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A
VIEW
OF
THE
DEVELOPMENT OF
THE
CONCEPT
OF
INTELLIGENCE
139
Perhaps there could
be
greater progress in conceptualizing the bases of acquisition
variability
if
we had theorists who were sufficiently
secure
in their psychological
theory to demand that the physiologist make his theory
fit
the psychological data
rather than perpetuating the converse role relationship.
At
any
rate,
to promote
a
strictly psychological theory does not imply
a
rejection of the consideration of
structural change. Maher’s argument that we cannot produce evidence that en-
vironmental change brings about
limitless
physiological change is entirely gra-
tuitous. Why should we need to produce such evidence in order to propose psycho-
logical explanations of
variability
in rate of response acquisition?
Rate
of acquisition
and limits of acquisition are obviously different variables. Perhaps, however,
Maher is falling into confusion produced by the old dilemma that the hereditarians
faced when they tried to state the nature of the variable that was
“set”
by heredity.
Was
it
the rate of the acquisition of material that
is
set,
or
was
it the “level” to
which material could be acquired,
or
was it some interrelationship between the
two variables?
One must agree with Maher’s objection to
podlt
hoc
argumentation. Never-
theless, he will not commit himself to stating that there has ever been
a
teaching-
learning situation where the experimenter would
assert
that he had controlled
the relevant psychological variables. He is careful, in fact, to point out that
at
those times when he finds it difficult to avoid the inference of “low intelligence”
he is
assuming
that the psychological variables
are
controlled. When one pursues
a
psychological theory of differences in rate of response acquisition he will be
expressing his conviction that his goal is to
test
the validity of these assumptions.
Maher, nor any other investigator, is in
a
position to say that he has already in-
vented all the variables that are relevant to these assumptions.
If
the theorist
were to stop his work at the point where he proposes his
post
hoc
argument then
Maher is justified in being critical.
If
one can go on to “point at” other relevant
variables, then there appear to
be
no grounds for criticism.
We can be grateful to Maher, however,
for
delineating the broad issues that
relate to the concept of intelligence:
(a)
Intelligence is
a
concept that evolves from
a
necessity to explain inter-individual variation
in
response acquisition;
(b)
The
necessity of taking recourse to the use of
a
variable that is related to the physical
state of the organism evolves from accepting the assumption that “instruction”
took place under identical motivational and previous training conditions;
(c)
If
one
is
to speak either
of
physical variables
or
of psychological variables he is obli-
gated to produce data on the nature and effect of the variables he wishes to use in
talking about rate of response acquisition;
(d)
Further, one should be cautious
about abandoning the concept of “intelligence” lest he be deprived of
a
useful
predictive variable.
It
is
disturbing, however, to find that
a
modern American psychologist of
Maher’s repute would deduce that the alternative to accepting the “empty
organism” theory (his phrase) is to fill the organism with mysterious nerve func-
tions. This has been an argument that has occupied psychologists far too long,
and
it
is now time that we recognize that there are other alternatives to these
conceptualizations of “intelligence”- the concept which we have evolved to explain
variability in response acquisition. Why does the argument persist in the form that
is
presented by Maher? Why do psychologists hesitate to cut themselves
loose
from