IEEE 802.11i-2004：2004年WLAN安全增强标准

802.11i-2004

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IEEE Std 802.11i-2004 是 IEEE 对于无线局域网络 (Wireless Local Area Networks, WLAN) 标准的修订和增强，特别是针对 Medium Access Control (MAC) 和 Physical Layer (PHY) 规范的安全性部分。该标准最初作为 IEEE 802.11 标准的1999版修正案发布，并在随后几年由多个802.11系列标准（如802.11a、802.11b、802.11b Cor1-2001、802.11d、802.11g 和 802.11h）的更新所扩展和完善。这些标准的修订反映了WLAN技术的发展，尤其是在安全性的重视程度上。 802.11i-2004 的主要目标是提供一种可靠且安全的无线网络环境，以对抗日益增长的无线威胁，例如非法接入、数据窃听和篡改。它引入了高级加密标准 (Advanced Encryption Standard, AES)，包括TKIP (Temporal Key Integrity Protocol) 和 AES-CCMP (Counter Mode with Cipher Block Chaining Message Authentication Code Protocol)，这些加密机制可以确保无线数据传输的机密性和完整性。此外，该标准还定义了 WPA (Wi-Fi Protected Access) 协议，这是一种广泛使用的认证和授权机制，旨在提高无线网络接入控制的强度。作为 IEEE 的正式标准，802.11i-2004 被设计为在未来的基本标准版本中被整合，这意味着它不仅规范了当时的无线网络操作，而且对后续的技术发展具有指导意义。它的实施对于推动 Wi-Fi 安全的标准化和规范化起到了关键作用，促进了企业和个人用户对无线网络的信任，同时也为无线设备制造商设定了统一的安全基线。 802.11i-2004 是一个里程碑式的标准，它定义了现代 Wi-Fi 网络中的网络安全基础，对于保护无线通信免受未经授权访问、数据泄露和其他安全威胁至关重要。随着技术的进一步发展，后续的 802.11 家族标准可能会在此基础上进行更多的迭代和增强，以适应不断变化的网络安全需求。

IEEE Standard for

Information technology—

Telecommunications and information

exchange between systems—

Local and metropolitan area networks—

Specific requirements

Part 11: Wireless LAN Medium Access Control

(MAC) and Physical Layer (PHY) specifications

Amendment 6: Medium Access Control

(MAC) Security Enhancements

[This amendment is based on IEEE Std 802.11™, 1999 Edition (Reaff 2003), as amended by IEEE Stds

802.11a™-1999, 802.11b™-1999, 802.11b™-1999/Cor 1-2001, 802.11d™-2001, 802.11g™-2003, and

802.11h™-2003.]

NOTE—The editing instructions contained in this amendment define how to merge the material contained herein into

the existing base standard and its amendments to form the comprehensive standard.

The editing instructions are shown in bold italic. Four editing instructions are used: change, delete, insert, and replace.

Change is used to make small corrections in existing text or tables. The editing instruction specifies the location of the

change and describes what is being changed either by using strikethrough

(to remove old material) or underscore (to add

new material). Delete removes existing material. Insert adds new material without disturbing the existing material.

Insertions may require renumbering. If so, renumbering instructions are given in the editing instructions. Replace is used

to make large changes in existing text, subclauses, tables, or figures by removing existing material and replacing it with

new material. Editorial notes will not be carried over into future editions.

1. Overview

1.2 Purpose

Change the fifth bullet of 1.2 as follows:

— Describes the requirements and procedures to provide privacy

confidentiality of user information

being transferred over the wireless medium (WM) and authentication of IEEE 802.11 conformant

devices.

End of changes to Clause 1.

IEEE

Std 802.11i-2004 LOCAL AND METROPOLITAN AREA NETWORKS

2. Normative references

Insert the following references at the appropriate locations in Clause 2:

FIPS PUB 180-1-1995, Secure Hash Standard.

FIPS PUB 197-2001, Advanced Encryption Standard (AES).

IEEE P802.1X™-REV, Draft Standard for Local and Metropolitan Area Networks: Port-Based Network

Access Control.

2, 3, 4

IETF RFC 1321, The MD5 Message-Digest Algorithm, April 1992.

IETF RFC 1750, Randomness Recommendations for Security, December 1994.

IETF RFC 2104, HMAC: Keyed-Hashing for Message Authentication, February 1997.

IETF RFC 2202, Test Cases for HMAC-MD5 and HMAC-SHA-1, September 1997.

IETF RFC 3394, Advanced Encryption Standard (AES) Key Wrap Algorithm, September 2002.

IETF RFC 3610, Counter with CBC-MAC (CCM), September 2003.

IETF RFC 3748, Extensible Authentication Protocol (EAP), March 2004.

End of changes to Clause 2.

3. Definitions

Delete the definition “3.40 privacy.”

Change the definition for “wired equivalent privacy (WEP)” as follows:

3.49 wired equivalent privacy (WEP): The

An optional cryptographic confidentiality algorithm specified

by IEEE 802.11 that may be

used to provide data confidentiality that is subjectively equivalent to the confi-

dentiality of a wired local area network (LAN) medium that does not employ cryptographic techniques to

enhance privacy

confidentiality.

Insert the following definitions in alphabetical order into Clause 3, renumbering as necessary:

3.63 additional authentication data (AAD): Data that are not encrypted, but are cryptographically

protected.

FIPS publications are available from the National Technical Information Service (NTIS), U. S. Dept. of Commerce, 5285 Port Royal

Road, Springfield, VA 22161 (http://www.ntis.org/).

IEEE publications are available from the Institute of Electrical and Electronics Engineers, Inc., 445 Hoes Lane, Piscataway, NJ 08854,

USA (http://standards.ieee.org/).

The IEEE standards or products referred to in this clause are trademarks of the Institute of Electrical and Electronics Engineers, Inc.

This IEEE standards project was not approved by the IEEE-SA Standards Board at the time this publication went to press. For infor-

mation about obtaining a draft, contact the IEEE.

Internet RFCs are available from the Internet Engineering Task Force at http://www.ietf.org/.

IEEE

AMENDMENT 6: MEDIUM ACCESS CONTROL (MAC) SECURITY ENHANCEMENTS Std 802.11i-2004

3.64 authentication, authorization, and accounting (AAA) key: Key information that is jointly negotiated

between the Supplicant and the Authentication Server (AS). This key information is transported via a secure

channel from the AS to the Authenticator. The pairwise master key (PMK) may be derived from the AAA

key.

3.65 authentication and key management (AKM) suite: A set of AKM suite selectors.

3.66 Authentication Server (AS): An entity that provides an authentication service to an Authenticator.

This service determines, from the credentials provided by the Supplicant, whether the Supplicant is autho-

rized to access the services provided by the Authenticator. (IEEE P802.1X-REV

)

3.67 Authenticator: An entity at one end of a point-to-point LAN segment that facilitates authentication of

the entity attached to the other end of that link. (IEEE P802.1X-REV)

3.68 Authenticator address (AA): The IEEE 802.1X Authenticator medium access control (MAC) address.

3.69 authorized: To be explicitly allowed.

3.70 big endian: The concept that, for a given multi-octet numeric representation, the most significant octet

has the lowest address.

3.71 cipher suite: A set of one or more algorithms, designed to provide data confidentiality, data authentic-

ity or integrity, and/or replay protection.

3.72 counter mode (CTR) with CBC-MAC [cipher-block chaining (CBC) with message authentication

code (MAC)] (CCM): A symmetric key block cipher mode providing confidentiality using CTR and data

origin authenticity using CBC-MAC.

NOTE—See IETF RFC 3610.

3.73 decapsulate: To recover an unprotected frame from a protected one.

3.74 decapsulation: The process of generating plaintext data by decapsulating an encapsulated frame.

3.75 EAPOL-Key confirmation key (KCK): A key used to integrity-check an EAPOL-Key frame.

3.76 EAPOL-Key encryption key (KEK): A key used to encrypt the Key Data field in an EAPOL-Key

frame.

3.77 encapsulate: To construct a protected frame from an unprotected frame.

3.78 encapsulation: The process of generating the cryptographic payload from the plaintext data. This com-

prises the cipher text as well as any associated cryptographic state required by the receiver of the data, e.g.,

initialization vectors (IVs), sequence numbers, message integrity codes (MICs), key identifiers.

3.79 4-Way Handshake: A pairwise key management protocol defined by this amendment. It confirms

mutual possession of a pairwise master key (PMK) by two parties and distributes a group temporal key

(GTK).

3.80 group: The entities in a wireless network, e.g., an access point (AP) and its associated stations (STAs),

or all the STAs in an independent basic service set (IBSS) network.

Information on references can be found in Clause 2.

IEEE

Std 802.11i-2004 LOCAL AND METROPOLITAN AREA NETWORKS

3.81 Group Key Handshake: A group key management protocol defined by this amendment. It is used

only to issue a new group temporal key (GTK) to peers with whom the local station (STA) has already

formed security associations.

3.82 group master key (GMK): An auxiliary key that may be used to derive a group temporal key (GTK).

3.83 group temporal key (GTK): A random value, assigned by the broadcast/multicast source, which is

used to protect broadcast/multicast medium access control (MAC) protocol data units (MPDUs) from that

source. The GTK may be derived from a group master key (GMK).

3.84 group temporal key security association (GTKSA): The context resulting from a successful group

temporal key (GTK) distribution exchange via either a Group Key Handshake or a 4-Way Handshake.

3.85 IEEE 802.1X authentication: Extensible Authentication Protocol (EAP) authentication transported by

the IEEE 802.1X protocol.

3.86 key counter: A 256-bit (32-octet) counter that is used in the pseudo-random function (PRF) to generate

initialization vectors (IVs). There is a single key counter per station (STA) that is global to that STA.

3.87 key data encapsulation (KDE): Format for data other than information elements in the EAPOL-Key

Data field.

3.88 key management service: A service to distribute and manage cryptographic keys within a robust secu-

rity network (RSN).

3.89 little endian: The concept that, for a given multi-octet numeric representation, the least significant

octet has the lowest address.

3.90 liveness: A demonstration that the peer is actually participating in this instance of communication.

3.91 message integrity code (MIC): A value generated by a symmetric key cryptographic function. If the

input data are changed, a new value cannot be correctly computed without knowledge of the symmetric key.

Thus, the secret key protects the input data from undetectable alteration. This is traditionally called a

message authentication code (MAC), but the acronym MAC is already reserved for another meaning in this

amendment.

3.92 Michael: The message integrity code (MIC) for the Temporal Key Integrity Protocol (TKIP).

3.93 nonce: A value that shall not be reused with a given key, including over all reinitializations of the sys-

tem through all time.

3.94 pairwise: Two entities that are associated with each other, e.g., an access point (AP) and an associated

station (STA), or a pair of STAs in an independent basic service set (IBSS) network. This term is used to

describe the key hierarchies for keys that are shared only between the two entities in a pairwise association.

3.95 pairwise master key (PMK): The highest order key used within this amendment. The PMK may be

derived from an Extensible Authentication Protocol (EAP) method or may be obtained directly from a pre-

shared key (PSK).

3.96 pairwise master key security association (PMKSA): The context resulting from a successful IEEE

802.1X authentication exchange between the peer and Authentication Server (AS) or from a preshared key

(PSK).

IEEE

AMENDMENT 6: MEDIUM ACCESS CONTROL (MAC) SECURITY ENHANCEMENTS Std 802.11i-2004

3.97 pairwise transient key (PTK): A value that is derived from the pairwise master key (PMK), Authenti-

cator address (AA), Supplicant address (SPA), Anthenticator nonce (ANonce), and Supplicant nonce

(SNonce) using the pseudo-random function (PRF) and that is split up into as many as five keys, i.e., tempo-

ral encryption key, two temporal message integrity code (MIC) keys, EAPOL-Key encryption key (KEK),

EAPOL-Key confirmation key (KCK).

3.98 pairwise transient key security association (PTKSA): The context resulting from a successful

4-Way Handshake exchange between the peer and Authenticator.

3.99 pass-phrase: A secret text string employed to corroborate the user’s identity.

3.100 per-frame encryption key: A unique encryption key constructed for each medium access control

(MAC) protocol data unit (MPDU), employed by some IEEE 802.11 security protocols.

3.101 per-frame sequence counter: For Temporal Key Integrity Protocol (TKIP), the counter that is used

as the nonce in the derivation of the per-frame encryption key. For CCM [counter mode (CTR) with cipher-

block chaining (CBC) with message authentication code (MAC)] Protocol (CCMP), the per-frame initializa-

tion vector (IV).

3.102 pre-robust security network association (pre-RSNA): The type of association used by a pair of sta-

tions (STAs) if the procedure for establishing authentication or association between them did not include the

4-Way Handshake.

3.103 pre-robust security network association (pre-RSNA) equipment: A device that is not able to cre-

ate robust security network associations (RSNAs).

3.104 preshared key (PSK): A static key that is distributed to the units in the system by a method outside

the scope of this amendment, always by some out-of-band means.

3.105 pseudo-random function (PRF): A function that hashes various inputs to derive a pseudo-random

value. To add liveness to the pseudo-random value, a nonce should be one of the inputs.

3.106 robust security network (RSN): A security network that allows only the creation of robust security

network associations (RSNAs). An RSN can be identified by the indication in the RSN Information Element

(IE) of Beacon frames that the group cipher suite specified is not wired equivalent privacy (WEP).

3.107 robust security network association (RSNA): The type of association used by a pair of stations

(STAs) if the procedure to establish authentication or association between them includes the 4-Way Hand-

shake. Note that the existence of a RSNA by a pair of devices does not of itself provide robust security.

Robust security is provided when all devices in the network use RSNAs.

3.108 robust-security-network-association- (RSNA-) capable equipment: A station (STA) that is able to

create RSNAs. Such a device can use pre-RSNAs because of configuration. Notice that RSNA-capable does

not imply full compliance with the RSNA Protocol Implementation Conformance Statement (PICS). A leg-

acy device that has been upgraded to support Temporal Key Integrity Protocol (TKIP) can be RSNA-

capable, but will not be compliant with the PICS if it does not also support CCM [counter mode (CTR) with

cipher-block chaining (CBC) with message authentication code (MAC)] Protocol (CCMP).

3.109 robust-security-network-association- (RSNA-) enabled equipment: A station (STA) when it is

RSNA-capable and dot11RSNAEnabled is set to TRUE.

3.110 robust security network association (RSNA) key management: Key management that includes the

4-Way Handshake, the Group Key Handshake, and the STAKey Handshake.

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