IEEE TRANSACTIONS ON CONTROL SYSTEMS TECHNOLOGY, VOL. 24, NO. 3, MAY 2016 843
Optimal DoS Attack Scheduling in Wireless
Networked Control System
Heng Zhang, Peng Cheng, Member, IEEE,LingShi,Member, IEEE,
andJimingChen,Senior Member, IEEE
Abstract—Recently, many literature works have considered the
security issues of wireless networked control system (WNCS).
However, few works studied how the attacker should optimize
its attack schedule in order to maximize the effect on the
system performance due to the insufficiency of energy at the
attacker side. This paper fills this gap from the aspect of
control system performance. We consider the optimal jamming
attack that maximizes the Linear Quadratic Gaussian (LQG)
control cost function under energy constraint. After analyzing
the properties of the cost function under an arbitrary attack
schedule, we derive the optimal jamming attack schedule and the
corresponding cost function. System stability under this optimal
attack schedule is also considered. We further investigate the
optimal attack schedule in a WNCS with multiple subsystems.
Different examples are provided to demonstrate the effectiveness
of the proposed optimal denial-of-service attack schedule.
Index Terms—Attack scheduling, Denial-of-Service (DoS)
attack, energy constraint, Linear Quadratic Gaussian (LQG)
control, system stability.
I. INTRODUCTION
W
IRELESS networked control systems (WNCSs),
in which physical elements (plants, sensors,
controllers, and actuators) communicate via wireless networks,
have received increasing research interests [1]–[4]. WNCSs
have a wide spectrum of applications in mobile sensor
networks, remote surgery, intelligent transportation, unmanned
aerial vehicles, mobile robots, and so on. Security issues in
WNCSs have been investigated from different viewpoints in
Manuscript received January 26, 2015; revised May 18, 2015; accepted
July 8, 2015. Date of publication August 26, 2015; date of current version
April 18, 2016. Manuscript received in final form July 19, 2015. This work
was supported in part by the National Natural Science Foundation of China
under Grant U1401253 and Grant 61429301, in part by the National Program
for Special Support of Top Notch Young Professionals, and in part by
the Fundamental Research Funds for the Central Universities under
Grant 2014XZZX001-03. The work of L. Shi was supported by
The Hong Kong University of Science and Technology Caltech Partnership
under Grant FP004. The work of H. Zhang was supported by the University
Science Research General Project of Jiangsu Province under
Grant 15KJB510002. Recommended by Associate Editor Y. Shi.
(Corresponding author: Jiming Chen.)
H. Zhang is with the State Key Laboratory of Industrial Control
Technology, Cyber Innovation Joint Research Center, Zhejiang University,
Hangzhou 310027, China, and also with the Huaihai Institute of Technology,
Lianyungang 222000, China (e-mail: ezhangheng@gmail.com).
P. Cheng, and J. Chen are with the State Key Laboratory of
Industrial Control Technology, Cyber Innovation Joint Research
Center, Zhejiang University, Hangzhou 310027, China (e-mail:
pcheng@iipc.zju.edu.cn; jmchen@ieee.org).
L. Shi is with the Department of Electronic and Computer Engineering,
The Hong Kong University of Science and Technology, Hong Kong (e-mail:
eesling@ust.hk).
Color versions of one or more of the figures in this paper are available
online at http://ieeexplore.ieee.org.
Digital Object Identifier 10.1109/TCST.2015.2462741
recent years due to the increasing amount of cyber attacks
that make WNCSs more and more vulnerable [5]–[9].
Various efforts have been devoted to studying the influence
of specific malicious attacks, e.g., Denial-of-Service (DoS)
attacks [10], replay attacks [11], and data injection attacks [7],
on particular systems. Thereinto, the DoS attack, which aims
to prevent the communication between system components,
has been widely studied since this attack pattern is the
most accomplishable one and can result in serious conseque-
nces [10], [12], [13]. A typical DoS technique in WNCS is
jamming attack, which can interfere with the radio frequencies
on the communication channels [14].
Recently, researchers have studied the LQG problems under
DoS attack [10], [15], [16]. A semidefinite programming-based
solution was presented in [10] to find an optimal feedback
controller that minimizes a cost function subject to safety and
energy constraints in the presence of an attack with identical
independent distributed actions. In [15], the optimal control
law is designed against an intelligent jammer with limited
actions. In [16], an event-trigger control strategy is derived
in the presence of an energy-constrained periodic jamming
attacker. The common characteristic of these related works
is that they aim to find optimal defensive control law. Our
work, however, is from the viewpoint of the attacker,
i.e., we look for the optimal attack strategies to maximize
the LQG cost function. This is equally important as one can
design an effective defensive control law only when he knows
how the attacker behaves.
In almost all types of attacks, energy constraint is
inherent and will affect an attacker’s strategies [17]–[19].
Kashyap et al. [17] studied a zero-sum game on Multiple Input
Multiple Output (MIMO) Gaussian Rayleigh fading channels
between an intelligent DoS jammer and a decoder with bilat-
eral power constraints. Li et al. [18] investigated the optimal
jamming attack strategies by controlling the probability of
jamming and transmission range. Zuba et al. [19] studied
the effect of jamming attack on underwater wireless sensor
networks and investigated the minimal energy consumption
and the probability of detection in order to launch an effective
DoS jamming attack.
In this paper, we aim to design an optimal attack schedule
to maximize the attacking effect on the WNCS. Specifically,
we first consider a system where one sensor measures the
system state and sends the data packets to a remote estimator
through a wireless channel. The attacker has a limited energy
budget in every active period and decides at each sampling
time whether or not to jam the channel. Then, we extend it
to the scenario with multiple subsystems. In this scenario, the
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