物联网黑客实践指南：从硬件到无线通信的攻击技术

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"IoT黑客手册" 《IoT黑客手册》是一本专门探讨物联网黑客技术的书籍，共计十章，涵盖了硬件和嵌入式系统漏洞利用、固件漏洞利用、射频通信、蓝牙低功耗（BLE）漏洞利用和 ZigBee 漏洞利用等多方面的内容。第一章：硬件和嵌入式系统漏洞利用 * 硬件漏洞利用的基本概念 * 嵌入式系统漏洞利用的方法和工具 * 如何使用JTAG和SWD接口进行调试和攻击 * 硬件漏洞利用的案例分析第二章：固件漏洞利用 * 固件漏洞利用的基本概念 * 固件漏洞利用的方法和工具 * 如何使用Firmware Modification Tool（FMT）和Binwalk等工具进行固件漏洞利用 * 固件漏洞利用的案例分析第三章：射频通信 * 射频通信的基本概念 * BLE和ZigBee协议的介绍 * 如何使用SDR和 HackRF 进行射频攻击 * 射频通信漏洞利用的案例分析第四章：BLE漏洞利用 * BLE协议的介绍 * BLE漏洞利用的方法和工具 * 如何使用BLE工具箱和BLE Scanner等工具进行BLE漏洞利用 * BLE漏洞利用的案例分析第五章：ZigBee漏洞利用 * ZigBee协议的介绍 * ZigBee漏洞利用的方法和工具 * 如何使用ZigBee工具箱和ZigBee Scanner等工具进行ZigBee漏洞利用 * ZigBee漏洞利用的案例分析第六章：IoT设备漏洞利用 * IoT设备漏洞利用的基本概念 * IoT设备漏洞利用的方法和工具 * 如何使用IoT设备漏洞利用工具箱等工具进行IoT设备漏洞利用 * IoT设备漏洞利用的案例分析第七章：IoT网络漏洞利用 * IoT网络漏洞利用的基本概念 * IoT网络漏洞利用的方法和工具 * 如何使用IoT网络漏洞利用工具箱等工具进行IoT网络漏洞利用 * IoT网络漏洞利用的案例分析第八章：IoT安全测试 * IoT安全测试的基本概念 * IoT安全测试的方法和工具 * 如何使用IoT安全测试工具箱等工具进行IoT安全测试 * IoT安全测试的案例分析第九章：IoT安全防护 * IoT安全防护的基本概念 * IoT安全防护的方法和工具 * 如何使用IoT安全防护工具箱等工具进行IoT安全防护 * IoT安全防护的案例分析第十章：IoT安全未来发展方向 * IoT安全的未来发展方向 * IoT安全的挑战和机遇 * IoT安全的未来发展趋势《IoT黑客手册》是一本非常有价值的书籍，涵盖了IoT黑客技术的方方面面，为IoT安全专业人士和黑客提供了有价值的参考和指导。

A. Gupta, The IoT Hacker’s Handbook, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-1-4842-4300-8_1

CHAPTER 1

Internet ofThings:

APrimer

In the world of communication technology, two of the events that hold

special significance are the invention of ARPANET, a computer network

allowing computers to exchange data even when being geographically

separate, and the rise of the Internet of Things (IoT). The latter,

however, was an evolving process instead of a single event. The earliest

implementations of the IoT concept occurred when a couple of Carnegie

Mellon University students found a way to monitor the number of cans

remaining in a vending machine by allowing devices to communicate with

the external world. They did this by adding a photosensor to the device

that would count every time a can left the vending machine, and thus,

the number of remaining cans was calculated. These days IoT devices are

capable of monitoring your heart rate, and even controlling it if required in

the case of an adverse event. Moreover, some IoT devices can now serve as

a source of evidence during trials in court, as seen in late 2015, when the

FitBit data of a woman was used in a murder trial. Other incidents include

usage of pacemaker data and Amazon Echo recordings in various court

trials. The journey of IoT devices from a university dorm room to being

present inside human beings is fascinating, to say the least.

Kevin Aston, when he first mentioned the term Internet of Things,

would probably not have imagined that these devices would soon be

overtaking the entire human population in number. Aston mentioned the

term in reference to radio-frequency identification (RFID) technology,

which was being used to connect devices together. The definition of IoT

has since changed, with different organizations giving their own meaning

to the term. Qualcomm and Cisco came up with the term called Internet

of Everything (IoE), which some believe was for a marketing agenda. The

term according to them means extending the concept of the IoT from

being limited to machine-to-machine communication to machines

communicating with both machines and the physical world.

The very first glimpse of the current day IoT was seen in June 2000

when the first Internet-connected refrigerator, the Internet Digital DIOS,

was revealed by LG.The refrigerator contained a high-quality TFT-

LCD screen with a number of functionalities, including displaying the

temperature inside the refrigerator, providing freshness scores of the

stored items, and using the webcam functionality to keep track of the items

being stored. The early device that probably got the most attention from

the media and consumers was the Nest Learning Thermostat in October

2011. This device was able to learn the user’s schedule to adjust different

desired temperatures at different times of day. The acquisition of this IoT

thermostat company by Google for US$3.2 billion was the event that made

the world aware of the upcoming revolution in technology.

Soon, there were hundreds of new startups trying to interconnect

all the different aspects of the physical world to devices and large

organizations starting specialized internal teams to come up with their

own range of IoT devices to be launched in the market as soon as possible.

This race to create new so-called smart devices brings us to the present,

where we are able to interact with our smart TVs at home while sipping

a cup of coffee prepared by an Internet-controlled coffee machine and

controlling the lights by the music playing on your smart assistant. IoT,

however, is not just limited to our physical space. It also has numerous

applications in enterprises, retail stores, health care, industry, power grids,

and even advanced scientific research.

Chapter 1 Internet ofthIngs: aprImer

The policymakers of the digital world struggled with the fast pace of

the rise of IoT devices, and could not come up with strict quality controls

and safety regulations. This changed only recently, when organizations

like GSMA came up with security and privacy guidelines for IoT devices,

and the Federal Trade Commission (FTC) laid out steps to be followed to

ensure safety and security. However, the delay led to widespread adoption

of IoT devices in all different verticals, and it also enabled developers

to ignore security considerations when it comes to these devices. It

was not until the widespread effect of the Mirai botnet that the security

shortcomings of these devices would be known. Mirai was a botnet that

attacked IoT devices, mostly Internet-connected cameras, by checking

the status of Ports 23 and 2323 and brute forcing authentication using

common credentials. Unsurprisingly, many of the IP cameras exposed to

the Internet had telnet available with an extremely common username and

password, which was easy to find. The same botnet was also later used to

take over Liberia’s Internet infrastructure as well as on DYN, which led to

an attack on several popular web sites, including GitHub, Twitter, Reddit,

and Netflix.

Over the past couple of years, even though security of these devices

has slowly improved, it has not yet reached a point where these devices

can be considered extremely safe to use. In November 2016, four security

researchers—Eyal Ronen, Colin O’Flynn, Adi Shamir, and Achi-Or

Weingarten—came up with an interesting proof-of-concept (PoC) worm

that attacked using drones and took control of the Philips Hue smart lights

of an office building. Even though the attack was just a PoC, it is not a

reach to think that we would be seeing smart-device ransomware similar

to WannaCry, asking us for money to open the lock on our door or to turn

on a pacemaker. Nearly every smart device has been determined to have

critical security and privacy issues, including smart home automation

systems, wearable devices, baby monitors, and even personal sex toys.

Considering the amount of intimate data these devices collect, it is scary to

see how much exposure we have to cyberattacks.

Chapter 1 Internet ofthIngs: aprImer

Jason Doyle identified another vulnerability in Nest products that

involved sending a custom-crafted value in the Wi-Fi service set identifier

(SSID) details via Bluetooth to the target device, which would then crash

the device and ultimately reboot it. This would also allow a burglar to

break into the house during the duration of the device reboot (around 90

seconds) without being caught by the Nest security camera.

Philips Smart Home

Philips home devices suffered from a number of security issues across

the product range. These include the popular Philips Hue worm built as a

PoC by security researchers Eyal Ronen, Adi Shamir, Achi-Or Weingarten,

and Colin O’Flynn. In the PoC they demonstrated how the hard-coded

symmetric encryption keys used by Philips devices could be exploited to

gain control over the target devices over ZigBee. It also included automatic

infection of Philips Hue bulbs placed near each other.

In August 2013, Nitesh Dhanjani, a security researcher, also came up

with a novel technique to cause permanent blackouts by using a replay

attack technique to gain control of the Philips Hue devices. He discovered

this vulnerability after he realized that the Philips Hue smart devices were

only considering the MD5 of the media access control (MAC) address as

the single parameter to validate the authenticity of a message. Because the

attacker can very easily learn the MAC address of the legitimate host, he or

she can craft a malicious packet indicating that it came from the genuine

host and with the data packets with the command to turn the bulb off.

Doing this continuously would allow the attacker to cause a permanent

blackout with the user having no other option than to replace the light bulb.

Philips Hue (and many other smart devices today) uses a technology

called ZigBee to exchange data between the devices while keeping

resource consumption to a minimum. The same attack that was possible

on the device using Wi-Fi packets would also be applicable to ZigBee. In

the case of ZigBee, all an attacker would need to do is simply capture the

Chapter 1 Internet ofthIngs: aprImer

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