双基地雷达技术综述：多站雷达定位与优势

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《双基地雷达经典教材：Advances in Bistatic Radar》是由尼古拉斯·J·威利斯和休·D·格里菲斯合编的一本专著，由SciTech Publishing出版。该书深入探讨了双基地雷达系统及其在现代通信和军事领域的应用。双基地雷达是一种特殊的雷达配置，它利用两个独立位置的天线，一个用于发射信号，另一个用于接收回波。这种设计的优势在于可以提供更广阔的覆盖范围和更高的定位精度。书中详细解释了两种主要类型的双基地雷达：传统的单传输多接收（TMR）和多传输单接收（MTR）。在TMR配置中，一个发射器伴随发射天线，多个接收器分布在不同的位置，通过同时接收来自不同接收器的信号，可以进行多路径测距和多普勒测速，从而实现目标状态（位置、速度和加速度）的估计。这依赖于多路测距数据的融合，而无需依赖角度信息，提高了定位的准确性和鲁棒性。在MTR模式下，情况则反转，一个或多个接收器与多个发射器配合工作，同样利用空间覆盖重叠的原理来获取目标信息。这种灵活性使得多基地雷达能够在复杂的环境中提供实时的、动态的目标跟踪能力，对于军事和民用监控应用如空中交通管理、航海导航和地面目标检测具有重要意义。此外，《Advances in Bistatic Radar》还可能包含技术细节，如信号处理算法、干扰抑制策略、以及双基地雷达系统的设计和优化方法。书中可能涵盖了如何通过网络协同工作、数据融合技术以及硬件和软件的集成，提升系统的性能和适应性。本书旨在为研究人员、工程师和学生提供全面的双基地雷达理论和实践指导，帮助他们理解和开发新的雷达系统，以满足日益增长的精确定位需求。书中所涉及的知识点包括雷达信号理论、电磁波传播、目标识别、系统集成与测试，以及实际应用中的挑战和解决方案。这是一本深入浅出且实用的参考资料，是学习和掌握双基地雷达技术的重要资源。

History Update

Nicholas J. Willis

2.1 BEGINNINGS

Radar was ﬁ rst patented and demonstrated in 1904 by the German engineer Christian Hülsmeyer.

As is well documented [2–5], his telemobilskop used a special spark-gap transmitter operating on

a 40–50-cm wavelength and a separate receiver that rang a bell when detecting ships up to 5 km

from the receiver. Figure 2–1 shows photographs of Hülsmeyer and his invention.

The ﬁ rst fully documented demonstration of the telemobilskop was in Cologne, in May 1904,

with both the transmitter and receiver located on a platform under the Rhine Bridge (a chain

suspension bridge destroyed during World War II) in a monostatic conﬁ guration to detect ships

on the Rhine River [5].

Purists might argue that Hülsmeyer’s telemobilskop was not a radar because it did not directly

measure range, as in “radio detection and ranging,” and technically they would be correct.

However, his invention included the essential elements of a radar, all reduced to practice: antennas,

transmitter, receiver (with adequate shielding), and indicator, in this case an audio alarm to signal

when a target was sufﬁ ciently close in range to require attention. More sophisticated indicators

would have to await the development of timing circuits and displays.

Now for an excursion to follow the monostatic telemobilskop story a little further. Hülsmeyer’s

telemobilskop was ﬁ rst rejected by none other than Admiral von Tirpitz of the German Navy—

who was namesake of the battleship Tirpitz, sister ship to the Bismarck—with the comment “Not

interested. My people have better ideas!” [5].

Although the admiral’s “better ideas” were not revealed at the time, one was likely the optical

rangeﬁ nder, a device that could measure both range and bearing to another ship at horizon

distances (15–20 nmi) under good visibility conditions. This development was a major advance

in naval ﬁ re control at the turn of the nineteenth century because target range had always been a

critical but poorly estimated parameter in gun ﬁ re control calculations. Figure 2–2 shows one of

1 This chapter updates Chapter 2 in Bistatic Radar [1]. It adds new information and enough previous data to present a

coherent story. However, not all photographs and details have been replicated here.

2 Prichard devoted a full chapter in his book [5] to the telemobilskop, documenting events with Hülsmeyer’s German

patent, letters and an oral history from his daughter Annelise. All these events showed a monostatic conﬁ guration with

substantial shielding between an adjacent transmitter and receiver. In contrast, Cooper [4] reported the May 1904

Cologne tests with the transmitter on a high tower in a bistatic conﬁ guration and Swords [2] reported the ﬁ rst public

demonstration was again in May 1904, but on the Hohenzollern bridge (a steel arch bridge that is still standing). Thus

it is possible that Hülsmeyer conducted a preliminary bistatic experiment on a different bridge, which may not have

used shielding and thus necessitated transmitter-receiver separation for adequate isolation.

3 Apparently the British Royal Navy also rejected it.

the ﬁ rst optical rangeﬁ nders used by the U.S. Navy. Figure 2–3 shows its evolution 30 years later

in the German Navy.

Unfortunately, while Hülsmeyer’s device was advertised to give a coarse indication of bearing

and a very coarse indication of range (by sliding the telemobiloscope up and down the mast for

triangulating the target [5]—not unlike the optical rangeﬁ nder), and most importantly, could

operate at night and under zero visibility conditions, its range was simply inadequate for naval

gunﬁ re control, the paramount objective of a warship.

Prichard [5] continues Hülsmeyer’s story:

But reports had reached Director Wierdsma of the Holland-Amerika-Line who invited the inventor to dem-

onstrate his discovery at a Technical Nautical Meeting at Scheveningen, and on Thursday, 9 June 1904, assist-

ed by students of Delft University, Hülsmeyer assembled his equipment in the tender Columbus and cruised

up and down Rotterdam Harbour detecting vessels at up to 5 kilometers’ range with unerring accuracy…

The representatives were… enthusiastic about the demonstration and showered Hülsmeyer with praise,

and after a lecture in which he explained that even longer ranges were quite possible he waited for orders.

But none came. Not even a trial order.

Prichard [5] then analyzed the reasons for rejection, ﬁ rst dismissing technical objections and

then concentrating on the maritime issue:

In the ﬁ rst place, world shipping in 1904 was going through a bad patch and expenditure on even the bare

essentials of safety procedures was viewed with reluctance…

Second, and more important, the arrival of wireless telegraphy was a hindrance to the acceptance of

Hülsmeyer’s discovery. By 1904 it had been installed in a number of vessels which were now able to com-

municate with others at distances far beyond the range of visual signalling. In emergencies the wireless

operator could quickly call for help, and this had been possible as early as 1901. Moreover, direction-ﬁ nd-

ing by the use of cross-bearings from shore stations enabled a master to ﬁ x his position with a fair degree

Figure 2–1 Christian . The spark-gap transmitter is on the left; receiver, dipole antennas, and bell on the right. Left

photo was taken in 1904; right photo, considerably later. The telemobilskop is now on display at the

Deutsches Museum, Munich. Courtesy of University College, London.

Beginnings 11

12 History Update

of accuracy. Ship-owners were therefore reluctant to part with money for a new-fangled system when they

were already paying enough for the present one.

Following unsuccessful attempts to sell the device to major electrical companies, including

the Wireless Telegraphy Company, now known as Telefunken, Hülsmeyer abandoned his quest

for other interests. Prichard observes in hindsight that the telemobilskop might have prevented the

Titanic disaster had the maritime industry embraced it. And in further hindsight, even the U.S.

Navy may have been able to stave off its worst disaster in peacetime history, which was caused by

a ﬂ awed implementation of that same type of wireless telegraphy direction-ﬁ nding [7]. Figure 2–4

shows a photograph of the disaster.

Clearly even warships need autonomous methods to safely navigate near land, for example

devices like Hülsmeyer’s telemobilskop. Of course such a device must be (1) installed, (2) working,

4 One line of bearing to a ship’s transmitter was measured by the U.S. Navy’s radio-compass station at Pt. Arguello, CA,

and then transmitted to the ship, but with a 180º measurement ambiguity. A squadron of 19 destroyers was en route

from San Francisco to San Diego on a speed run in limited visibility conditions due to fog. The squadron navigator, the

only one in the squadron with authority to navigate, mistakenly plotted the ambiguity, which put the squadron south of

Pt. Arguello, rather than north of it. The squadron in single-ﬁ le, follow-the-leader, formation then turned east, landing

the ﬁ rst seven ships on the rocks at Honda. Compounding the disaster was the fact that the bearing ambiguity could

have been resolved by installing a switchable reﬂ ector behind the radio-compass antenna at Pt. Arguello, as done on the

British Chain Home radars (Figure 2–9).

Figure 2–2 “In the maintop of the [U.S. battleship] North Dakota,” circa 1910 [6]. The rangeﬁ nder is the long,

horizontal tube in front of the seamen standing on the platform at the head of mainmast, in this case

built as a cage-mast. It consists of lenses, reﬂ ectors, and prisms at each end and center of the tube, which

display two target images, one above the other, to an observer at the center. The observer aligns the two

images with a vernier calibrated in range, solving the triangle with the target at the apex. The range is

then phoned to the ﬁ re-control station below. The observer also reports subsequent shell splashes as

short or over the target. The system operated only in daylight and fair weather. It (and the seamen) was

also handicapped by stack gas (background) and gunﬁ re smoke (foreground). Rangeﬁ nders remained on

most U.S. warships until well after World War II. It was not one of the coveted battle stations. The addition

of radar—when it was working—rectiﬁ ed all these problems. (Photo courtesy of the U.S. Navy.)

14 History Update

(3) turned on, (4) manned, and most importantly (5) heeded.

The probability of all those events

occurring was inﬁ nitesimally small in the 1920s. For example, the better idea optical rangeﬁ nder

had not yet been installed on any of those destroyers. But the potential was there—just not

appreciated for either maritime or military use.

As a result, those rejections ended all radar work for the next 18 years. That, in ﬁ nal retrospect,

was the major tragedy of Hülsmeyer’s work: it was forgotten. There was no documentation of his

successful experiments in technical journals—just a few newspaper articles and obscure patents

buried in the ﬁ les. So his legacy was lost to the engineering community, which was then forced to

start over with new and, as it turned out, quite different approaches.

This radar effect was rediscovered by A. H. Taylor and L. C. Young in 1922 when they were

carrying out 60 MHz propagation experiments using a superheterodyne receiver and a 50-W

transmitter amplitude-modulated at 500 Hz at the U.S. Navy Aircraft Laboratory, Anacostia,

DC. They ﬁ rst detected bistatic reﬂ ections from buildings, trees, and other stationary objects and

then a wooden steamer traveling down the Potomac River, which cut the beam in what is now

known as the forward-scatter mode [2, 8]. Again and likely for similar reasons such as no range

measurements, the concept was rejected by the U.S. Navy.

Then in the next 15 years both this forward-scatter effect and the doppler beat frequency

generated between the direct path signal and echoes from moving targets were observed by many

engineers and scientists conducting RF (radio frequency) propagation experiments. Both effects

could be observed together, as shown in Figure 2–5.

These experiments used new, commercial radio transmitters or similar experimental equipment

operating between 30 and 80 MHz.

Table 2–1 summarizes these events.

5 On December 7, 1941, an SCR-270 air surveillance radar at Pearl Harbor was installed, working, turned on, and

manned. But its data was not heeded.

6 An exception is the 1935 U.K. experiment, which exploited the 6-MHz BBC transmitter station at Daventry.

7 There is a sketchy report [10] about A. S. Popov detecting the Russian warship Lieutenant Il’in when it crossed a radio

communication link between two other Russian ships Europe and Africa on the Baltic Sea in 1897. The report then

credited him with discovering radiolocation—yet another father of radar. (Such claims lead Lamont Blake, nominated

by this author as father of the deﬁ nitive radar range equation, to conclude that radar was one of those bastard

inventions: one mother, many fathers.) Unfortunately the Popov et al.’s 1945 report (in Russian) is not accessible.

Since nothing further appears to have been accomplished or published, we shall let it be.

(F)

(F')

l'avion

s'approche

l'avion

coupela

base

l'avion

s'eloigne

⋅

Figure 2–5 1937 drawing by Pierre David, showing an aircraft approaching, crossing, and then departing his

electromagnetic barrier [9]. (F) is the barrier, also called the fence or baseline. The doppler beat

frequency decreases during the approach, is zero during the crossing, and increases during the

departure. The increase in amplitude is the forward-scatter radar cross-section enhancement. (Pierre

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