17 / 183Issued: 26.09.2012 Version: P1KSS8 Roboterprogrammierung 1 V2 en (PDF-COL)
1 Structure and function of a KUKA robot system
There must always be at least one external EMERGENCY STOP device in-
stalled. This ensures that an EMERGENCY STOP device is available even
when the KCP is disconnected.
External E-STOP
There must be EMERGENCY STOP devices available at every operator sta-
tion that can initiate a robot motion or other potentially hazardous situation.
The system integrator is responsible for ensuring this.
There must always be at least one external EMERGENCY STOP device in-
stalled. This ensures that an EMERGENCY STOP device is available even
when the KCP is disconnected.
External EMERGENCY STOP devices are connected via the customer inter-
face. External EMERGENCY STOP devices are not included in the scope of
supply of the industrial robot.
Operator safety
The operator safety signal is used for interlocking physical safeguards, e.g.
safety gates. Automatic operation is not possible without this signal. In the
event of a loss of signal during automatic operation (e.g. safety gate is
opened), the manipulator stops with a safety stop 1.
Operator safety is not active in the test modes T1 (Manual Reduced Velocity)
and T2 (Manual High Velocity).
Safe operational
stop
The safe operational stop can be triggered via an input on the customer inter-
face. The state is maintained as long as the external signal is FALSE. If the
external signal is TRUE, the manipulator can be moved again. No acknowl-
edgement is required.
External safety
stop 1 and
external safety
stop 2
Safety stop 1 and safety stop 2 can be triggered via an input on the customer
interface. The state is maintained as long as the external signal is FALSE. If
the external signal is TRUE, the manipulator can be moved again. No ac-
knowledgement is required.
Tools and other equipment connected to the manipulator
must be integrated into the EMERGENCY STOP circuit
on the system side if they could constitute a potential hazard.
Failure to observe this precaution may result in death, severe injuries or con-
siderable damage to property.
Following a loss of signal, automatic operation must not
be resumed merely by closing the safeguard; it must first
additionally be acknowledged. It is the responsibility of the system integrator
to ensure this. This is to prevent automatic operation from being resumed in-
advertently while there are still persons in the danger zone, e.g. due to the
safety gate closing accidentally.
The acknowledgement must be designed in such a way that an actual
check of the danger zone can be carried out first. Acknowledgement
functions that do not allow this (e.g. because they are automatically trig-
gered by closure of the safeguard) are not permissible.
Failure to observe this may result in death to persons, severe injuries or
considerable damage to property.