least offer a word of methodological advice: namely, that it is wasted effort, contributing absolutely
nothing to the cause of understanding, to spend time wishing that preliterate people had employed a
conception and criteria of knowledge that they had never encountered—a conception, in the case of
prehistoric people, that was not invented until centuries later. We make no progress by assuming that
preliterate people were trying, but failing, to live up to our conceptions of knowledge and truth. It
requires only a moment of reflection to realize that they were operating within quite a different
linguistic and conceptual world, and with different purposes; and it is in the light of these that their
achievements must be judged.
The stories embodied in oral traditions are intended to convey and reinforce the values and
attitudes of the community, to offer satisfying explanations of the major features of the world as
experienced by the community, and to legitimate the current social structure; stories enter the oral
tradition (the collective memory) because of their effectiveness in achieving those ends, and as long
as they continue to do so there is no reason to question them. There are no rewards for skepticism in
such a social setting and few resources to facilitate challenge. Indeed, our highly developed
conceptions of truth and the criteria that a claim must satisfy in order to be judged true (internal
coherence, for example, or correspondence with an external reality) do not generally exist in oral
cultures and, if explained to a member of an oral culture, would be greeted with incomprehension.
Rather, the operative principle among preliterates is that of sanctioned belief—the sanction in
question emerging from community consensus.
14
Finally, if we are to understand the development of science in antiquity and the Middle Ages, we
must ask how the preliterate patterns of belief that we have been examining yielded to, or were
supplemented by, a new conception of knowledge and truth (represented most clearly in the
principles of Aristotelian logic and the philosophical tradition it spawned). A necessary condition, if
not the full explanation, was the invention of writing, which occurred in a series of steps. First there
were pictographs, in which the written sign stood for the object itself. Around 3000 B.C. a system of
word signs (or logograms) appeared, in which signs were created for the important words, as in
Egyptian hieroglyphics. But in hieroglyphic writing, signs could also stand for sounds or syllables—
the beginnings of syllabic writing. The development of fully syllabic systems about 1500 B.C. (that is,
systems in which all nonsyllabic signs were discarded) made it possible and, indeed, reasonably easy
for people to write down everything they could say. And finally, fully alphabetic writing, which has a
sign for each sound (both consonants and vowels), made its appearance in Greece about 800 B.C. and
became widely disseminated in Greek culture in the sixth and fifth centuries.
15
One of the critical contributions of writing, especially alphabetic writing, was to provide a means
for the recording of oral traditions, thereby freezing what had hitherto been fluid, translating fleeting
audible signals into enduring visible objects.
16
Writing thus served a storage function, replacing
memory as the principal repository of knowledge. This had the revolutionary effect of opening
knowledge claims to the possibility of inspection, comparison, and criticism. Presented with a
written account of events, we can compare it with other (including older) written accounts of the
same events, to a degree unthinkable within an exclusively oral culture. Such comparison encourages
skepticism and, in antiquity, helped to create the distinction between truth, on the one hand, and myth
or legend, on the other; that distinction, in turn, called for the formulation of criteria by which
truthfulness could be ascertained; and out of the effort to formulate suitable criteria emerged rules of
reasoning, which offered a foundation for serious philosophical activity.
17
But giving permanent form to the spoken word does not merely encourage inspection and criticism.