数字签名与安全：加密技术在汽车行业的应用

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"Digital_signature.pdf" 本资源主要涵盖了与信息安全、加密算法和汽车电子系统相关的概念，特别是Digital Signature（数字签名）的重要性和应用。以下是对这些概念的详细解释： 1. **数字签名**：数字签名是一种数学机制，用于验证数字消息或文档的真实性。它确保消息来源于已知的发送者（身份验证）并且在传输过程中未被篡改（完整性）。当满足先决条件时，接收者可以通过使用发送者的公钥来验证签名，确保解密后的副本与原始消息完全匹配。 2. **非对称加密（Asymmetric Cryptography）**：与对称加密不同，非对称加密使用一对密钥，一个用于加密，另一个用于解密。这种算法基于大数运算，如RSA算法，通常密钥长度较长，超过1500位。 3. **椭圆曲线算法（Elliptic Curve Algorithm）**：这是一种80年代开发的非对称加密算法，其特点是使用较短的密钥（小于512位），但安全性与非对称加密相当。 4. **AES（Advanced Encryption Standard）**：是由NIST制定的一种加密标准，用于保护数据的安全，常见的有AES-128、AES-192等版本。 5. **Secure Boot（安全启动）**：在硬件模块启动时，通过检查固件的完整性和真实性来防止未授权的修改。 6. **Chain-of-Trust**：安全启动的增强版，将固件检查细分为多个子部分，以缩短启动时间并提高安全性。 7. **ECU（Electronic Control Unit）**：由TIER1供应商开发的汽车电子控制单元，负责控制车辆的各种功能。 8. **Car-to-X通信**：车辆与环境（如其他车辆、交通标志）之间的通信，是智能交通系统的一部分，用于提高道路安全和效率。 9. **HSM（Hardware Security Module）**：硬件安全模块，是集成密码处理和核心加密功能的设备，有时允许用户编程。 10. **物理攻击（Physical Attack）**：利用超出设备规格的操作，如电压波动、温度或时钟变化，对设备进行攻击。 11. **重放攻击（Replay Attacks）**：攻击者记录并重复发送加密消息，绕过安全机制。 12. **随机数生成器（RNG / TRNG / PRNG）**：RNG生成随机数，TRNG基于物理效应，而PRNG则使用数学算法。 13. **安全内存（Secure Memory）**：专门用于存储敏感信息，如加密密钥，具有严格的访问控制。 14. **SHA（Secure Hash Algorithm）**：NIST指定的一系列哈希算法，用于计算数据的固定长度摘要，验证数据完整性。 15. **完整性（Integrity）**：确保数据的一致性、准确性和可靠性，防止未经授权的更改。 16. **SHE（Security for Highly Integrated Systems）**：由德国汽车OEM指定的安全标准。 17. **边信道攻击（Side-Channel Attacks）**：攻击者通过测量加密过程的物理特性，如功耗、时序或电磁辐射，来推测安全信息。 18. **签名（Signature）**：在消息后附加一个经过发送者私钥加密的版本，以证明消息的来源和完整性。这些概念在自动驾驶、嵌入式系统以及汽车电子安全领域至关重要，它们确保了数据的安全传输、软件更新的可靠性和系统的整体安全性。

Pr [ (pk, sk) ← G(1
n
), V( pk, x, S(sk, x) ) = accepted ] = 1.
[16]
A digital signature scheme is secure if for every non-uniform probabilistic polynomial time adversary, A
Pr [ (pk, sk) ← G(1
n
), (x, t) ← A
S(sk, · )
(pk, 1
n
), x ∉ Q, V(pk, x, t) = accepted] < negl(n),
where A
S(sk, · )
 denotes that A has access to the oracle, S(sk, · ), Q denotes the set of the queries on S made by
A, which knows the public key, pk, and the security parameter, n, and x ∉ Q denotes that the adversary may
not directly query the string, x, on S.
[16][17]
In 1976, Whitfield Diffie and Martin Hellman first described the notion of a digital signature scheme, although
they  only  conjectured  that  such  schemes  existed  based  on  functions  that  are  trapdoor  one-way
permutations.
[18][19]
  Soon  afterwards,  Ronald  Rivest,  Adi  Shamir,  and  Len  Adleman  invented  the  RSA
algorithm, which could be used to produce primitive digital signatures
[20]
 (although only as a proof-of-concept
–  "plain"  RSA  signatures  are not  secure
[21]
). The  first  widely  marketed  software  package  to  offer  digital
signature was Lotus Notes 1.0, released in 1989, which used the RSA algorithm.
[22]
Other digital signature schemes were soon developed after RSA, the earliest being Lamport  signatures,
[23]
Merkle signatures (also known as "Merkle trees" or simply "Hash trees"),
[24]
 and Rabin signatures.
[25]
In 1988, Shafi Goldwasser, Silvio Micali, and Ronald Rivest became the first to rigorously define the security
requirements  of  digital  signature  schemes.
[26]
  They  described  a  hierarchy  of  attack  models  for  signature
schemes, and also presented the GMR signature scheme, the first that could be proved to prevent even an
existential  forgery against  a chosen message attack,  which is  the currently accepted security  definition  for
signature schemes.
[26]
 The first such scheme which is not built on trapdoor functions but rather on a family of
function with a much weaker required property of one-way permutation was presented by Moni Naor  and
Moti Yung.
[27]
One digital signature scheme (of many) is based on RSA. To create signature keys, generate an RSA key pair
containing a modulus, N, that is the product of two random secret distinct large primes, along with integers, e
and d, such that e d ≡ 1 (mod φ(N)), where φ is the Euler's totient function. The signer's public key consists of
N and e, and the signer's secret key contains d.
To sign a message, m, the signer computes a signature, σ, such that σ ≡  m
d
 (mod N). To verify, the receiver
checks that σ
e
 ≡ m (mod N).
Several early signature schemes were of a similar type: they involve the use of a trapdoor permutation, such as
the RSA function, or in the case of the Rabin signature scheme, computing square modulo composite, N. A
trapdoor permutation family is a family of permutations, specified by a parameter, that is easy to compute in the
forward direction, but is difficult to compute in the reverse direction without already knowing the private key
("trapdoor"). Trapdoor permutations can be used for digital signature schemes, where computing the reverse
direction with the secret key is required for signing, and computing the forward direction is used to verify
signatures.
Used directly, this type of signature scheme is vulnerable to key-only existential forgery attack. To create a
forgery, the attacker picks a random signature σ and uses the verification procedure to determine the message,
m, corresponding to that signature.
[28]
 In practice, however, this type of signature is not  used directly, but
History
Method

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数字签名与安全：加密技术在汽车行业的应用

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