"TCG发布PC客户端专用TPM技术规范1.59版本（2021年9月29日）"

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本文是关于TCG Protection Profile PC Client Specific TPM TPM Library Specification Family “2.0” Level 0 Revision 1.59的技术规范。该规范于2021年9月29日发布，版本号为1.3。本规范由TCG PUBLISHED发布，版权归TCG所有。在使用本规范时需要注意免责声明、通知和许可条款，本规范提供的是"按原样"的，不提供任何形式的担保，包括但不限于对于适销性、非侵权性和特定用途适用性的担保。 TPM（Trusted Platform Module，可信平台模块）的相关技术规范在当今信息安全领域具有重要的意义。TPM是一种集成电路芯片，用于提供计算机系统基本安全功能，如加密和密钥管理、认证、平台完整性验证等。本规范是针对PC客户端特定TPM TPM库规范的保护剖面，属于“2.0”系列，级别为0，修订版本为1.59。该规范的发布旨在规范PC客户端特定TPM TPM库的技术要求，从而提高相关产品的安全性和稳定性。在信息技术高速发展的今天，安全问题更加凸显，网络攻击、数据泄露等问题给个人和组织带来了巨大的风险和损失。因此，加强对计算机系统的安全性防护具有重要意义。TPM作为一种硬件安全模块，可以提供硬件级别的安全保障，保护系统免受恶意软件和恶意攻击的威胁。而本规范的发布，则规范了PC客户端特定TPM TPM库的技术要求，从而保证了相关产品的安全性和稳定性。本规范的内容主要包括技术规范的背景介绍、范围与目标、规范性引用、术语和定义、符号和缩略语以及详细的技术要求等。通过本规范，用户可以清晰了解PC客户端特定TPM TPM库规范的相关要求，包括其适用范围、术语定义，符号语法的规范等。同时，该规范还包括了TPM Library Specification Family “2.0” Level 0 Revision 1.59的具体技术要求，为相关产品的开发和实施提供了明确的技术指导。值得注意的是，本规范所提供的技术要求是基于TCG发布的，因此具有一定的权威性和可靠性。用户在使用本规范时需要遵守TCG的版权和使用条款，确保规范的正确使用和落实。鉴于本规范的重要性和严肃性，用户在阅读和实施本规范时应当仔细阅读，确保对规范的要求有深刻的理解，并严格按照规范的要求进行产品的研发和实施。综上所述，TCG Protection Profile PC Client Specific TPM TPM Library Specification Family “2.0” Level 0 Revision 1.59的技术规范是一份重要的文件，它规范了PC客户端特定TPM TPM库的技术要求，为相关产品的安全性和稳定性提供了重要的保障。该规范的发布对于提高计算机系统的安全性防护具有重要的意义，能够有效帮助个人和组织应对安全风险和挑战。希望广大用户能够充分利用该规范，提高对计算机系统安全的重视，保障信息安全和数据保护的重要性。

Level 0 Revision 1.59 10 29 September 2021

TCG PUBLISHED

The TPM manufacturer delivers the firmware upgrade for Field Upgrade to the platform

vendor as their customer.

• Platform Integration (Phase 3)

The platform vendor uses the Field Upgrade functionality

to install the new TPM

firmware on hardware of a previous TPM before delivery of the platform to the end user.

Note the platform vendor may use different ways for delivery of the firmware upgrade

to the end user, e.g. using update mechanisms of operating systems running on the

platform.

• Operational usage (Phase 4)

The platform vendor or the end user may use the Field Upgrade functionality to install

the new TPM firmware on hardware of a previous TPM after delivery of the platform to

the end user. The preparative procedures for operational usage of the new certified

TPM include secure acceptance procedures for use by the end user.

The Field Upgrade preserves User data (NV index allocations and contents, persistent

object allocations and contents) and TSF data (EPS, PPS and SPS, hierarchy

authentication reference data authValue, authPolicy and proof, lockoutAuth,

lockoutPolicy, lockout parameters, the PCR authValue and authPolicy values, clock).

Thus the Field Upgrade does not change the Storage key hierarchy for protection of

owner-related and other User data and TSF data. After Field Upgrade the new TPM will

be ready for operational use in the environment of the end user.

The installation of the new firmware may be performed in Phase 3 or Phase 4. The previous

TOE requires authorisation for firmware upgrade and verifies the integrity and authenticity

of TPM firmware upgrade data as provided by the TPM firmware manufacturer. But the new

TPM may or may not be a certified TPM depending on the TPM vendor or platform vendor

certification policy. Thus the user of the TPM shall be made aware of these changes, whether

the installed firmware is certified, and which version of a certified TPM is installed.

The TPM manufacturer may use the field upgrade process as well but this is not expected as the

TPM vendor may use manufacturing utilities.

The field upgrade implementation may be proprietary or compliant to the library specifications but

must fulfill the SFRs defined in this protection profile.

Level 0 Revision 1.59 13 29 September 2021

TCG PUBLISHED

5. Security Problem Definition

The following sections describe the security problem definition of the Protection Profile PC

Client Specific Trusted Platform Module.

5.1 Assets

This section of the security problem definition shows the assets of the TOE to be protected

and the threats that are considered.

The assets are:

- Protected Objects, operations, security attributes and authorisation data as

defined in Table 8.

- Objects, operations and security attributes for the TPM state control SFP as

defined in Table 9.

5.2 Threats

This section of the security problem definition shows the threats that are to be countered by

the TOE, its development environment, its operational environment, or a combination of

these three. A threat consists of a threat agent, an asset (either in the operational or in the

development environment) and an adverse action of that threat agent on that asset.

Table 1: Threats

Threat

Description

T.Compromise

An undetected compromise of the data in shielded locations

may occur as a result of an attacker (whether an insider or

outsider) attempting to perform actions that the individual or

capability is not authorised to perform.

T.Bypass

An unauthorised individual or user may tamper with TSF,

security attributes or other data in order to bypass TOE

security functions and gain unauthorised access to TOE

assets.

T.Export

A user or an attacker may export data from shielded locations

without security attributes or with insecure security

attributes, causing the data exported to be erroneous and

unusable, to allow erroneous data to be added or substituted

for the original data, and/or to reveal secrets.

T.Hack_Crypto

Cryptographic key generation or operation may be incorrectly

implemented, allowing an unauthorised individual or user to

compromise keys generated within the TPM or encrypted data

or to modify data undetected.

T.Hack_Physical

An unauthorised individual or user of the TOE may cause

unauthorised disclosure or modification of TOE assets by

physically interacting with the TOE. The attacker may be a

hostile user of the TOE.

Level 0 Revision 1.59 14 29 September 2021

TCG PUBLISHED

Threat

Description

T.Imperson

An unauthorised individual may impersonate an authorised

user of the TOE (e.g. by dictionary attacks to guess the

authorisation data) and thereby gain access to TOE data in

shielded locations and protected capabilities.

T.Import

A user or attacker may import data without security attributes

or with erroneous security attributes, causing key ownership

and authorisation to be uncertain or erroneous and the

system to malfunction or operate in an insecure manner.

T.Insecure_State

The TOE may start-up in an insecure state or enter an

insecure state, allowing an attacker to obtain sensitive data

or compromise the system.

T.Intercept

An attacker may intercept the communication between a user

and the TPM subjects to gain knowledge of the commands and

data sent to the subject or manipulate the communication.

T.Malfunction

TOE assets may be modified or disclosed to an unauthorised

individual or user of the TOE, through malfunction of the

TOE.

T.Modify

An attacker may modify data in shielded locations or their

security attributes in order to gain access to the TOE and its

assets.

T.Object_Attr_Change

A user or attacker may create an object with no security

attributes or make unauthorised changes to security attribute

values for an object to enable attacks.

T.Replay

An unauthorised individual may gain access to the system

and sensitive data through a “replay” or “man-in-the-middle”

attack that allows the individual to capture identification and

authentication data.

T.Repudiate_Transact

An originator of data may deny originating the data to avoid

accountability.

T.Residual_Info

A user may obtain information that the user is not authorised

to have when the data in shielded locations is no longer

actively managed by the TOE (“data scavenging”).

T.Leak

An attacker may exploit information which is leaked from the

TOE during usage of the TSF in order to disclose confidential

assets.

5.3 Organisational Security Policies

This section of the security problem definition shows the Organisational Security Policies

(OSPs) that are to be enforced by the TOE, its development environment, its operational

environment, or a combination of these three. OSPs are rules, practices, or guidelines. These

may be laid down by the organisation controlling the operational environment of the TOE, or

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