We propose a bi-level bargaining framework for distributed user association and resource allocation. In the followerlevel game, UE competition occurs in a non-cooperative manner. In contrast, full coordination is assumed among the BSs in the leader-level game. Congestion factors are introduced to balance the loads on small BSs with different capacities We consider two fundamental limitations of HetNets: the backhaul bottleneck and UE capability constraints. Accordingly, constraints are introduced on the wireless resources and maximum number of serving UEs in small BSs to reflect the backhaul bottleneck, and minimum rate requirements for UE devices are introduced to represent the UE capability constraints. Potential game theory is used to decouple the backhaul bottleneck constraints. The existence, uniqueness and convergence of the Nash equilibrium (NE) of the follower-level game are also verified. Finally, the resident-oriented GS algorithm is used to obtain a stable single-BS association.翻译
时间: 2024-04-22 08:26:56 浏览: 117
Joint User Association and Resource Allocation forEnergy-Efficient Multi-Stream Aggregation
我们提出了一个分布式用户关联和资源分配的双层谈判框架。在追随者层次博弈中,UE设备之间以非合作的方式进行竞争。相反,在领导者层次博弈中,假设基站之间完全协调。为了平衡不同容量的小型基站的负载,引入了拥塞因素。我们考虑了HetNets的两个基本限制:后向链路瓶颈和UE能力约束。因此,引入了无线资源和小型基站能够服务的最大UE数量的约束,以反映后向链路瓶颈,并引入了UE设备的最低速率要求来表示UE能力约束。我们使用潜在博弈理论来解耦后向链路瓶颈约束。还验证了追随者层次博弈的纳什均衡(NE)的存在性、唯一性和收敛性。最后,使用面向居民的GS算法来获得稳定的单基站关联。
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