xBook：构建隐私保护的社交网络应用框架

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"《xBook：社交网络平台上的隐私重设计》是一本深入探讨当前社交网络隐私控制问题的著作，作者Kapil Singh、Sumeer Bhola和Wenke Lee来自计算机科学领域，分别来自Google和乔治亚理工学院。随着社交媒体从单纯的提供服务转变为承载第三方应用的平台，用户对隐私保护的需求日益突出。以往，用户往往信任社交网站处理个人数据并假设其能正确执行隐私设置。然而，如今他们被要求同样信任每个使用的第三方应用程序，这使得用户的隐私面临着被这些应用无意或恶意泄露的风险。该作品提出了一种创新的框架，旨在构建兼顾隐私保护和社会网络功能的新型应用。通过利用信息流模型，该框架能够有效地控制不信任的应用程序对其接收信息的处理权限。作者通过展示一个平台的设计实例，证明了他们的设计在实践中是可行且有效的。这个框架的关键在于确保用户的数据安全，同时保持社交网络平台的核心服务特性，如分享、互动和个性化推荐等。在书中，读者可以了解到如何通过严格的隐私控制策略，如访问控制、数据最小化原则和实时监控等手段，来限制第三方应用对用户数据的潜在滥用。此外，还可能探讨了如何通过透明度和用户教育来增强用户对隐私设置的理解和控制能力。《xBook：社交网络平台上的隐私重设计》不仅为解决当前隐私挑战提供了理论基础，也为社交网络平台的未来发展指明了方向，即如何在保护用户隐私的前提下，实现更加智能、安全的社交体验。对于信息安全专家、隐私倡导者以及社交网络平台开发者来说，这本书无疑是一份重要的参考资料，它推动了业界对于隐私保护技术的思考与实践。"

nent communicates with www.tarot.com and has no

access to user data. Another component has access to

user’s birthday, but does not communicate with any ex-

ternal entity.

From an end user’s perspective, the applications are

monolithic as the user does not know about the compo-

nents. At the time of adding a particular application, the

user is presented with a manifest that states what user

proﬁle data is needed by the application and which ex-

ternal entity will it be sharing this data with. For exam-

ple, horoscope’s manifest would specify that it does not

share any information with any external entity. Note that

the horoscope application does not need to reveal that it

communicates with www.tarot.com as no user infor-

mation is being sent to www.tarot.com. The user can

now make a more informed decision before adding the ap-

plication. Admittedly, the user will need to make a trust

decision with respect to the parties with which the appli-

cation shares user data, but these external parties can be

expected to be larger and better branded entities providing

internet services, such as Google for ads, Yahoo for maps,

etc.

Figure 2 shows a typical life cycle of an application.

The developer of an application decides on the structure of

the components for that application and during the appli-

cation’s deployment on xBook, he speciﬁes the informa-

tion required by each component and the external entity a

particular component needs to communicate with. xBook

uses this information to generate the manifest for the ap-

plication. As shown in the ﬁgure, a manifest is basically a

set that speciﬁes all of the application’s external commu-

nications (irrespective of the components) along with the

user’s proﬁle data that is shared for each communication.

Additionally, the xBook platform ensures that all of the

application’s components comply with the user’s privacy

policy and the manifest approved by the user. We discuss

this further using the case study of an example application

in Section 6.3.

The division of an application into multiple compo-

nents allows the application writer to develop different

functionality within an application that rely on different

pieces of the user proﬁle. For example, let us consider

an application that requires a user’s information to gen-

erate a customized proﬁle for the user. It also requires

his address information to be passed to Google to gener-

ate a map showing the address. In the application design

of current social networks, the application would be able

to pass all information about the user to Google. In the

xBook framework, the application would be split into two

components: the ﬁrst component presents the customized

proﬁle of the user, has full access to the user’s data and

is not allowed to communicate with Google; the second

component encapsulates the user’s address (with no map-

ping to the user’s proﬁle) that is passed to Google to gen-

Figure 2: Typical life cycle of an application in xBook.

erate the map. We discuss some example applications in

Section 7.1.

Figure 3 shows a high-level design of our xBook frame-

work. There are two parts of the xBook platform, one that

runs on the server-side and another that executes on the

client-side in the user’s browser (Figure 3). The applica-

tion components, in turn, are also split into client-side and

server-side components. The components are written in a

safe subset of javascript, called ADsafe [1], which facili-

tates conﬁnement of these components in our xBook im-

plementation. Any communication to and from the com-

ponents occurs by using xBook APIs, thereby allowing

all such communication to be mediated by xBook. Each

component is associated with a privilege level or label that

is derived from the application’s manifest. The platform

mediates the information ﬂow between the components

based on these labels (Section 6).

Both client-side and server-side components commu-

nicate with server-side storage to retrieve data. There

are two types of storage in xBook system: one for stor-

ing xBook data that includes user proﬁles, and second for

the data stored by the application. While the structure of

xBook data is known, the semantic of the application data

is internal to the application and hence unknown to the

platform. All data ﬁelds are labeled to control access by

application components. These labels are assigned based

on high-level user-deﬁned policies, such as a policy al-

lowing access to only the user’s friends, and the manifest

approved by the user (Figure 2).

To store application data with unknown structure and

semantics, xBook contains a group of storage pools,

where data is stored as a set of name-value pairs. An ap-

plication can have multiple storage pools, which could be

for each user or for user-independent data.

3.1 Leakage Prevention by xBook Design

In the current platform designs, a user’s information

can be leaked in three major ways: (1) applications can

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