STABLE SINGLE-BS ASSOCIATION ALGORITHM翻译

"STABLE SINGLE-BS ASSOCIATION ALGORITHM" 可以翻译为 "稳定的单基站关联算法"。

在移动通信系统中，移动设备通常需要与基站进行关联，以便进行通信。"STABLE SINGLE-BS ASSOCIATION ALGORITHM" 是一种用于确定移动设备与单个基站之间稳定关联的算法。

这个算法的目标是确保移动设备与基站之间的关联是稳定的，即在一定时间内保持一致，减少频繁的切换和干扰。它可以通过考虑一些因素，如信号强度、负载情况、功率控制等来决定设备与基站的关联。

这种算法对于移动通信系统的性能优化非常重要，能够提高系统容量和资源利用率，减少通信中断和干扰。它可以应用于各种无线通信系统，如蜂窝网络、Wi-Fi 网络等。

相关问题

 We propose a bi-level bargaining framework for distributed user association and resource allocation. In the followerlevel game, UE competition occurs in a non-cooperative manner. In contrast, full coordination is assumed among the BSs in the leader-level game. Congestion factors are introduced to balance the loads on small BSs with different capacities  We consider two fundamental limitations of HetNets: the backhaul bottleneck and UE capability constraints. Accordingly, constraints are introduced on the wireless resources and maximum number of serving UEs in small BSs to reflect the backhaul bottleneck, and minimum rate requirements for UE devices are introduced to represent the UE capability constraints.  Potential game theory is used to decouple the backhaul bottleneck constraints. The existence, uniqueness and convergence of the Nash equilibrium (NE) of the follower-level game are also verified. Finally, the resident-oriented GS algorithm is used to obtain a stable single-BS association.翻译

我们提出了一个分布式用户关联和资源分配的双层谈判框架。在追随者层次博弈中，UE设备之间以非合作的方式进行竞争。相反，在领导者层次博弈中，假设基站之间完全协调。为了平衡不同容量的小型基站的负载，引入了拥塞因素。我们考虑了HetNets的两个基本限制：后向链路瓶颈和UE能力约束。因此，引入了无线资源和小型基站能够服务的最大UE数量的约束，以反映后向链路瓶颈，并引入了UE设备的最低速率要求来表示UE能力约束。我们使用潜在博弈理论来解耦后向链路瓶颈约束。还验证了追随者层次博弈的纳什均衡（NE）的存在性、唯一性和收敛性。最后，使用面向居民的GS算法来获得稳定的单基站关联。

In the proposed algorithm, the access prices of BSs are adjusted according to incomes and load situations in the leaderlevel game, and each UE independently chooses the BS that maximizes its payoff (or minimizes its payment) in the follower-level game. Thus, the algorithm achieves optimization in a distributed manner. When a small BS is overloaded, the price will increase to ensure that the offloaded UE has a higher access payment. For the design of the price, a particle swarm optimization-based pricing strategy (PSO-PS) is proposed to maximize the BS revenue. Finally, we use the resident-oriented Gale-Shapley (GS) algorithm to obtain a stable single-BS association. The main contributions of this paper can be summarized as follows:翻译

在所提出的算法中，基站的接入价格根据领导者层次博弈中的收入和负载情况进行调整，而每个UE在追随者层次博弈中独立选择使其效益最大化（或支付最小化）的基站。因此，该算法以分布式的方式实现了优化。当小型基站超载时，价格将增加，以确保离载的UE具有更高的接入支付。在价格设计方面，提出了一种基于粒子群优化（PSO-PS）的定价策略，以最大化基站的收入。最后，我们使用面向居民的Gale-Shapley（GS）算法来获得稳定的单基站关联。本文的主要贡献可以总结如下：