arXiv:quant-ph/0702202v3 13 Mar 2007
Quantum Cryptography: from Theory to Practice
Hoi-Kwong Lo and Norbert L¨utkenhaus
Center for Quantum Information and Quantum Control,
Department of Physics and Department of Electrical & Computer Engineering,
University of Toronto, Toronto,
Ontario, M5S 3G4, Canada
and
Institute for Quantum Computing & Department of Physics and Astronomy,
University of Waterloo,
200 University Ave. W. N2L 3G1
(Dated: March 17, 2016)
Quantum cryptography can, in principle, provide unconditional security guaranteed by the law
of physics only. Here, we survey the theory and practice of the subject and highlight some recent
developments.
PACS numbers:
”The human desire to keep secrets is almost as old as
writing itself.” [1] With the advent in electronic com-
merce, the importance of secure communications via en-
cryption is growing. Each time when we go on-line for
internet banking, we should be concerned with commu-
nication secur ity. Indeed, methods of secret communi-
cations were used in many ancient civilizations includ-
ing Mesopotamia , Eqypt, India and China. Legends say
that Julius Caesar used a simple substitution cipher in
his correspondences. Each letter is replaced by a letter
that followed it thr e e places alphabetically. For instance,
the word LOW is replaced by ORZ because the first let-
ter ”L” in LOW is replaced by L → M → N → O, etc.
Regardless of the size of the shift, the illustrated method
is still called Caesar’s cipher.
Let us introduce the general problem of secure commu-
nication. Suppose a sender, Alice, would like to send a
message to a receiver, Bob. An eavesdropper, Eve, would
like to learn about the message. How can Alice prevent
Eve from learning her message?
A standard method is encryption. Alice uses her en-
cryption key (some secret information) to transform her
message (a plaintext) into something (a ciphertext) that
is unintelligible to Eve and sends the ciphertext throug h
a communica tio n channel. Bob, with his decry ption key,
recover s Alice’s message from the c iphertext. For in-
stance, in Caesar’s cipher, the key takes a value between
1 and 26, which denotes the size of the shift.
Since encryption machine s may be captured, in moder n
cryptography, it is standard to assume that the encryp-
tion method is known and the security of the message lies
on the security of the key. For instance, we assume that
Eve knows that Caesar’s cipher is being used, but she
does not a priori know the value of the key. Note that
Caesar’s cipher is not that secure because the number of
all poss ible key values is s o small (only 26) that Eve can
easily try all possible values.
Throughout the history of cryptography, many ciphers
have been invented and believed for a while to be un-
breakable. Almost all have subsequently been broken,
with disastrous consequences to the unsuspecting users.
For instance, in the Second World War, the Allies’ break-
ing of the German Enigma code contributed greatly to
the ultimate vic tory of the Allies. The first lesson in
cryptography is: never under-estimate the ingenuity and
efforts that your enemies are willing to spend on breaking
your codes.
Unbr eakable codes do exist in co nventional cryptogra-
phy. T hey are called o ne-time pads and were invented by
Gilbert Vernam in 1918: A message is firs t converted into
a binary form (i.e., a string consisting of 0’s and 1’s) by
a publicly known method. The key is ano ther sequence
of 0’s and 1’s of the same length. For encryption, Al-
ice combines each bit of the message with the re spec tive
bit of the key by using addition modulo 2 to generate
the ciphertext. For decryption, Bob combines each bit of
the ciphertext with the respective bit of the key by using
addition modulo 2 to generate the plaintext.
For one-time pad to be secure, it is important that
a key is never re-used. This is why it is ca lled a one-
time pad. Why re-using a key would ma ke the scheme
insecure? Suppose the same key, k, is use d to encrypt
two different messages, m
1
and m
2
. Then, the cipher-
texts, c
1
= m
1
⊕ k and c
2
= m
2
⊕ k, are trans mitted
in public. An eavesdropper can simply take the addition
modulo 2 of the two cipher-texts to obtain c
1
⊕ c
2
=
m
1
⊕ k ⊕ m
2
⊕ k = m
1
⊕ m
2
. But, this allows Eve to
learn some non-trivial information, namely the parity,
about the two original messages.
I. KEY DISTRIBUTION PROBLEM
The one-time pad has a serious drawback: it pre -
supposes that Alice and Bob share a random string of
secret, a key, before the actual transmission o f the mes-
sage. So, the introduction of the one-time pad shifts the
problem of secure communication to the problem of se -
cure key distribution. This is called the key distribution
problem. In top secret applications, key distribution is