IEEE
Std 802.11F-2003 MULTI-VENDOR ACCESS POINT INTEROPERABILITY VIA AN IAPP
4
Copyright © 2003 IEEE. All rights reserved.
IAPP transactions are over the DS. Hence, IAPP is independent of the security scheme defined in ISO/IEC
8802-11:1999.
This recommended practice makes use of the IETF RFCs listed in Clause 2 to implement many of its func-
tions. It also relies on a STA making use of the 802.11 Reassociation Request frame when roaming from one
AP to another, in order to provide the most complete services to the APs using the IAPP. When a STA uses
the 802.11 Association Request, rather than the Reassociation Request, the IAPP may not be able to notify
the AP at which the STA was previously associated of the new association. This may result in the old AP
(indicated in the “current AP” field of the reassociation request frame) maintaining context for the STA that
has roamed to a new AP for a longer time than is strictly necessary. This may cause undue waste of resources
at the old AP, as well as limiting the ability of the IAPP to help enforce the single STA association require-
ment of 802.11.
One issue that AP designers should address that can cause significant problems in a WLAN is the continued
operation of an AP when it has lost its link to the DS. When an AP continues to accept associations without
a link to the DS, it is a black hole in the WLAN, where STAs associate and cannot communicate with
anything beyond the AP’s BSS. When an AP loses its link to the DS, it should cease transmitting Beacons,
disassociate all associated stations, and cease responding to Probe Request, Authentication, and Association
Request frames.
1.4 Inter-AP security risks
Inter-AP communications present opportunities to an attacker. The attacker can use IAPP or forged 802.11
MAC management frames as a Denial-of-Service (DoS) attack against a STA state in its AP. It can capture
MOVE packets to gather information on the STA that is roaming. It can act as a rogue AP in the ESS.
A bogus MOVE or ADD-Notify might cause an AP to drop all state it has with a STA. Since these IAPP
packets are transmitted over IP, they could be introduced anywhere, from any device that has the necessary
knowledge. This attack can best be eliminated by providing packet authentication to all MOVE and ADDs.
The protection for the MOVEs can be provided by IP Encapsulating Security Payload (ESP) (RFC
2406:1998) pair-wise Security Associations (SA). The protection for the ADDs requires a group ESP SA.
The content of the MOVE can be encrypted by the same ESP pair-wise SAs, protecting it from scrutiny of an
attacker.
The use of ESP with RADIUS for the Key Management provides for discovery of Rogue APs. The use of
ESP for IAPP MOVEs prevents a STA from roaming from a Rogue AP to a valid AP in the ESS. It also
blocks the move of the STA context information to a Rogue AP if the STA roams to it. The RADIUS Access-
Request provides the RADIUS server with knowledge of the presence of a Rogue AP.
2. References
The following standards contain provisions which, through references in this text, constitute provisions of
this recommended practice. At the time of publication, the editions indicated were valid. All standards are
subject to revision. When a standard is superceded by an approved revision, the revision applies.
IEEE Std 802.11, 1999 Edition (R2003) (ISO/IEC 8802-11: 1999), IEEE Standard for Information Technol-
ogy—Telecommunications and Information Exchange between Systems—Local and Metropolitan Area
Network—Specific Requirements—Part 11: Wireless LAN Medium Access Control (MAC) and Physical
Layer (PHY) Specifications.
2,
3
2
The IEEE standards referred to in Clause 2 are trademarks belonging to the Institute of Electrical and Electronics Engineers, Inc.
3
IEEE publications are available from the Institute of Electrical and Electronics Engineers, 445 Hoes Lane, P.O. Box 1331, Piscataway,
NJ 08855-1331, USA (http://www.standards.ieee.org/).