write a one-page non-technical report in English to the leaders of China on whether to support a switch to GGDP or to reject a switch and maintain GDP as the primary measure of national economic health.给我一些支撑文献的网址

我可以推荐以下网址作为支撑文献：1. 经济学院：https://economics.cals.cornell.edu/sites/default/files/wp/2018/econ_wp_2018_022.pdf2. 国际货币基金组织：https://www.imf.org/external/pubs/ft/fandd/2017/06/wilson.htm3. 加州大学伯克利分校：https://ers.berkeley.edu/sites/default/files/publications/ers_wp_2017-12_2.pdf4. 经济学家：https://www.economist.com/leaders/2017/09/21/gauging-the-value-of-gdp

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Motivated by the above discussion, a multi-leader multifollower Stackelberg game architecture is proposed to formulate the interaction between BSs and UEs. In this game, BSs have an advantage as the first mover and can be regarded as the market leaders. UEs are assumed to be in the position of followers in this market. There is a sequential relationship between the actions of the participants. Therefore, the Stackelberg model is more suitable than the Cournot model. Under the proposed architecture, a user association algorithm based on joint UE demand shaping and BS demand response is proposed. With this framework, we can maximize the UE utility function and apply flexible payoff functions to BSs and UEs to design a load-balancing algorithm.翻译

在上述讨论的基础上，提出了一个多领导者多追随者Stackelberg博弈架构，以建立基站和UE之间的相互作用。在这个博弈中，基站作为先行者具有优势，可以被视为市场领导者。UE设备被假设为市场中的追随者。参与者的行动之间存在顺序关系。因此，Stackelberg模型比Cournot模型更适合。在所提出的架构下，提出了一种基于联合UE需求塑造和基站需求响应的用户关联算法。通过这个框架，我们可以最大化UE的效用函数，并对基站和UE应用灵活的收益函数来设计一个负载平衡算法。

翻译：As shown in Fig. 2, to solve problems (7) and (11), a multileader multi-follower Stackelberg game SL, in which BSs are regarded as leaders and UE are followers, is adopted. Although players make their decisions independently, a hierarchy of players at different levels exists in this game, and the strategies chosen by the followers depend on the strategies selected by the leaders. Moreover, the choice of the optimal strategy of leaders can vary with the follower equilibrium that occurs. Here, the Stackelberg equilibrium (SE) of the proposed Stackelberg game is defined as follows.

如图2所示，为了解决问题（7）和（11），采用了一个多领导者多追随者斯塔克伯格博弈SL，其中基站被视为领导者，用户设备（UE）则是追随者。尽管玩家们独立地做出决策，但在这个博弈中存在不同层级的玩家，并且追随者选择的策略取决于领导者选择的策略。此外，领导者的最优策略选择可能会随着出现的追随者均衡点而变化。在这里，提出的斯塔克伯格博弈的斯塔克伯格均衡（SE）定义如下。