基于异构多链架构的区块链扩展性和可扩展性解决方案

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区块链架构的可扩展性和可扩展性问题解决方案在当前的区块链架构中，存在着许多问题，例如可扩展性和可扩展性不够。这些问题的根源在于将两个非常重要的部分紧密相连，即规范性和有效性。为了解决这些问题，我们提出了异构多链架构，该架构将规范性和有效性分离，从而实现了可扩展性和可扩展性。异构多链架构的核心思想是将规范性和有效性分离开来，使得它们可以独立地进行扩展和优化。通过这种方式，我们可以实现核心扩展性和可扩展性，解决当前区块链架构中的问题。在异构多链架构中，我们引入了分区和征服的方法来解决可扩展性问题。我们将规范性和有效性分离，然后将它们分配到不同的节点上，从而实现了可扩展性和可扩展性。同时，我们还引入了激励机制，鼓励节点参与网络中，提高了网络的可扩展性和可扩展性。异构多链架构的另一个优点是它能够实现trustless的网络互操作性。通过这种架构，我们可以实现多种不同的共识系统之间的互操作性，实现开放和 закрытый网络之间的trust-free访问。异构多链架构提供了一种解决当前区块链架构问题的方法，它可以实现可扩展性和可扩展性，提高网络的可扩展性和可扩展性，并实现trustless的网络互操作性。知识点： 1. 异构多链架构：一种解决当前区块链架构问题的方法，通过将规范性和有效性分离开来，实现可扩展性和可扩展性。 2. 规范性和有效性：两个非常重要的部分，在当前的区块链架构中，它们被紧密相连，导致了可扩展性和可扩展性问题。 3. 分区和征服：一种解决可扩展性问题的方法，通过将规范性和有效性分离开来，并将它们分配到不同的节点上。 4. 激励机制：一种鼓励节点参与网络中的机制，提高了网络的可扩展性和可扩展性。 5. Trustless网络互操作性：异构多链架构可以实现trustless的网络互操作性，实现多种不同的共识系统之间的互操作性。

POLKADOT: VISION FOR A HETEROGENEOUS MULTI-CHAIN FRAMEWORK DRAFT 1 5

A validat or not fulﬁlling their duty to ﬁnd consensus

under the rules of our chosen consensus algorithm is pun-

ished. For initial, unintentional failures, this is through

withholding the validator’s reward. Repeated failures re-

sult in the reduction of their security bond (throu g h burn-

ing). Provably malicious action s such as double-signing or

conspiring to provide an invalid block result in the loss of

the entire bond (whi ch is parti al ly burnt but m o st ly given

to the informant and the honest actors).

In some sense, validators are similar to the mining pools

of current PoW blockchains.

4.2. Nominators. A nominator is a stake-holding party

who contributes to the securi ty bond of a validator. The y

have no additional role except to place risk capi t al and as

such to sign al that they trust a particular validator (or

set thereof) to act respon s ib l y in their maintenance of the

network. They receive a pro-rata increase or redu c ti o n

in their deposit a c c o rd in g to the bond’s growth to which

they contribute.

Together with collators, nex t , nominators are in some

sense similar to the miners of the present-day PoW net-

works.

4.3. Collators. Transaction collators (collators for short)

are parties who a ssi st validators in producing valid

parachain blocks. They maintain a “full-node” for a par-

ticular parachain; meaning that they retain all necessary

information to be able to autho r new blocks and execute

transactions i n much t h e same way as miners do on cur-

rent PoW blockchains. Under normal circu ms ta n c es , they

will collate and execute transaction s to create an unsealed

block, and provide it, together with a zero-knowledge

proof, to one or more valida t o rs p rese ntly responsible for

proposing a parachain block.

The precise natu re of the re la t ion sh i p between colla-

tors, nomina to rs and validators will likely change over

time. Initially, we expect collato rs to work very closely

with validators, since there will be only a few (perhaps

only one) parachain(s) with little transaction volume. The

initial client implementation will include RPCs to allow a

parachain collator node to unconditionally supply a (relay-

chain) validator node with a provably valid parachain

block. As the cost of maintaining a synced version of

all such parachains increases, we expect to see additional

infrastructure in place wh i ch will help separate out the

duties to independent, economically-motivated, parties.

Eventually, we expect to see collator pools who vie to

collect the most transaction fees. Such collators may be-

come contracted to serve particular validators over a pe-

riod of time for an on-going share in the reward proceeds.

Alternatively, “freelance” collators may simply create a

market o↵ering valid parachain blocks in return for a com-

petitive share of the reward payable immediately. Simi-

larly, decentralised nominator pools would allow multiple

bonded participa nts to coordinate and share the duty of a

validator. This ability to pool ensures open participation

leading to a more decentralised system.

4.4. Fishermen. Unlike the ot h er two active parties,

ﬁshermen are not directly related to the block-authoring

process. Rather they are independent “bounty hunters”

motivated by a large one-o↵ reward. P rec ise ly due to

the existence of ﬁshermen, we expect events of misbe-

haviour to happen seldom, and when they do only due to

the bonded party being ca rele ss with secret key security,

rather than through malicious intent. The name comes

from the ex pected frequency of reward, the minimal re-

quirements to take part and the eventual reward size.

Fishermen get their reward through a timely proof that

at least one bonded party acted illegally. Illegal actions

include signing two blocks each with the same ratiﬁed par-

ent or, in the c a se of parachains, help i n g ratify an invalid

block. To prevent over-rewarding of the compromise and

illicit use of a session’s secret key, the base rewa rd for

providing a single validator’s illegally signed message is

minimal. This reward in cre a ses asymptotically as more

corroborating illeg a l signatures from other validators are

provided implying a genuine attack. The asymptote is set

at 66% following our base security assertion that at least

two-thirds of the validators act benevolently.

Fishermen are somewhat similar to “full nodes” in

present-day blockchain systems that the resources needed

are relatively small and the commitment of stable uptime

and bandwidth is not necessary. Fishermen di↵er in so

much as they must post a small bond. This bond prevents

sybil attacks from wasting validators’ time and compute

resources. It is immediately withdrawable, prob a b ly no

more than the equivalent of a few dollars and m ay lead

to reaping a hefty reward from spotting a misbehaving

validator.

5. Design Overview

This section is intended to g ive a brief overview of the

system as a wh o le . A more thorough exploratio n of the

system is given in the section following it.

5.1. Consensus. On the relay-chain, Polkadot achieves

low-level consensus over a set of mutually agreed valid

blocks through a modern asynchronous Byz a ntine fault-

tolerant (BFT) algorithm. The algorithm will be inspired

by th e simple Tendermint [11] and the substantially more

involved HoneyBad g erB F T [13]. The latter provides an

eﬃcient and fault-tolerant consensus over an arbitrarily

defective network infrastructure, given a set of mostly be-

nign authorities or validators.

For a proof-of-authority (PoA) style network, this alone

would be suﬃcient, however Polkadot is imagined to be

also deployable as a network in a fully open and public

situation without any particular organisation or trusted

authority required to maintain it. As such we need a

means of determining a set of validators and incentivising

them to be honest. For this we utilise PoS based selection

criteria.

5.2. Proving the Stake. We assu me that the netwo rk

will have some means of measuring how much “stake”

any parti c u la r account has. For ea se of comparison to

pre-existing systems, we will call the unit of measurement

“tokens”. Unfortunately the term is less than ideal for a

number of reasons, not least that being simply a sca l a r

value associated with an acco u nt, there is no notion of

individuality.

We imagine validators be elected, infrequently ( a t most

once per day but perhaps as seldom as o n ce per quarter),

through a Nominated Proof-of-Stake (NPoS )scheme.In-

centivisation can happen through a pro-rata allocation of

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