Sharing Schemes

Deﬁnition 1. (Access Structure [2], [27]) : Let S be the

attribute universe. A collection (respectively, monotone col-

lection) A ⊆ 2

of non-empty sets of attributes is an access

structure (respectively, monotone access structure) on S. A

collection A ⊆ 2

is called monotone if ∀B, C ∈ A : if

B ∈ A and B ⊆ C, then C ∈ A. The sets in A are called

authorized sets, and the sets not in A are called unauthorized

sets.

Here we restrict our attention to monotone access structure.

Deﬁnition 2. (Linear Secret-Sharing Schemes (LSSS) [2],

[27]). Let S denote the attribute universe and p denote a

prime. A secret-sharing scheme

with domain of secrets Z

realizing access structure on S is called linear (over Z

) if

(1) The shares of a secret s ∈ Z

for each attribute form

a vector over Z

; (2) For each access structure A on S,

there exists a matrix M with l rows and n columns called

the share-generating matrix for

. For i = 1, ..., l, we deﬁne

a function ρ labels row i of M with attribute ρ(i) from the

attribute universe S. When we consider the column vector

~v = (s, r

, ..., r

), where s ∈ Z

is the secret to be shared

and r

, ..., r

∈ Z

are randomly chosen. Then M~v ∈ Z

l×1

is the vector of l shares of the secret s according to

. The

share (M~v)

“belongs” to attribute ρ(j), where j ∈ [l].

As shown in [2], every linear secret-sharing scheme accord-

ing to the above deﬁnition enjoys the linear reconstruction

property, deﬁned as follows: suppose that

is an LSSS for

the access structure A, S

∗

∈ A is an authorized set and let

I ⊂ {1, 2, ..., l} be deﬁned as I = {i ∈ [l] ∧ ρ(i) ∈ S

∗

Then, there exist constants {ω

∈ Z

}

i∈I

such that for any

valid shares {λ

= (M~v)

}

i∈I

of a secret s according to

i∈I

= s.

C. Prime Order Bilinear Groups.

Let G and G

be two multiplicative cyclic groups of prime

order p. Let g be a generator of G and e : G × G → G

be a

bilinear map. The bilinear map e has the following properties:

(1) Bilinearity: ∀u, v ∈ G and a, b ∈ Z

, we have e(u

, v

) =

e(u, v)

; (2) Non-degeneracy: e(g, g) 6= 1. We say that G is

a bilinear group if the group operations in G and the bilinear

map e : G×G → G

can both be computed efﬁciently. Notice

that the map e(·, ·) is symmetric since e(g

, g

) = e(g, g)

e(g

, g

) [27].

D. Complexity Assumption.

The decisional q-bilinear Difﬁe-Hellman inversion (deci-

sional q-BDHI) problem [7] asks, given the tuple ~y =

(g, g

, ..., g

) as input, if one can distinguish e(g, g)

1/x

from

a random value in G

Formally, an algorithm A has advantage  in solving the

above decisional q-BDHI problem if | Pr[A(~y, e(g, g)

1/x

) =

0] − Pr[A(~y, R) = 0]| ≥ , where the probability is over the

coin tosses of A and the choice of x ∈ Z

∗

and R ∈ G

. The

decisional q-BDHI assumption holds if all PPT algorithms

have at most a negligible advantage in solving the decisional

q-BDHI problem.

III. AUDITABLE σ-TIME OUTSOURCED ABE SYSTEM

A. System Model

We build our system in the key/data encapsulation mecha-

nism (KEM/DEM) setting [31] where an ABE ciphertext (i.e.,

the KEM ciphertext) encrypts a symmetric session key and

剩余11页未读，继续阅读

weixin_38676500

粉丝: 9
资源: 915

云计算中可审计的属性基外包加密访问控制技术

根据$$ \ sigma _8 $$σ8张力测试暗能量模型

在s N N = 5.02 $$ \ sqrt {s _ {\ mathrm {NN}}} = 5.02 $$ TeV的p-Pb碰撞中包容性J /ψ产生的中心性相关性

sigma-notation-data-science-intro-000

The-Certified-Six-Sigma-Black-Belt-Handbook

PSI-Sigma：PSI-Sigma

超对称AdS $$ _ 2 \ times \ Sigma _2 $$ 2×Σ2解决方案来自三萨萨克语截断

Delta-sigma-ADC-verilog-master.zip

firstorder.rar_Delta-Sigma_delta sigma_sigma-delta

sigma-notation-hou01-dtsc-ft-080320

6sigma方法论--214601705.pptx

最新资源