litical positions. One brief way of understanding this
emergence of the political within the aesthetic is to
say that Kant’s idea of
sensus communis (Kant 1952), a
common standard of aesthetic judgment in which in-
dividual perception tallies with general taste, recalls
Thomas Paine’s notion of “common sense” (Paine
1953), which marshals public sentiment for the pur-
poses of revolution. Structured by familiar responses
and shared stimuli, aesthetics represent the possibility
of mass mobilization. It is a possibility that echoes
with political ambivalence; even as collective feeling
resounds with democratic energy, the hum of a mass
unified—and manipulated—by emotion also echoes
with more ominous overtones of totalitarian control,
as Walter Benjamin (1968) predicted in his famous es-
say on mechanical reproduction.
In the nineteenth-century United States, the poten-
tially transformative effects of aesthetic feeling in gal-
vanizing political opinion appeared in literary
sentimentalism. Animating a host of reforms from
temperance to women’s rights, sentimentalism figured
prominently in the antislavery crusade, culminating
in Harriet Beecher Stowe’s directive that individuals
confronted with the awesome task of defeating the
monster of slavery begin by making sure that “
they feel
right
” (1852/1981, 624). Individual by individual, citi-
zens could build a
sensus communis that would change
how the world acts and thinks. The problem, of
course, was that individual feeling could remain indi-
vidualized, forever private and never connected to
shared action or thought. Indeed, Ralph Waldo Emer-
son, in the poem that introduces his essay “Art,”
seemed to imply that when art touches us, it recon-
ciles and adjusts the individual to the social world as it
is, instead of reshaping the world in accordance with a
common regard for justice or fairness. The duty of art,
according to Emerson’s couplet, is “Man in Earth to
acclimate, / And bend the exile to his fate” (1983,
429). Here, the politics that aesthetics produce come
in the mode of resignation.
Identifying Emerson with this one-dimensional po-
sition ignores his belief that beauty could reinvent the
ordinary forms of social life. Aesthetics for much of
the twentieth century were prone to distortions and
simplifications that cast beauty and art as the conser-
vative guarantors of the social world as it is and not
how it might be reimagined and reformed. Twentieth-
century proponents of New Criticism often stressed
aesthetics as a means of giving order and stability to
sexual passion and political affect. “Aesthetic forms
are a technique of restraint,” announced John Crowe
Ransom (1965, 31), advancing the position that the
human rush to action, overflow of emotion, and un-
predictable stir of social life could all be reined in by
using art to formalize beauty and our responses to it.
These lingering effects of social governance and po-
litical containment are what motivate some American
studies and cultural studies scholars to critique aes-
thetics as a conservative strategy of retrenchment that
justifies art’s putative evasion of political matters,
mystifies class privilege as disinterestedness, and uses
ideas of harmony and unity to excuse the status quo.
As Sacvan Bercovitch and Myra Jehlen framed the is-
sue in their landmark collection
Ideology and Classic
Aesthetics Russ Castronovo
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